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ABSTRACT
The thesis is that Hume and Smith between them outline a new theory
of justice as the foundation for all social and political life.
Justice is a mode of assessing social and political behaviour, the
central point of which is that the motives behind such behaviour
must not have an injurious tendency which would arouse the resentment
of an impartial spectator. This means that they must be in accordance
with a general rule which is negative, telling people what not do to,
and which thus ensures that the behaviour which is allowed as just is
as widely compatible as possible with the rest of the values and aims
accepted at any given time by a society. The latter can only be under¬
stood as they have developed through the interaction of individual men;
and jurisprudence as a critical discipline is, therefore, dependent upon
history and the new "science of human nature".
Justice is dealt with in the context of the general moral philosophy of
the four authors, and it is shown how it stands apart as a negative virtue,
the rules of which are enforcible for negative utilitarian reasons.
In connection with Smith and Millar a major objection to the present inter¬
pretation is cleared away by showing that their view of history was not
economic and deterministic but of such a nature that it allows scope for
natural justice.
Finally, it is shown how Craig changes the doctrine by discarding the
theoretical role of history. This contributes to the breaking up of
the tradition and points towards the new developments in political
thinking in the 19th century.
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The problem from which the present work takes its starting point is
this, How is fundamental legal criticism possible? This becomes a
genuine problem if one rejects the two traditional opposites, natural
law and legal positivism. That the former is discredited both in
its old religious formulation and in its 17th Century rationalistic
formulations I take to be one of the established achievements of
David Hume.''' To maintain that the latter is discredited would be to
go against the general tendency of the legal philosophy of the English
speaking world in the past century and a half. For although a simple
voluntaristic version of legal positivism, such as has often been
attributed to Hobbes, has found it increasingly difficult to find
supporters - even in Scandinavia, some kind of more or less clear uti¬
litarian version of positivism seems to be the most prevalent attitude
to the status of law. Nevertheless, formidable arguments against
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such a position have been put forward. The core of these arguments
is that the utilitarian idea of law is too rationalistic and too
"constructivist"; i.e. it presupposes an amount and a kind of know¬
ledge about men and society, which it is in principle impossible for
any one to have; and this again leads to a measure of centralised
power which may be deemed undesirable and, indeed, may lead in total¬
itarian directions. It is not part of the present work to expound,
or evaluate, this line of argument. My point is rather that anyone
who takes this line, and who rejects traditional natural law theories,
is obliged to give an explanation of how law can be fundamentally
criticised, when the standards for such criticism are neither God-
given nor deliberatley man-made.
2.
My thesis is that the basic elements of a highly original answer to
this problem can be found in an isolated, but internally coherent
tradition of legal thinking. I am thinking of the work of four
Scotsmen: David Hume, Adam Smith, John Millar, and John Craig. The
tradition is isolated in that it has had little influence on legal
thinking - in spite of the mark Hume and Smith have put on other dis¬
ciplines. That it is coherent is to be argued for below. Suffice
it here to point out that it is handed down from older to younger
friend and, with the exception of Hume and Smith, from teacher to
student.
The reasons for studying this particular answer to our problem fall
into three categories. 1) It is of the greatest inherent philosoph¬
ical interest and, modem restatements apart, it is unique.
2) To see it as one coherent tradition and, indeed, to see it as con-
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cerned with our problem at all, is a new (and highly controversial)
perspective from which to see this group of works. 3) Various
unclarities in this body of thought may have been instrumental in the
sudden upsurge of utilitarian legal positivism.
1. The central idea is of justice as part of, but a very special part
of, moral values in general, the criterion for distinction being a
highly original and valuable suggestion for how to distinguish between
4
morality and law. And this suggestion is a clear precursor of
modem ideas of 'negative utilitarianism'.
The general theory of moral evaluation is naturalistic and descriptive,
being part of a general science of human nature. But it is more than
this. For in combining a theory of human needs and human goal-
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directedness with a theory of morality, and in particular justice, as
social institutions, it achieves a set of principles by means of which
law can be critically assessed. And this is done in a way which com¬
pletely by-passes the traditional gulf between normative and descriptive
disciplines - but without any confusions of quasstio de facto and
quaestiode jure.
The tradition does, then, establish a new and original relationship
between ideal "law" and de facto law. And this is indeed a new idea
of the relationship between "history and theory"; for in order to view
justice as a social institution, it has to be seen in an evolutionary
perspective. And in starting these speculations about justice as an
unintended by-product of human action and interaction, Hume even comes
close to exploding the age-old, sharp distinction between natural and
conventional (or artificial) phenomena. But that remains an unful¬
filled promise.
In spite of its unusual foundations, this view of justice allows it to
fulfil many of the critical functions of traditional natural law.
First of all, it is, in a sense, a basic and universal justice. This
is the basis for the criticism of relativist, and particularly posit-
ivist, ideas of law, which we find throughout the tradition. It is
in terms of natural justice that all evaluation of positive laws and
institutions takes place. It leads to a clear distinction between
power and rights; between justice as the ultimate aim and the state and
all positive institutions as mere means; between civil rights and
natural rights.
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2. Such are in my view the philosophical achievements that one can
find in this tradition. It is, however, not exactly an interpretation
which has impressed itself upon the world as the historically correct
one. In fact it goes against much, if not most, established scholar¬
ship. First of all, most scholars are likely to dispute the point
that there is one tradition at all. While one can talk of the Hume-
Smith tradition or of the Smith-Miliar tradition without being too
controversial, to talk of a Hume-Smith-Miliar tradition (no one talks
of Craig at all) seems out of the question. Unless, of course, one
makes the interpretation in so broad categories that every second
Enlightenment figure would fit in. But my interpretation is not meant
to be in such broad categories. It is meant to be the substantial
claim that despite all their differences, our four Scotsmen use very
similar ideas of natural justice as the focal point for their normat¬
ive politics. But there is no denial that there are differences enough
to hide this. There are differences in the evaluation of individual
political institutions and events. And there are significant differ¬
ences in intellectual style, ranging from Hume's and Smith's abstract
philosophical speculations, to Millar's nearly exclusively factual
approach in his sociology and history of law. But, as mentioned
above, part of the thesis to be presented here is that the theory of
natural justice, which we are trying to formulate, establishes a highly
original relationship between the descriptive and the normative
approaches to justice.
It may under all circumstances seem perverse to approach any or all of
our thinkers from a perspective which in some respects comes close to
that of "natural law". The whole "movement" of social thinking in
Scotland in the second half of the 18th Century has often been seen as
little more than a confused overture to the clear-headed utilitarianism
of the following Century. Particularly, Hume has been seen as the
proto-utilitarian, and in no respect more so than in his theory of
justice. Although this idea has noble ancestry in Bentham, I think it
is wrong and one of the main sources of confusion about Hume's moral
philosophy. And in the chapter on Hume I will outline why Hume could
hardly mean the same by utility as Bentham and the later utilitarians
did.
As far as Smith is concerned, one of the strongest - and most well
received - interpretations of late years^ has been that Smith's concern
was more or less exclusively with a science of morals. Part of the
purpose of my treatment of Smith is to show that he had some very
original ideas of how this science could be put to critical, political
use, and that Smith's evaluative standpoint has some more bite to it
than the "contemplative utilitarianism" which has been allowed him on
this interpretation.
Smith's science of morals does, of course, include what is now called
the social sciences, and one of the most popular exercises amongst
scholars for many years has been to show that both Smith and Millar in
this area present a body of doctrine which can only be characterized
as materialism or economic determinism - or at least close approxim¬
ations to it.^ Now, clearly such a reading of Smith and of Millar
is incompatible with the thesis presented here, and I will accordingly
outline my reasons for thinking that such a reading is misconceived.
More particularly, I will try to show how ill founded is the further
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step, which at least a couple of recent scholars have taken,^ namely
to argue that Millar, in particular, often falls out of tune with the
music of the spheres, i.e. the ages, in his normative political pro¬
posals, although he had come very close to the correct score in his
history and sociology - and that he does so because of his own bourgeois
class affiliation. This line of arguing against Millar obviously
reflects on Smith as well - and it opens up the whole question about
the relationship between Smith and Marx: is the latter right that the
former is no more than a representative of English political economy,
who begins to get vague ideas of the "problematic" of historical
materialism? This is well outside the problem area of the present
work, but clearly the truth of my thesis would entail the falsity of
Marx's.
3. The fourth man in our team has received little mention so far.
John Craig is all but forgotten and when he receives a footnote it is
g
for the excellence of his economic work. To my knowledge Craig has
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never before been dealt with as a political thinker, in spite of the
fact that he wrote a massive three volume work which possibly for the
first time incorporated the phrase "political science" in the title.
Craig is, however, of importance. As we will see below, he is in the
direct line of inheritance from Hume and Smith, and he writes so late
that he is able to demonstrate the ability of this tradition to deal
with both the ideology of the French Revolution and the emerging utili¬
tarianism. At the same time he is in a significant sense the last to
carry the tradition: he receives it, and he changes it in a way which
can properly be called its dissolution. This is of inherent interest,
and it is of interest as showing up the deficiencies in the presentation
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of the central ideas of natural justice in Hume, Smith, and
Millar.
Neither of these thinkers wrote a book or even an essay dealing
exclusively with justice and basic law. In Hume and Smith justice
is dealt with in the much wider context of their general theory of
morals - and Smith burnt the manuscript on jurisprudence which would
have solved all our problems. Millar was primarily the legal historian
and sociologist. And not only is the idea of justice with which we
are here concerned rarely, if ever, presented on its own; the contexts
in which it is put forward very often confuse the idea itself. We
are, therefore, engaged, not only in uncovering, but to a certain
extent also in reconstructing a theory. As shown in my criticism of
contemporary scholarship, I do not believe that this work is being
done today; and I also want to suggest, though not to argue in the
present work, that it was not done at the time. For the 19th Century
Hume was a historian, Smith the founder of political economy, and
Millar - in so far as he was remembered at all - the historian of the
constitution. This is, I think, important. For it meant that the
utilitarian radicals got a very wide intellectual Spielraum in polit¬
ical theory, which soon paved a way to practice. That secular idea
of natural justice which might have provided a third force between
conservatism and radicalism was too well buried and too vaguely formu¬
lated. And this circumstance may well have been determining for the
climate in which political theory and discussion has been conducted
ever since.
This 19th Century perspective on the present work is not meant to form
part of the work itself. But it lends a keen sense of importance
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to the identification and explanation of the difficulties which we will
meet in the theory of justice in our four authors.
The treatment of a theme like ours is inevitably incomplete. Although
I have tried to place the theory of justice clearly in the wider philo¬
sophy of the four authors, it is the former and not the latter which
is the main object of treatment. And although the broader historical
perspective is important it is ideas rather than their effects that we
are dealing with. Both limitations do, however, give such work an
appearance of incompleteness. This may in the present case be
heightened by a more specific limitation. It is not part of my thesis
that no one else but Hume, Smith, Millar, and Craig contributed to the
theory of justice with which we are concerned. In the early part of
the tradition it would certainly be of interest to look at both Hutche-
son and Karnes. And, as far as the change and eventual breaking up of
the tradition is concerned, it would be of importance to look into
Dugald Stewart - and not least into what he may have taught James Mill -
as well as into the politics of the Edinburgh Reviewers. And there
may as well be other people of significance as well. It would, however,
seem that this kind of completeness would be the bane of a study like
the present one. The prime task must be to establish the existence
and character of the particular theory of justice in the most central
thinkers. It will then be a somewhat easier, but by no means
uninteresting or unimportant enterprise, to relate other thinkers to it.
A further - and maybe surprising - incompleteness needs explanation.
I have left one source of information untapped, namely a number of
students' notes from Millar's lectures. This is certainly not due to
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lack of interest: these notes give us insight into Millar's views of
areas of law, which we otherwise know little or nothing about; they
give us some ideas about the development of his views; and they are,
for reasons to be given below, of importance for the study of Craig's
Elements of Political Science, as well as some anonymous works. How¬
ever, to make a study of these notes within the framework of the
present thesis is completely out of the question. The bulk of them is
simply enormous. Apart from the notes on the course on English Law,
where only one set is preserved, there are two or more sets on all of
Millar's lecture courses; and all together more than twentyfive sets
are known of. Of these some are fairly modest in size - but then very
often in a more or less illegible shorthand. Some are in one way or
another incomplete, so that various sets have to be collated in order
to establish the general content of a course. And yet other sets are
huge manuscripts of more than 600 handwritten pages. To which must be
added that they stretch over a quarter of a century and show clear
developments and changes of view. And where is a change or an incon¬
sistency between two sets of notes due to Millar, and where to the
student who took the notes? - To sort all this out and give reasonable
answers to such questions is a task of such magnitude that it must
constitute a study by itself. Very little has been done in that
direction so far. Apart from very brief descriptions of the general
theme in the Lectures on Government by Professor Lehmann and Dr.
Medick,^ this vast material has never been in any way structured. So
while such a study would be interesting and of historical importance,
and while its outcome would throw some additional light on the present
argument, we must renounce it here.
CHAPTER II
HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
Section 1. One Theory or Two?
When Hume refused to follow Francis Hutcheson's advice to preach
morality at the same time as he explored its foundations,1 he clearly
implied that his task was a factual and descriptive one. But when he
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added that his own "Metaphysician may be very helpful to a Moralist",
we can take it that he was aware of the principle that "ought implies
can", and that his view of the "cans" was highly relevant for what
view to take of the "oughts". The roots of the latter are given us by
nature in the form of the activating forces in our life, as passions.
In this sense the foundation of morality is private and subjective.
And yet morality as such is something public and objective: it is
that which binds people together and makes a society possible, and in
this function it is dependent upon the existence of a common moral
language.
Hume's task in his moral philosophy is, therefore, completely analogous
to his task in epistemology: to explain how a common world is created
out of private and subjective elements. For, as he expresses it,
"'twere impossible we cou'd ever make use of language,
or communicate our sentiments to one another, did we not
correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook
our present situation", but fortunately, "Such corrections
are common with regard to all the senses". (T. 582;
my ital.).
In order to fulfil this task Hume takes an approach which is both
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psychological and social. On the one hand morality is a matter of the
passions, and hence to be dealt with within the framework of his asso-
ciationist scheme of the human mind. But at the same time the mind is
seen not just as acting, but as interacting with other minds. For
Hume, as well as for Smith, morality is not primarily accounted for in
terms of the person acting and the subject of his action, but in terms
of the reaction of the observer of men's dealings with each other.
^Morality thus arises out of such triadic relationships.
But before we outline how this happens, it may be useful to say a few
words about the relationship between Hume's two main texts on moral
philosophy, the third book of the Treatise and the second Enquiry, as
far as the fundamental features of his theory are concerned.
It has been argued that the two works are fundamentally different, and
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that this shows a significant development of Hume's views : In the
Treatise Hume's problem is how morality is constituted, i.e. what
forces are capable of forming morality, and the approach is accordingly
psychological. But in the Enquiry morality is taken as a given social
fact which has to be described and the function of which has to be
explained. The approach is therefore distinctly social in the
later work, and the whole cumbersome theory of the passions is left
out completely./ This is taken as a sign that Hume was in difficulties
with his original program and, more importantly, that he was beginning
to realize the independence of the various disciplines which had
hitherto been integrated in one comprehensive moral philosophy -
disciplines like psychology, morals proper, social and political dis-
4
ciplines etc. This alleged change from an interest in the individual
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and his actions to an interest in the social effects of his actions,
is further seen as an important step towards the utilitarianism of
Bentham and the two Mills.^
There is much to be said for this line of interpretation. First of
all, it gives the Enquiry an independent value, which is in accord with
Hume's own high opinion about it: it is not to be seen as just a
journalistic venture. Secondly, it makes sense of the obvious differ¬
ences between the two works: The complicated theory of the passions is
left out, and is explicitly declared unnecessary;^ in keeping with
this, the concept of sympathy is no longer used in a strictly technical
sense, but is now and then used interchangeably with fellow-feeling -
although we know from the Treatise that it is not a feeling at all - and
fellow-feeling seems nearly to include the moral evaluation itself;
and finally, the concept of utility seems to be stressed much more
strongly in the Enquiry.
These points do, however, seem to exaggerate the difference between
the two works. Firstly, it is a fatal mistake to overlook that
morality is clearly treated from the "social." point of view already
in the Treatise, and that Hume's whole moral psychology is incompre¬
hensible if the individual is not seen in a social context. This has
already been indicated above, and it will become even clearer when we
come to treat of justice below. Secondly, although it is true that
Hume deliberately left out the theory of the passions in the Enquiry,
this is certainly not a sign of a complete change of the substance of
his theory. For in the very first Section of the Enquiry he states
it as his aim to show the relative role of reason and sentiment in our
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moral evaluations; and Section V, 'Why Utility Pleases', and Appendix
I, 'Concerning Moral Sentiment', show clearly that ultimately they are
passions. In this fundamental question there is thus no change.
And presumably Hume has not been all that dissatisfied with the theory
of the passions in itself, since he republished it in shortened form
some years after the Enquiry had appeared, as A Dissertation of the
Passions.
Whereas the neglect of the theory of the passions in the Enquiry is
real enoughj I think that it is a total illusion to see the later
work as an approach towards the utilitarianism of a later age.
Certainly the word utility is used more frequently, but it means the
same as it did in the Treatise, and - as will be argued below - this
meaning is rather different from what Bentham and the Mills meant.
And the verbal change itself is presumably the kind of difference we
need in order to distinguish between an essay and a treatise.
It does, however, remain a fact that the theory of the passions is
left out in the second Enquiry, and that one of the most central con¬
cepts in this theory, namely sympathy, seems to lose its original and
somewhat technical meaning. This latter is the most significant clue
we have in finding an explanation of the differences between the two
works. It is, however, a clue which we cannot fruitfully follow up
till much later in the present treatment of Hume's moral theory, for
what I want to argue is that it is in connection with a special group
of virtues that Hume's sympathy mechanism fails, namely the artificial
virtues.
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My tentative conclusion is, then, that Hume came to see that he could
achieve the most basic purposes with his theory of morality without
invoking the full detail of his theory of the passions: He could explain
how morality is the cement of social life, in spite of the fact that
it is "merely" a natural growth, and not a set of abstract truths, insti¬
tuted by the reason of God or man and the subject of a calculating
science. Consequently he emphasized the social perspective at the
expense of the psychological for the purposes of the Enquiry. And
this may well have been reinforced by the indicated difficulty in how
sympathy can provide the connecting link between the passions and the
artificial virtues. But it is difficult to believe that Hume should
totally have given up his theory of the passions and their connection
with morality. it seems to me that a false alternative is being pre¬
sented when Hume is said to be either reducing morality (and social
life) to psychology or innovatingly treating morality as a social
phenomenon sui generis and the object of an independent social science.
For the real methodological importance of Hume, as well as Smith, would
seem to be that they begin to treat the theory of the human mind,
ry
y including the psychology of the passions, as part of a social science,
the object of which is the individual in his situation. This is the
reason why the other person and the spectator, plus their actions and
their language are of such importance in Hume's theory of knowledge as
well as in his moral theory.
While the difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry can thus be
taken as a clue to the true nature of Hume's theory of the passions
rather than as evidence of its abandonment, it does make the later work
less valuable for our present purposes. For when he to some extent
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disregards the constitution of the various parts of morality, he takes
away an aspect which - as we will see - is particularly important for
our understanding of justice. The following account is, therefore,
mainly based on the Treatise, although we will not forget the Enquiry.
Section 2. Moral Evaluation
Whenever we as spectators observe other men we only have their actions,
their behaviour to go by, but we take this as a clue to their motives,
and we are more interested in their motives because they are more
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firmly connected with their character or person. And in the end the
objects of our moral evaluations are persons and their permanent
characters.
Our reactions to our fellow men and their activities can be divided
into two broad categories of negative and positive reactions; the
first reaction being pain, the second pleasure. This of course also
applies when we "observe" our own behaviour. Pleasure and pain are
impressions, and they give rise by association to some resembling
impressions. Those new impressions are pride, if the original impres¬
sion was one of pleasure, and if the person concerned, i.e. the object
of the passion, is oneself. . If the object is someone else, the new
impression is love. And if the original impression is one of pain,
the new impressions are humility or hatred, respectively. Finally,
an association of ideas takes place between the idea of the original
cause of pleasure or pain, and the idea of the object of pride or
humility, love or hatred, - i.e. between the quality judged of, and
the person concerned (oneself or some other person).
Pride and humility, love and hatred belong to the so-called indirect
passions, and their formation by means of pleasure and pain is one of
the necessary links in the chain of causes which forms our moral
passions of approval and disapproval. Another vital ingredient is a
^/certain natural rapport between men, a mechanism by which they can
come to take some interest in their fellow-men. Unless such a thing
exists, it is impossible to understand how that "objectivity", in the
sense of "inter-personality", which is a distinguishing characteristic
of morality, can come about. This is what Hume calls sympathy, which
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is not a passion, but a "principle of communication". The central
feature of sympathy is a conversion of an idea into an impression.
Whenever the behaviour of some other person gives us an idea of his
present feelings, this idea is liable to be turned into an impression,
i.e. into an actual feeling of a kind similar to the other person's.
This conversion is liable to happen because we always have a strong
and lively impression of our own self and any feelings, of which we
initially have nothing but an idea, are therefore easily connected
with the self and made our own, i.e. turned into impressions. It is,
however, important to understand the place of sympathy in Hume's
account of our evaluation of people: sympathy does not convey to us
the motive or trait of character which is the object (or rather, in
the person, who is the object) of our evaluation; what we sympathize
With is the effect which this motive tends to have on other persons
(or on the person himself). This effect, or tendency to have certain
effects, is the utility (or disutility) which Hume stresses as a main
determinant of our evaluations - and which is particularly dominant in
the second Enquiry. It is thus sympathy with the utility, i.e.
17.
tendency, of a quality of a character that is the cause of the passion
which constitutes our evaluation; but it is the person with the quality
who is the object of the evaluation.
This concept of utility is obviously of great importance for our under¬
standing of Hume's moral theory. It is, however, more easily under¬
stood in the context of his theory of justice, where it becomes even
clearer that it is significantly different from the idea of utility
which we find in the later utilitarians.
It is not sympathy with utility, in the sense given above, that as such
creates moral approval. There are further complications. Thus,
although it is normally the actions of a person, the actual effects
of his personal qualities, that bring about our sympathy, this is not
a necessary condition. We can sometimes sympathize with the imagined
effects of such qualities, although they may never be allowed to show
themselves in action because of external hindrances. Our imagination
is able to tell us what the effects of the qualities in question would
have been, if the hindrances were removed; this starts the machinery of
sympathy, and that again creates our evaluation of the qualities con¬
cerned. But although it is possible in this way to judge a person
independently of his actual action, or lack of action, it would in prac¬
tice be extremely difficult for men to do so to any large extent, if
they were not supported by general habitual rules about the connection
between motives and behaviour. Such general rules are amongst the
most important means of creating an objective and intersubjective
morality, which is independent of the accidental features of the given
9
situation.
The other important accidental influence on our evaluations - and
indeed on all our impressions and ideas - is the particular situation
in which we happen to be. As with all the senses we have to make
allowance for our twisted perspectives when we judge morally. We are
naturally inclined to have a more lively sympathy with those close to
us in some respect than with other people. But we must remember that
human nature is essentially uniform, and it is therefore possible to
sympathize with any given person. And it is this side of sympathy
that is the foundation for our ability to learn how to judge objectively,
in the sense of inter-personally. For experience will soon teach us,
not only that the same thing appears different to ourselves at different
times and from different viewpoints, but also that our own evaluations
vary from those of others, and that unless we approach each other's
standpoints, it is difficult or impossible to communicate. Under
pressure of the influence of actual spectators, everybody is thus
forced to approach the standpoint of an independent spectator, or a
general rule - and this even applies to our judgement of our own
behaviour.^
I think that the preceding is enough to enable us to state the essen¬
tials of Hume's ideas of moral approval and disapproval, vice and
virtue. Moral virtues and vices are those qualities in a person,
which have a tendency to create such effects as by means of a sympathy,
unbiased by regards to the actual success of or personal relation to
the person judged of, cause a pleasure or pain in the observer - a
pleasure or pain which by association of impressions call forth calm,
as opposed to violent, versions of love and hatred; and the idea of the
person with those qualities is, by association of ideas from the idea
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of the cause of our pleasure/pain, called forth as the object of those
two calm passions just mentioned; and those two passions are what is
properly called moral approval or disapproval, according to Hume.
There are, of course, innumerable qualities in persons that are subject
to moral evaluation, but they can all be reduced to four broad, non¬
exclusive groups: those which are immediately agreeable to ourselves
(i.e. to the person with the quality), or to others; and those which
are useful to ourselves, or to others. * Hume is not in doubt as to
which are the most important:
"I am ... of opinion, that reflexions on the tendencies
of actions have by far the greatest influence, and
determine all the great lines of our duty". (T. 590)
Especially the last group of qualities, those useful to others, is
important, because it comprises the so-called artificial virtues,
including justice.
Section 3. The Motive for Justice - a Dilemma.
As already noted above, actions have a strong influence on men's moral
evaluations. But ultimately they refer to the motive, and through
the motive to the person, behind the action, as the real object of
evaluation. This doctrine of Hume's means that any action at least
partly derives its moral quality from the motive behind it, and he must
therefore be able to show in each individual case what the motive is,
and that it is subject to moral approval or disapproval, in the manner
described above. This task leads to some prima facie difficulties
with certain actions that are normally characterized as virtuous.
Those are the virtues Hume - for reasons to be explored later - calls
artificial. They constitute an enormous complication of his moral
theory, and the explanation of what at first sight seemed an exception,
becomes an outgrowth that dominates the rest of the tree.
Hume clearly indicates the importance of the artificial virtues, and
especially of justice. The treatment of them takes up more than half
of the third Book of the Treatise, and in the Enquiry he virtually uses
them as an introduction to the whole of his theory of the Principles of
Morals; and the second Part of Treatise, Book III, deals with all of
the artificial virtues, but it is called 'Of justice and injustice'.
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Hume opens his treatment of justice as we would expect him to, on
the background of his general moral theory, by asking what the motive
behind just acts is. For since we commonly regard such acts as virtuous,
there must be a motive behind which is the real object of our judgement
(or rather, which makes us judge the person with the motive virtuous).
The most common motive referred to is, of course, a sense of duty or
honesty and Hume explicitly allows that that is the common motive
(T. 479). But as duty can only be understood in terms of justice, and
thus presupposes that justice is a virtue, it is a circular justifica¬
tion of justice: we are back where we started, looking for a motive
which has such a tendency as will, by means of sympathy with its
supposed beneficiaries, give rise to moral approval (and its absence,
disapproval).
Hume considers various alternative kinds of motives as possibly being
behind just behaviour - and he rejects them all. They are; self-love,
regard to public interest and, more generally, benevolence towards
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mankind as such; and finally, benevolence towards the person to whom
justice is being shown. Let us take them one by one.
First, it is clear that self-love per se , or unregulated, is directly
contrary to justice. Or, as Hume has it,
'"tis certain that self-love, when it acts at its
liberty, instead of engaging us to honest actions,
is the source of all injustice and violence". (T. 480).
As to a regard to public interest, this is ruled out as a motive to
justice by the following three arguments. First that there is no
natural connection between public interest and observance of the rules
of justice; they are only connected, as Hume says,
"after an artificial convention for the establishment of
these rules". (T. 480)
And what exactly is meant by that can only be seen at a later stage of
the argument. Secondly, many acts of justice are only a matter between
individuals, without any public interest involved at all. Hume's
example is a secret, private loan.(T. 480-81) Thirdly, it is a
matter of fact that men only rarely have the public interest in mind, .
"when they pay their creditors, perform their promises,
and abstain from theft, and robbery, and injustice of
every kind". (T. 481)
It may be remarked that this last argument seems somewhat beside the
point; for although public interest may not be the motive behind acts
of justice in a society, where you can already talk of creditors,
promises etc., it might still in some sense be an original motive to
justice.
Not even if we broaden the idea of a regard to public interest to a
general benevolence towards mankind, will it carry the weight of being
the original motive to just behaviour. And that for the simple reason
that there is no such thing as a benevolence to mankind. Hume here
introduces a useful distinction between sympathy with mankind, and sym¬
pathy with any given man. As all men are fundamentally alike, we have
an ability for the latter, and thus for coming to feel benevolence
towards any man. But he has to be a concrete man. We cannot sympa¬
thize with abstract mankind as such. (T. 481-82)
The last class of possible natural motives for just behaviour that Hume
considers is "private benevolence, or a regard to the interests of the
party concerned" (T. 482), i.e. the person to whom justice should be
shown. This is obviously implausible, since it is a characteristic of
justice that it is shown to friend and foe alike, i.e. regardless of
personal relations. And, furthermore, benevolence is variable from
person to person (T. 482-83), whereas justice is embodied in a general
rule that does not take into regard who the persons involved are.
The upshot of this first Section on justice in the Treatise is a
dilemma. Justice exists as a moral fact, for we do consider just acts
as virtues. It is a social fact as well, for it is articulated in
rules, which we consider as obligatory. And it is a psychological
fact too, for we do at least sometimes behave justly with nothing but
a regard to justice as our motive. But the existence of all these
facts presupposes as their origin a natural motive, which is morally
approved of, in the manner described at the beginning of this chapter -
and such a motive can not be found:
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"From all this it follows, that we have naturally* no
real or universal motive for observing the laws of
equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance;
and as no action can be equitable and meritorious, where
it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here
an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. Unless,
therefore, we will allow, that nature has established a
sophistry, and render'd it necessary and unavoidable,
we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is
not deriv'd from nature". (T. 483)*^
This is in a way a rather dramatic place in the Treatise. For to say
that something is not derived from nature seems tantamount to saying
that Hume's naturalistic program for a science of human nature has
broken down. And yet Hume thinks that his theory of the artificial
virtues, especially justice, can avoid this difficulty. For he con¬
tinues the passage just quoted, saying that the sense of justice
"arises artificially, tho' necessarily from education,
and human conventions". (T. 483, my ital.)
When something arises necessarily, it can also be explained by means
of that which necessitates it, and that is exactly what he intends
to do.
If we look upon this first Section on justice in isolation, we can, as
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I have pointed out elsewhere, see that it is of quite some methodo¬
logical importance. For it in a way amounts to an argument against
what we would now call a psychologistic explanation of one of the
most central social institutions at all. And in keeping with this,
we see that Hume premises his further discussion with a remark to the
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effect that we have to draw social phenomena into consideration, in
order to find a satisfactory explanation - namely what he broadly
describes as "education, and human conventions". Given the structure
of the Treatise, with its elaborate theory of the passions as the back¬
ground for the moral theory proper, it is only too easy to see Hume's
approach as wholly psychological. And, indeed, much of the problem-
situation he inherited was psychological; I am thinking of Hobbes, and
to some extent also Hutcheson. But this must not lead us to overlook
the fact that the moral sentiments are right from the start accounted
for by means of a minimum of a social framework, namely the spectator
situation, as I pointed out earlier in the present Chapter. And it
is this social or institutional framework that is greatly added to
when Hume comes to the artificial virtues. For whereas his original
problem was how values emerge in a world of natural facts (namely as
a certain set of passions), the difficulties in accounting for the
artificial virtues, represented at first and mainly by justice, forces
him to go one step further back and ask, how certain social phenomena
can emerge in this world, - for he needs those social phenomena to
explain the emergence of a good deal of the values. As far as this
institutional aspect is concerned, Hume was quite undoubtedly very
much influenced by modern natural law theories in Grotius, Pufendorf
and others.^ But his real genius was to combine the strands of his
inheritance into a completely new sort of natural law theory - for,
indeed, he is quite willing to call his idea of justice that, provided
we let him fill in the contents himself. (T. 484) And that is what
he starts doing in the following Section, 'Of the origin of justice
and property'.
Section 4. The Origins of Justice
Given that justice is not established as a moral virtue by means of a
natural motive, Hume, then, takes the approach, that first it must be
shown how justice comes into existence as a social practice, or insti¬
tution, and then he will show how we come to get the proper passion,
called moral obligation, to adhere to it. In other words, he distin¬
guishes between
"two questions, viz. concerning the manner, in which
the rules of justice are establish'd by the artifice
of men; and concerning the reasons, which determine
us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these
ruJes a moral beauty and deformity." (T. 484, the
passage is italicized in ilumc.)
The former question, which is one of our main concerns, takes up nearly
the whole of the present Section, while the latter is not finally
answered till the first Section of Part 111, where he makes the transi¬
tion from the artificial to the natural virtues.
It is important to remember that the whole of Hume's discussion of
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how justice arises as a social institution is itself set in a'social
framework from the outset. He simply points out that man, considered
individually, does not have any ecological niche, and that he is only
able to acquire one by living some kind of social life. The extant
members of the species are thus necessarily social. (T. 485)
The bare minimum of social life is the family society; and that is held
together by sexual and parental feelings. This latter fact might be
taken as an attempt, after all, to reduce this minimal social institution
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to psychological principles. But that clearly won't do, for these
passions are themselves to be accounted for inter-personally; and they
are only socially formative in a more or less hostile environment.
(T. 486).
This minimal social life, which men necessarily must lead, is suffic¬
ient to let justice emerge, and it is justice which creates the possi¬
bility for the development of social life on a larger scale. But
Hume never makes it absolutely clear to what extent justice is estab¬
lished within the family society, and to what extent it only comes
about as a relationship between families. On the one hand he does
say that
"every parent, in order to preserve peace among his
children, must establish the rule for the stability of
possession." (T. 492-93).
But on the other hand he points out that family societies naturally
develop a tribal morality, which includes a strong partiality against
other such societies, (all men are governed by self-love and a confined
generosity - confined to the family). And it is this friction between
tribal societies, that justice has to overcome. (T. 488-89) The
obvious solution is, of course, that the faint beginnings of justice in
the small society have to be transplanted to a larger scale (e.g.
T. 489).
Justice is an absolutely necessary ingredient in any kind of social
life. At least some minimum of it must be present, for justice is,
as already indicated,
"a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the
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concurrence of certain qualities of the human mind
with the situation of external objects. The qualities
of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity:
And the situation of external objects is their easy
exchange, join'd to their scarcity in comparison of
the wants and desires of men." (T. 494)
It will be seen that for Hume the origin of justice is to be accounted
for in terms of challenges to the possession of external goods. The
reason he gives for this is simply that the other kinds of "goods",
as he calls them, namely "the internal satisfaction of our mind" and
"the external advantages of our body" (T. 487) , cannot be of any use
for another person, and they are therefore not matters of dispute.
This seems a little odd, for it seems to restrict Hume's concept of
rights that are protected by rules of justice to property rights.
Now, there is of course no reason why he should not be able to account
for our more personal rights, by simply saying that our concept of
right is extended to include those, when people become more and more
civilized. Nevertheless, it is of quite some importance that he does
not do so, and that he deliberately concentrates his theory of the
origin of justice around the concept of external goods - and with a
reference to what can be of use for people. For it is exactly those
points that Adam Smith takes him to task for, and John Millar follows
Smith in this, as we will see later in this thesis. For Smith, men
are quite likely to try and dominate their fellows just for the sake
of dominating. So in the end this seems to show a certain difference
in the ideas of what kind of creature man is: is he primarily con¬
cerned with bettering his lot, or with dominating his fellows? Be
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that as it may, Hume and Smith would undoubtedly find common ground in
pointing out that bettering one's lot is in fact one of the main instru¬
ments for dominating one's fellow men.
The background for the emergence of justice and society is a combination
of the qualities of the human mind, and the external situation in
which men find themselves. Hume underlines this argument strongly by
showing that if we imagine that either of the two, the qualities or
the situation, be changed materially, then justice would not arise.
In other words, justice is not by nature with man, as man; it is only
with him as man in a special situation.
Those imagined situations are presented both in the Treatise and in
the Enquiry, but like so many of the more spectacular and dramatic
elements in Hume's argument, they are dealt with more extensively and
systematically in the latter work. First Hume asks us to imagine that
our external situation be changed to one of complete abundance in
everything.
"It seems evident that, in such a happy state, every
other social virtue would flourish, and receive tenfold
increase; but the cautious, jealous virtue of justice
would never once have been dreamed of. For what purpose
make a partition of goods, where every one has
already more than enough? Why give rise to property,
where there cannot possibly be any injury? Why call this
object mine, when upon the seizing of it by another, I
need but stretch out my hand to possess myself of what
is equally valuable? Justice, in that case, being totally
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useless, would be an idle ceremonial, and could never
possibly have place in the catalogue of virtues." (E. 183-84)
This situation is in fact taking place in the few cases where things
are abundant in the actual world. Hume mentions the cases of air
and water in most parts of the world. (E. 184; T. 495)
Equally if we suppose that human nature be transformed, so that the
human mind is completely dominated by generosity and general benevolence
to every other man:
"it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in this
case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor
would the divisions and barriers of property and obligation
have ever been thought of." (E. 185)
And again this is a situation which is approached in the real world in
the relations between friends and members of the same family; and it
is an ideal which has inspired "fanatics" with such "enthusiasms"
that they have tried it on a larger scale - only to be taught a lesson
by experience about the "selfishness of men." (E. 185-86; cf. T. 495)
Finally, Hume invites us to imagine the direct reverse of the two
situations quoted above.
"Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever
means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without
regard to former limitations of property?" (E. 186) Indeed not.
And "suppose likewise, that it should be a virtuous man's fate to
fall into the society of ruffians, remote from the protection
of laws and government; what conduct must he embrace in
that melancholy situation? ... He ... can have no other
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expedient than to arm himself, to whomever the sword
he seizes, or the buckler, may belong: ... his
particular regard to justice being no longer of use
to his own safety or to that of others, he must consult
the dictates of self-preservation alone, without concern
for those who no longer merit his care and attention."
(E. 187)
And as the quotations show, those two situations are certainly inst¬
anced in the world in which we live - not least in a civil war.
(E. 187-88)
Taken together the two first imagined situations amount to a descrip¬
tion of "the poetical fiction of the golden age" (E. 188-89;
T. 493-94), whereas the two latter give the elements of "the philo¬
sophical fiction of the state of nature" (E. 189; T. 493). Both
are, of course, "an idle fiction",but they serve Hume well to
underpin his point,
"that 'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd
generosity of men, along with the scanty provision
nature has made for his wants, that justice derives
its origin." (T. 495; cf. E. 188)17
All those reflections lead up to the main problem: how does justice
arise from the combination of human nature and its particular environ¬
ment? Hume's answer is, in a sense, very simple. He simply points
out that men in general are not so stupid that they do not see that
most of the trouble in the world arises when one man makes free with
what is in somebody else's possession. Only "slight experience"
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(E. 195) with this, and "the least reflection" (T. 492) on it, is
required to make men abstain from such violence. But what does this
more particularly mean in terms of the operation of the passions?
It simply means that when men see that acting on self-love-cum-confined
benevolence is self-defeating in the world such as it is, this leads
to a restraint of these "interested passions" - but a restraint in the
sense of a re-direction of them. For those passions will be satisfied
much more easily in a social situation:
"Instead of departing from our own interest, or from that
of our nearest friends, by abstaining from the possessions
of others, we cannot better consult both these interests
than by such a convention; because it is by that means we
maintain society, which is so necessary to their well-
being and subsistence, as well as our own." (T. 489)
Whatever else men may be inspired by, we know that they are at least
under the guidance of the interested passions, and
"'tis certain, that no affection of the human mind
has both a sufficient force, and a proper direction to
counter-balance the love of gain, and render men fit
members of society, by making them abstain from the
possession of others. ... There is no passion, therefore,
capable of controlling the interested affection, but the
very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction."
(T. 492)
Although Hume does not say so explicitly in this context, we must
undoubtedly understand this idea about the interested passion restrain¬
ing itself by finding a new direction, or outlet, in terms of his
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theory of the calm passions. For the passion keeps its identity,
but it gets another emotional strength, through "the least reflection"
on our situation, reflection being one of the things that can make a
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passion calm and strong, but not violent. That he does have this
theory in mind, is also given some support from the fact that he
draws it in, when he returns to the problem of how to make the rule of
justice being observed, in the Section 'Of the origin of government'.
(T. 536-37)
"Slight experience" and "the least reflection" lead us to abstain from
our neighbours' possessions, by making us enter a convention about this,
"a convention enter'd into by all the members of the
society to bestow stability on the possession of those
external goods, and leave every one in the peacable
enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and
industry." (T. 489)
But Hume's idea of a convention must be attended to with much care.
For
"this convention is not of the nature of a promise:
For even promises themselves ... arise from human con¬
ventions." (T. 490; cf. E. 306)
It is difficult to say exactly what Hume means by entering into a con¬
vention, but let me first quote his own description, and afterwards
see what can be made of it:
The convention "is only a general sense of common
interest; which sense all the members of the society
express to one another, and which induces them to
regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe,
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that it will be for my interest to leave another in the
possession of his goods, provided he will act in the
same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like
interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this
common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is
known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and
behaviour. And this may properly enough be call'd a
convention or agreement betwixt us, tho' without the
interposition of a promise; since the actions of each
of us have a reference to those of the other, and are
perform'd upon the supposition that something is to be
perform'd on the other part." (T. 490; cf. T. 498 and
E. 306)
And Hume then goes on to liken this to situations where two men are
rowing a boat, and to the conventions about language and money.
In a way the most natural way to read the passage just quoted is that
men actually express their common interest verbally. But on the
other hand, this would come pretty near to a promise. And, further¬
more, Hume does say explicitly that it is the individual actions of
abstaining from the other person's property that have a reference to
each other. And this reading is also supported by at least the first
of the parallel examples he mentions, namely the rowing of a boat.
So on the whole the most reasonable reading seems to me to be that it
is actually the individual actions that function as signs d»r expres-
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sions of the common interest. The parallel passage in the Enquiry
does not offer much help: both expressions and actions have disappeared
in any recognizable shape:
"if by convention be meant a sense of common interest;
which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he
remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in con¬
currence with others, into a general plan or system of
actions, which tends to public utility; it must be owned,
that, in this sense, justice arises from human conven¬
tions." (E. 306)
At first sight this is a rather trifling difficulty in Hume's idea of
the conventional origin and character of justice. But if we attend
more closely to it, immensely important problems will open up to us.
When Hume begins his account of the convention in the passage just
quoted from the Treatise above, he talks of "a general sense of common
interest; which ... all the members of the society express to one
another" (my ital.); and this universality requirement tallies with
Hume's often expressed view that it is of the essence of justice that
it is a general rule (e.g. T. 497 and 531-33). But both the fact that
the passage just quoted smacks of verbal expression, and something
very close to a promise, and this universality requirement are hard to
reconcile with Hume's repeated insistence that justice is a slow growth
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something developing through the ages. For if justice only is
justice when it is universal within a society, then it seems as if its
institution must happen as one single event, such as our passage seems
to suggest. Yet Hume does within the same paragraph say the following
"Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession
the less deriv'd from human conventions, that it arises
gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by
our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing
it." (T. 490)
No, quite; but then the convention, from which it derives, can hardly
be an event at which "all the members of society express a general
sense of common interest." It is, however, exactly in the light of
this difficulty that it is so interesting to see Hume, later in our
passage, go on to account for the actual moves in the convention in
terms of individual actions between given persons, as pointed out
above. For actions do not carry any implications of universality.
They can act as "an example to others". (T. 498) And if justice is
understood to develop by imitation of examples of it in action, then
we can understand why Hume says that "it arises gradually, and acquires
force by a slow progression".
From what I have said so far, it should be relatively clear that in
this passage about the convention about justice, we in fact have the
indications of two widely different views of the origin of justice.
On the one hand what may fairly be called a rationalistic and contract-
arian view and on the other hand an evolutionary view. On the former
view justice is instituted as a general rule by all the members of a
society. On the latter view it grows out of a practice which slowly
becomes more and more general.
The rationalistic view immediately strikes one as rather un-Humean,
and the evolutionary one seems to be the one borne out by the whole
trend of Hume's discussion. On the background of such an impression
one might try to account for the rationalistic view of the convention
as a mere methodological device for Hume. On such an interpretation
Hume is really saying that the qualities of universality and convention¬
alism make justice a phenomenon, which exists as if it had been insti-
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tuted by men as such a thing, whereas its real origin must be accounted
for by an evolutionary theory.
This is an attractive interpretation, but there is rather little to
support it in Hume's text. First of all, Hume does not say that the
convention is to be taken only as a methodological device, such as he
does with the state of nature. And Hume was in general not the
person who missed a chance to drive a methodological rule home.
Secondly, Hume does give the above mentioned rationalistic indications,
as well as others to be described below, in the run of stating the
efficient causes that lead to the institution of justice. And thirdly,
we would like to see some kind of bridge established explicitly
between, on the one hand, the efficient causes of the evolutionary
strand of the theory and, on the other hand, the "final causes"
(i.e. the functions of justice) imaginarily accounted for by a
rationalistic convention. But no such bridge is established explic¬
itly, and this speaks against Hume's consciously using the rational¬
istic convention as a mere methodological tool.
In order to get any further in this matter, I will first describe what
I am convinced would be Hume's considered view of the origin of
justice. I will then discuss in what sense this justice is artificial
for Hume. And this will enable us to discuss, and maybe to some
extent explain, what I have called his rationalistic indications.
Hume's considered view of the origin of justice must be evolutionary.
He says so emphatically in the Treatise, as we have seen above; and in
the Enquiry, which is otherwise not very specific in those matters, we
have his sketch of how justice and society develop together. (E. 192)
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But let us characterize this theory more closely. As we have seen
already, it accounts for the development of justice in terms of indiv¬
idual acts, which are imitated more and more widely. If we pay at¬
tention to the nature of these actions, we will see that they are
exceedingly simple, being in reality pieces of inactivity - namely the
"abstaining from the possessions of others". (T. 489) All this tallies
with Hume's often repeated insistence that the role of reason is very
modest at the institution of justice (and thus of society): "Vulgar
sense and slight experience are sufficient". (E. 195) For if the
rule for the stability of possession
"be very abstruse, and of difficult invention; society
must be esteem'd, in a manner, accidental, and the
effect of many ages. But if it be found that nothing can
be more simple and obvious than this rule; that every
parent, in order to preserve peace among his children, must
establish it; and that these first rudiments of justice
must every day be improv'd, as the society enlarges: If
all this appear evident, as it certainly must, we may
conclude, that 'tis utterly impossible for men to remain
any considerable time in that savage condition, which
precedes society; but that his very first state and
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situation may justly be esteem'd social." (T. 493)
This idea that only a very low degree of rationality is involved in the
origins of justice is extremely important, for it allows Hume to point
out a nearly paradoxical disparity between causes and effects. The
causes are a presumably immense number of individual actions, which
all are done out of restrained, regulated (or, so to speak, enlightened)
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self-love cum confined benevolence. But the end effect is a set of
universal or general rules, which are absolutely vital for the very
existence of society, and thus for the individual, and which in that
sense have as strong a "natural tendency" to the public good, as
could be imagined but which yet may very easily be directly contrary to
both private and public good in their application to individual cases.
"Judges take from a poor man to give to a rich; they bestow
on the dissolute the labour of the industrious; and put
into the hands of the vicious the means of harming both them¬
selves and others. The whole scheme, however, of law and
justice is advantageous to the society, and* to* every*
individual*." (T. 579; and see also e.g. ib. 497 and 531-
33, and E. 304-306)
The over-all, or long-term, effect of individual men's "selfish"
actions is thus something very far removed indeed from what they did
have, and could have, in mind. The idea of justice "wou'd never
have been dream'd of among rude and savage men".(T. 488) Justice, in
the form of institutionalized general rules, is the effect of individ¬
ual human actions, but they are not intended effects. And this is not
just a doctrine which is implied in what Hume has to say about justice:
it is an explicitly stated idea:
"Those rules, by which property*, right*, and obligation* are
determin'd ... have all of them a direct and evident
tendency to public good, and the support of + society.
This last circumstance is remarkable upon two accounts.
First, because, tho' the cause of the establishment of these
laws had been a regard for the public good, as much as the
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public good is their natural tendency, they wou'd still
have been artificial, as being purposely contriv'd and
directed to a certain end. Secondly, because, if men
had been endow'd with such a strong regard for public good,
they wou'd never have restrain'd themselves by these rules;
so that the laws of justice arise from natural principles in
a manner still more oblique and artificial. 'Tis self-
love which is their real origin; and as the self-love of one
person is naturally contrary to that of another, these
several interested passions are oblig'd to adjust themselves
after such a manner as to concur in some system of conduct
and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending
the interest of each individual, is of course advantageous
to the public; tho' it be not intended for that purpose
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by the inventors." (T. 528-29; italics rearranged by me)
If we first take what is implied by the use of the subjunctive mood
under the first point in this quotation, we get that the cause of
justice is not a regard for the public good, (and that is said explic¬
itly elsewhere: T. 495 and cf. 499), although that is the effect it
naturally tends to. In the latter half of the citation we are then
told that the individual "interested passions" have to "adjust
themselves", and thus form a "system of conduct and behaviour".
And finally, it is explicitly underlined that the whole outcome is "not
intended ... by the inventors".
And later in the Treatise we find Hume adding a clarifying marginal
note. In the text he says that justice, allegiance, the laws of
nations, etc., "are mere human contrivances for the interest of society",
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and then he adds
"The Inventors of them had chiefly in view ... their own
Interest. But we carry our Approbation of them into the
most distant Countreys [sic] § Ages & much beyond our own
Interest." (T. 577)
In other words, one thing is how justice is established, quite another
matter is our relationship to it once it is established.
To see justice in this way, as an unintended consequence of individual
human actions, must be one of the boldest moves in the history of the
philosophy of law. And it is as ingenious as it is bold. For it
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allows Hume to avoid any excessive rationalism, of a Hobbesian kind ;
although justice is a result of human activity, it is not deliberately
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constructed by men. And in this sense Hume avoids the pitfalls of
legal positivism, and keeps the options open for some kind of
"natural law", or basic law, above all positive law. On the other
hand Hume is able to keep the origin of justice well within the natural
world: he is able to specify the specific causes that bring it about,
namely the actions (and interactions) of individual men. He, there¬
fore, has no need for any divine interference - or, for that matter,
for any special moral sense. True to his general empiricist leanings
and to his Newtonian rules of philozophizing he can account for the
origins of justice in terms of well-known and very general human
passions (restrained self-love cum confined benevolence), actions
(prudent abstention from the possessions of others), and interactions
{mutual abstention and imitation).
The idea of social institutions as the unintended effects of human
41.
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actions is in itself a negative doctrine. It merely says what is
not the cause of the institutions concerned. It therefore in a way
just broadens our quest, for we then want to know not only what
actions in fact caused which institutions but also what motivated those
actions. For if we can find those motives, we may find an explana¬
tion of why the intention of creating the institution in question
could not be part of those motives.
Now it is a significant fact that Hume's theory satisfies us on this
point. For he only reaches the conclusion that justice is an
undesigned and unenvisaged institution, after having scrutinized the
causes and after having found what a modest role constructive reason¬
ing has to play in the process.
The idea that some social phenomena are the unintended effects of
human actions is not original with Hume. As F.A. von Hayek has
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pointed out it is in modern times clearly anticipated by Bernard
Mandeville. But Mandeville uses the idea in a rather general sort of
way, without too much attention to the details of the links between
the individual causes and the over-all effect. And, also, he mostly
uses the idea in an economic context, which was of course the context
in which the idea should become particularly famous with Adam Smith.
But the particular boldness in Hume is that he uses it in accounting
for one of the traditionally most central, and in a way most "sacred",
elements in social life at all, namely fundamental law itself, our very
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"sense of justice". It is one of the most important parts of his
philosophical justification for replacing traditional natural law with
a secular and empirical conception of fundamental law, which makes it
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truly "natural" in the sense that it can be accounted for within his
science of human nature and thus be accounted a full member of his
Newtonian universe. And yet it does, in common with traditional
natural law theories, find the roots of justice beyond any rational
human deliberations, and far beyond our present society.
In this last respect Hume's theory is obviously in line with the Common
Law tradition and with Burke. And he would find further common
ground with those thinkers in the stress on the historical development
of justice. But this must not make us blind to the very decisive
difference there is. For Hume would never say that the antiquity of
law in itself justified it. Its historical development would be of
the very highest importance for our understanding of it, and for our
chances of changing (or preserving) it. But it would never be one
of our principles of evaluation. The exact nature of these principles
will be explained below; but it should be pointed out already here
that this balance between the history of law and its theory is one of
the persisting themes all through the tradition with which we are
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dealing, and we will return to it repeatedly.
Section 5. Nature and Artifice
Throughout his treatment of justice Hume is concerned with its meta¬
physical status. As we have seen, he sees it as a main point to show
that it has natural causes and yet he calls it an artifice or contri¬
vance, instituted by men conventionally. The distinction between
nature and artifice seems from the very structure of the Treatise, Book
III, to be of fundamental importance in Hume's moral theory. Part II
43.
deals with the artificial virtues, while Part III opens with his
account of the natural virtues, and then goes on to gather up the
threads of the theory as a whole. But let us see whether it really
is of such importance.
In the first Section of Part II, where Hume has asked 'Justice, whether
a natural or artificial virtue?', and where he has come down firmly
in favour of the latter, as we have seen earlier, he concludes with
the following clarification of "natural" and "artificial" as applied
to justice:
"I must here observe, that when I deny justice to be a natural
virtue, I make use of the word, natural, only as opposed to
artificial. In another sense of the word; as no principle
of the human mind is more natural than a sense of justice;
so no virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is an
inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and
absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be
natural as anything that proceeds immediately from original
principles, without the intervention of thought or reflexion.
Tho' the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary.
Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature;
if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or
even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from
the species." (T. 484)
Two things stand out in this passage; that artificial phenomena are
I
the result of the intervention of "thought and reflexion" and that
they, paradoxically, are natural in the sense that they exist with the
same necessity as everything else in this world - which, of course,
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means that they have natural causes bringing them about. Those two
points naturally presuppose that "thought and reflexion" can be accounted
for in terms of such causes. We of course know that to be Hume's
position, and he explicitly refers to it the first time he in the
Treatise discusses the distinction between natural and artificial in
connection with moral qualities:
"Nature may also be opposed to artifice, as well as to what
is rare and unusual; and in this sense it may be disputed,
whether the notions of virtue be natural or not. We readily
forget, that the designs, and projects, and views of men
are principles as necessary in their operation as heat and
cold, moist and dry: But taking them to be free and entirely
our own, 'tis usual for us to set them in opposition to the
other principles of nature." (T. 474)
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In other words, Hume invokes/methodological determinism to say that
although justice and the like are artificial phenomena, because they
are brought about through the intervention of men's rational powers,
they are yet securely within the orbit of the natural world, because
the activity of the rational powers can in itself be explained by
means of natural causes. And as we have seen, this means that men's
situation in the world is such that "vulgar sense and slight experience"
necessarily brings the "interested passions" to restrain themselves
and thus our behaviour towards our neighbour etc.
This theme, that artificial phenomena have their specific character
because our rational powers are involved in their causation, and that
those powers and their activity are in themselves a link in nature,
turns up again and again. Thus:
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"The remedy [for men's plight in the world] ... is not
deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more properly
speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgement and
understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious
in the affections." (T. 489; and cf. 475, 477, 484, 493,
E. 307).
On closer examination it therefore turns out that the distinction between
natural and artificial, which at first sight seemed so fundamental for
Hume, from one point of view is not very fundamental at all. Artificial
things have causes as natural as any others, and the distinction is,
therefore, in this view, rather verbal. It is accordingly not at all
surprising to find Hume warning us in the Treatise, that "there is
none more ambiguous and equivocal" than "the definition of the word
30
Nature"; and in the Enquiry, that "The word natural is commonly
taken in so many senses and is of so loose a signification, that it
seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not." (T. 474 8 E.
307) And it is with a sense of relief that one reads in a footnote,
that "all these disputes are merely verbal." (E. 308) We must conclude
that Hume, as we would expect, is absolutely intent on keeping nothing
but purely natural, efficient causes in his universe, and in accord¬
ance with this we see him declare in a letter to Francis Hutcheson, to
whom he had sent the manuscript of the third Book of the Treatise:
"I cannot agree to your Sense of Natural. Tis founded
on final Causes; which is a Consideration, that appears to
me pretty uncertain § unphilosophical. ... I have never
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call'd Justice unnatural, but only artificial."
It is clear that Hume is engaged in a discussion of a distinction that
46.
is nearly as old as Western philosophy, the distinction between nomos
32
and physis, the conventional, or artificial, and the natural, and I
think that his immediate inspiration to go into it very likely is
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Hobbes. The negative side of his discussion of it, which we have
now been presented with, seems to lead to the conclusion that it is
really a non-distinction. But nevertheless Hume keeps using the dis¬
tinction and if we take this as an indication that there is some use
for it in one sense or another, we are not all that wrong.
In at least one place Hume takes a somewhat abstract view of artificial
phenomena, represented by justice, not only from the point of view of
their origin, but also from tjie point of view of their characteristics,
once they are created:
"Those rules, by which property*, right*, and obligation*
are determin'd, have in them no marks of a natural origin,
but many of artifice and contrivance. They are too
numerous to have proceeded from nature: They are changeable
by human laws: And have all of them a direct and evident
tendency to public good, and the support of # society. This
last circumstance is remarkable ... because, tho' the
cause of the establishment of these laws had been a regard
for the public good, as much as the public good is their
natural tendency, they wou'd still have been artificial, as
being purposely contriv'd and directed to a certain end."
(T. 528-529)
It is the third and last mark of artificiality mentioned here, I want
to concentrate on. As already pointed out earlier, the subjunctive
mood clearly implies the point which Hume makes explicitly a little
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later, namely that the "aim" of the rules (the public good) was not an
intended aim. But he then goes on to say that even if this had been
the case, the rules "wou'd still have been artificial, as being pur¬
posely contriv'd and directed to a certain end". In other words, it
is the fact that the rules of justice have a purpose or an end, that
makes them artificial. But although the passage clearly implies that
there is a difference between an intended aim and an "aim" that is
just a "natural tendency", Hume never brings this out clearly in his
reasoning about the distinction between natural and artificial. This
is a pity, for Hume is as close as could be to a very important revision
of the distinction between natural and artificial. If he had worked
out what he implies in the passage quoted above, and in his whole
theory of justice as an unintended consequence phenomenon, he would
have seen that there is a third category between natural and artificial,
which shares certain characteristics with both. The things in this
category resemble natural phenomena in that they are unintended and to
be explained in terms of efficient causes and they resemble artificial
phenomena in that they are the result of human action, including of
course rational human action. But it remains a fact that Hume did
not work out such a theory, although he virtually stated the idea, as
we have seen, and although he had a superb example of this third cate¬
gory in his idea of justice.34
In a couple of comparisons Hume is again in effect pointing out that
justice, as an artificial phenomenon, has a rather special status in
this world - but again without saying the decisive things. He com¬
pares property with "the imaginary qualities of the peripatetic philo¬
sophy", and then points out that the only difference is that property
is able to cause moral approval - and it is only able to do so, because
it serves a certain function. (T. 527-28) And in the Enquiry he com¬
pares justice and various "vulgar superstitions"; with the result
that the former "is absolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind
and existence of society", whereas the latter "is frivolous, useless,
and burdensome". (E. 199)
It is clear that what really impressed Hume in what he took to be arti¬
fices, was their goal-directedness, the fact that they had a certain
function. Now, if we take this fact; plus the fact that the tradi¬
tional conception of artifice was that it involved some kind of con¬
structive reason; plus the further circumstance that for Hume "the
intervention of thought and reflexion" did in fact play a decisive
role in the origination of justice - although not as constructive
reasoning aiming at rules of justice, but only as the "vulgar sense
and slight experience" which is sufficient to restrain and re-direct
the interested passions of self-love and confined benevolence in con¬
crete situations; if we take all those facts together, I think it
becomes somewhat more intelligible why Hume fairly frequently slipped
from the evolutionary theory of justice, which we presented above,
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into the indications of a rationalistic view. The troublesome
concepts are those of reason, goal-directedness, and utility. The
level of reason involved in the origin of justice is low, but its
operations result unwittingly in an institution which looks as if it
had involved a very high level of rationality because it is directed
towards a certain goal in the sense that it has a definite function.
The individual actions in which justice originates have one conscious
end, namely a safer satisfaction of the "interested passions", i.e.
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self-interest, but they result in the rules of justice which have public
interest (or utility) as their "end". And this public interest of
course comprises each individual's private interest; but qua public
interest it could originally be nobody's aim and, indeed, it is properly
nothing but a "natural tendency".
I suggest that it is the failure to keep those tangled relationships
quite clear (plus the lack of clarity about the natural/artificial dis¬
tinction) that in some individual cases leads Hume to say things that
are patently inconsistent with his theory of justice. I will take the
more obvious cases:
"The whole scheme ... of law and justice is advantageous to the
society and* to* every* individual*, and 'twas with a view to this ad¬
vantage, that men, by their voluntary conventions, establish'd it."
(T. 579) But surely men could not have had the public advantage in
view beforehand - only the individual (so it seems a little signifi¬
cant that Hume in the margin added the bit about individual advantage).
In discussing the moral character of justice, Hume adds the following:
"Now justice is a moral virtue, merely because it has that tendency
to the good of mankind; and, indeed, is nothing but an artificial in¬
vention to that purpose." (T. 577) And elsewhere: "These rules [of
justice] ... are artificially invented for a certain purpose." (T. 532-
33) Here the same comment applies as above.
Finally, in the Enquiry appears what is nearly the most rationalistic-
sounding passage of all - and exactly in Hume's discussion of in which
sense justice is artificial:
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"Natural may be opposed, either to what is unusual, miraculous,
or artificial. In the two former senses, justice and property
are undoubtedly natural. But as they suppose reason, fore¬
thought, design, and a social union and confederacy among men,
perhaps that epithet cannot strictly, in the last sense, be
applied to them." (E. 307-308. note).
It is rather difficult to square "reason, forethought, design", as well
as the previously quoted long-ranging views and purposes, with that
"vulgar sense and slight experience", that "least reflection", which
we otherwise meet in Hume when he is concentrating on the origin of
justice.
If we turn our attention to the closely connected problem of where
public interest (or utility) comes in, we will also find the occasional
confusion: is it actually part of the original motivation for insti¬
tuting justice, or is it only a "natural tendency" of justice, once
established? Thus Hume says quite clearly,
"that 'tis only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity
of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for
his wants, that justice derives its origin." (T. 495)
But only half a page later he allows unclarity to slip in:
'"Twas therefore a concern for our own, and the public
interest, which made us establish the laws of justice".
(T. 496)
Equally he declares at the outset of his Section 'Of Justice' in the
Enquiry that he wants to show "that public utility is the sole origin
of justice". (E. 183)
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There can, however, hardly be any doubt that passages such as these
are the result of carelessness, for elsewhere Hume is perfectly clear
about the relation between private and public interest in his theory;
e.g.
"Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establish¬
ment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the
source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.
This* latter* Principle* of* Sympathy* is* too* weak* to*
control* our* Passions*; but* has* sufficient* Force* to*
influence* our* Taste*, §* give* us* the* Sentiments* of*
Approbation* or* Blame*." (T. 499-500)
It is here disclosed that public interest comes in when Hume accounts
for the moral quality of justice - a theory which we have yet to describe
while private interest is reaffirmed as the force behind the origin of
justice.
All those occasional tensions between Hume's evolutionary theory of
justice and various rationalistic ideas do, I think, in the end stem
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from the difficulty I mentioned at the outset of this discussion:
on the one hand Hume can only recognize justice as justice in the form
of absolutely general rules, for if there were any exceptions, the
system would break down. But on the other hand, if justice is
created piecemeal by individual actions and imitation of such actions,
then an intermediate state must be possible where individual acts,
that are later recognized as being just, are able to gain ground
without justice existing in the form of general rules, for those rules
are the outcome of the individual acts of that particular kind gaining
ground.
We are thus referred back to the individual actions that lie behind the
origin of justice. Hume took these to be the acts of re-directed
self-interest (self-love and confined benevolence), but has not been
able to show that people would actually be able and willing to imi¬
tate such "enlightened" self-interest - except on the implausible
presupposition that virtually everybody at once did so. In other
words, if the whole evolutionary theory is to function properly, some
kind of change must be made in the explanation of the actual behaviour
that unintentionally leads to establishment of justice - and that is,
as we will see later, exactly Adam Smith's achievement.
Section 6. Property
Hume has tried to account for the origin of justice by means of the
idea of external possessions. Originally justice is, as we now under¬
stand, the kind of behaviour men exhibit when they keep away from the
possessions of others. This renders these possessions a certain
stability, and stabile possessions protected by justice is what we
call property. Thus the idea of justice gives rise to the idea of
property.(T. 490-91) The question is, however, which possessions
are turned into property under the protection of justice. In his
usual dialectic way, Hume only reaches his own conclusion by way of a
couple of impossible alternatives: Since the ultimate justification
for the rules of justice, as we will see later, is the kind of public
utility which is able to call forth our moral approbation, it might
be thought that the possessions which justice protects, and thus turns
into property, would be those which would yield the maximum public
use, i.e. those in the hands of men who would be best suited to use
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them for the common good. (T. 502, E. 192-93) But this cannot possib¬
ly be the case; for first of all it is not an unequivocal criterion
which would single out a particular person for particular pieces of
property; and secondly, men's ideas of who are fit for what possess¬
ions are
"liable to so many controversies, and men are so partial and
passionate in judging of these controversies, that such a
loose and uncertain rule wou'd be absolutely incompatible
with the peace of human society" (T. 502),
and thus with the very "purpose" of the rules of justice.
The second possibility that Hume considers is that "real" justice only
protects possessions when they are equally distributed among men, such
as the Levellers claimed. (E. 193-94) But this is also impossible.
First of all, men are by nature so different that even if equality had
at some point been reached, inequality would immediately crop up again.
And secondly, as far as the origin of justice is concerned, one could
not imagine anyone having the sufficient power to distribute property
equally. And as to the normative side of the Levellers' doctrine, it
would be highly dangerous to try and make a reality of it, for it
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would inevitably require a tyranny. (E. 194)
The outcome of Hume's discussion of this point is, then, that the
possessions which justice is introduced to protect cannot be required
to be redistributed in any way, for that would require a power which
nobody in fact can have, and/or a unanimity which is not present.
And if anybody tried to act on the opposite assumptions, it would
wreck the possibility of a social formation.
Hume's own solution is that the introduction of justice cannot possibly
do more than ratify de facto possession. (T. 503) Apart from the
negative arguments given above, Hume points out that men are slaves of
habits and custom, so that they develop a greater affection for what
they in fact have in their possession than for anything else. And
this makes it rather obvious for them to expect the rules of justice to
protect this de facto possession. In a long footnote he makes his
meaning a little clearer. Although there are "motives of public
interest for most of the rules which determine property" (T. 504)
and although, as we know, "vulgar sense and slight experience" (E. 195)
is enough to give men such motives, Hume still finds reason to "suspect,
that these rules are principally fix'd by the imagination, or the more
frivolous properties of our thought and conception". (T. ib.)
And he then goes on to invoke his principles of association, pointing
out that the relation between a man and his possessions is such that
the mind naturally tends to connect them, and the new relation called
property is therefore nothing but an underpinning of an already existing
relation:
As property forms a relation betwixt a person and an
object, 'tis natural to found it on some preceding relation;
and as property is nothing but a constant possession, secur'd
by the laws of society, 'tis natural to add it to the
present possession, which is a relation that resembles it."
(T. 504-505, note; and cf. E. 195-196)
Present possession is thus the circumstance that explains the original
emergence of property through the introduction of the rules of justice,
and it remains also in developed society one of the sources of
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property. Hume then calls it occupation. (T. 505-507) But as he
points out (T. 505) , this is obviously too impracticable and inflex¬
ible a rule to be the only source of property in a changing and
developing society, and the principles of prescription, accession and
succession therefore naturally develop. In all these the rules have
a background in the natural operation of the imagination, but what the
imagination yields is frequently rather vague and contradictory from
case to case, and there is thus bound to be a strong element of
arbitrariness in such rules. Where obvious analogies or considera¬
tions of utility fail, civil law comes in and supplements natural law.
(E. 196)
In those short sketches it is clear that Hume is not only concerned
with explaining some fundamental principles underlying law as it is
found in present society. He is quite as much interested in showing
that, given man's nature and situation, fundamental law must be a
phenomenon with an evolutionary background. For the reasons already
given, some kind of stability of possession must be developed. This
in itself gives rise to a new situation which requires the articula¬
tion of this fundamental rule in the more specific rules about prescrip¬
tion etc., which again requires interference by civil law and statutes.
In the same manner necessity and convenience naturally lead to the
rule about the transference of property by consent, (T. 514-516,




In the Treatise Hume makes a special study of promises, the aim of
which is to show that just like "justice in general" (T. 518) promises
constitute an artificial institution, and that the attendant virtue
of keeping one's word is in that sense an artificial virtue. This
is an extremely important discussion, for it is one of the few clues
to Hume's views on obligation, and thus to the moral quality of the
laws of justice in general, i.e. their character as natural law.
Just as in the case of justice, Hume begins by pointing out that there
is no natural motive to keep promises. (T. 516-18) The general
motive is a sense of duty or obligation, but that presupposes a promise
by which the obligation is incurred. (T. 518) What precisely this
means cannot be seen till we come to treat Hume's theory of obligation
below. Till then we must take it as a premise for his further argu¬
ment, which is that we will first have to explain how promises can
emerge as a social institution, and then show how our moral obligation
to keep promises arises out of that.
His account of the emergence of promises is closely parallel to his
account of how the fundamental law of justice arose, as he himself
points out. (T. 519) On the one hand the reign of the interested
passions over men's minds makes it very difficult for them to come to
trust each other. (T. 519-20) But on the other hand their situation
is such that it is rather necessary for them. For although they may
have developed a certain stability of property, and even the idea of
transferring it by consent, it will still not be possible for them to
transfer such property as is "absent or general" without the institution
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of promises and contracts .
"One cannot transfer the property of a particular house, twenty
leagues distant; because the consent cannot be attended with
delivery, which is a requisite circumstance. Neither can
one transfer the property of ten bushels of corn, or five
hogsheds of wine, by the mere expression and consent; because
these are only general terms, and have no direct relation
to any particular heap of corn, or barrels of wine." (T. 520)
And equally the exchange of services is impossible. (T. 520-21)
Under the pressure of this situation, individual men will in particular
situations see the advantage of taking the risk of trusting another
man, and this other man will very likely see it as in his interest to
prove himself trustworthy. For if he does not, he cannot expect ever
to be trusted in the future and he would therefore cut himself off
from a co-operation that is necessary for him. This danger arises
because promises have to be expressed and this verbalisation of one's
resolution makes it public:
"When a man says he promises any thing, he in effect
expresses a resolution of performing it; and along with
that, by making use of this form of words, subjects him¬
self to the penalty of never being trusted again in case
of failure." (T. 522, and cf. E. 199-200, note)
It is thus not the resolution that creates a promise, for that is just
our natural motive. It is the use of signs, or expressions, to pub-
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licise the resolution that creates the promise because it creates a
new motive, namely the fear of not being trusted by our fellow men in
case of non-performance. And as the signs used are artificially
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invented by men, we see that promises are artificial phenomena as
well. (T. 522)
Just as in the case of justice there are certain rationalistic ele¬
ments in Hume's much shorter account of the origin of promises. Thus
he talks of the "institution" of promises and he clearly thinks of
promises as created deliberately for a certain purpose. But on the
other hand he stresses that the purposefulness and deliberation is of
the very low rationality sort which only arises in concrete situations.
(T. 522) And it is also clear that the emergence of promises is
just another step in the gradual articulation of the laws of justice,
for it is only the logic of situations where property already exists
and where slightly more complicated social relations are under way,
that creates a real need for the institution of promises. It must,
however, be made quite clear that in his treatment of the origin of
promises, Hume does not give us the kind of clarifying comments that
he does in connection with the origin of justice about the relation
between men's intentions and the overall result of their actions.
What we would have expected him to point out is that men unwittingly
create a new institution when they sufficiently often, in individual
instances, out of self-interest take the chance of trusting their
neighbour's word, and that this new institution is such that it auto¬
matically creates a new self-interested motive for keeping one's word,
namely the fear of "never being trusted again in case of failure".
Although he never says this explicitly, it is clear that he has all
the materials for saying so. And on the background of what he does
say in the parallel case of the origin of the fundamental idea of jus¬
tice, there can hardly be much doubt that this would be his opinion,
if challenged on the point.
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Section 8. Obligation
As we noted at the beginning of the present treatment of Hume's theory
of justice, this theory is really made up of two parts: a theory of
the origin of justice, and a theory of the moral quality of justice.
So far we have only dealt with the former. Not until we have gone
through the latter and seen how it is integrated in Hume's general
account of moral evaluation, will we be in a position to appreciate
how important the fundamental division of the theory of justice into
the two parts is.
Hume's general theory of morals is mainly concerned with explicating
moral good and bad, virtue and vice. And so it is not surprising to
find that when he, at the end of his Section 'Of the origin of justice
and property' in the Treatise, turns to the question of the moral quality
of justice, he formulates it as "Why we annex the idea of virtue to
justice, and of vice to injustice". (T. 498) He does, however, have
a theory of obligation as well, which is completely in line with his
general theory. And although he does not say very much about it it
is both so clear and so important that I think it most convenient to
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approach his ideas of the moral quality of justice (including promises)
through it.
Hume opens one of his most important paragraphs on obligation by stat¬
ing the principle that ought implies can:
"No action can be requir'd of us as our duty, unless there
be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or
motive, capable of producing the action." (T. 518)
We can only be under an obligation to do actions the motives for which
are within the range of natural human motivation. He then goes on to
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spell our what this means for our idea of obligation:
"This motive cannot be the sense of duty. A sense of
duty supposes an antecedent obligation: And where an
action is not requir'd by any natural passion, it cannot
be requir'd by any natural obligation; since it may be
omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the
mind and temper, and consequently without vice." (T. ib.)
In other words, we have an obligation to perform an action,
1) if the motive for this action is a natural human motive (this is the
principle that ought implies can, and it is a necessary condition for
obligation), and 2) if our non-performance of the action is a sign
that we are missing a quality in our character (and consequently a
motive for the action) which it is a "defect or imperfection in the
mind and temper" to be missing. What Hume means by "defect or imper¬
fection" is strongly indicated on the previous page:
"All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any
action or quality of the mind, pleases us after a certain
manner, we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non¬
performance of it, displeases us after a like manner, we
say that we lie under an obligation to perform it." (T. 517)
The imperfection, of which the non-performance of an obligation is a
sign, is thus a quality which is subject to a certain kind of dis¬
pleasure, namely a displeasure which is similar to the pleasure which
accompanies our perception of virtue. But now we know from Hume's
general exposition of the emotional background to moral evaluation,
that this latter pleasure arises in conjunction with a peculiar indirect
passion which is closely akin to, and in a way nothing but a corrected
61.
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version of, love and which we call moral approbation. And this, of
course, leads us to expect that the displeasure in question here arises
in conjunction with the indirect passion which is akin to hatred and is
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known as moral disapprobation. That this is what Hume intends is
strongly supported by a short treatment of obligation much earlier in
the Treatise:
"When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human
nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that
principle*, may hate himself upon that account and may
perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense
of duty,...". (T. 479, my ital.)^
If we put all those pieces together, we can see fairly clearly what
Hume's theory of obligation was. Obligation has to be seen on the
background of the natural and common qualities of human character and
the accompanying motives. If a man either lacks a certain quality, or
in a particular situation does not have the common or natural motive, he
may yet perform the action which this quality and motive would have
lead him to do if he had had it. For he may see that if he looks upon
the situation as men commonly and naturally do, i.e. as an impartial
spectator, then he will come to hate himself, in the sense of dis¬
approve of himself, if he does not perform the action. Whereas, on the
other hand, he will be pleased with, i.e. approve of, himself if he
does perform. And in this consists the sense of duty:
"A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper, is
still pleas'd to perform grateful actions, and thinks
he has, by that means, fulfill'd his duty." (T. 479) And
"Tho' there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our
humanity wou'd lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the
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immorality of the omission arises from it being a proof,
that we want the natural sentiments of humanity. A father
knows it to be his duty to take care of his children: but
he has also a natural inclination to it. And if no human
creature had that inclination, no one cou'd lie under any
such obligation." (T. 518-19)
It will be noticed that I have above interpreted Hume's obligation as
making up for motives which are natural and common. This latter
description was used to indicate Hume's view that the natural principles
in the human mind have conventional expressions and that these can vary
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from time to time, and from place to place. In this way it becomes
possible for him to reconcile the idea of a basically uniform human
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nature with the facts of historical and geographical differences.
Also, we must not be led to believe that the regard to what is natural
and common in our idea of obligation makes obligation the same as
respectability. Although our idea of obligation is formed under social
pressure, it only becomes moral obligation proper when the situation
is viewed objectively and impartially - exactly as in all moral evalua¬
tion in Hume. This is a vital step in Hume's argument, but its full
import can only be appreciated after we have analysed the role of
history, and the idea of utility.
What we have presented so far is, however, only part of Hume's theory
of obligation. For it is evident that as the theory stands above, it
can only explain how a sense of duty can make up for natural motives,
and thus why we have an obligation to perform natural virtues. But
what we are particularly interested in is the obligation to perform
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artificial virtues. One can formulate the problem about these virtues
in the following way. There are no natural motives to perform them,
i.e. no motives which do not presuppose their existence as social
practices, as we have seen. But this means that the non-performance
of them does not indicate any natural " defect or imperfection in the
mind and temper". Accordingly one does not naturally come to hate
oneself for not performing them, and therefore there does not
naturally arise any sense of duty to perform them. It is this situa¬
tion which forces Hume to embark upon his detailed theories of how the
rules of justice (including the institution of promises) emerge from
men's individual, self-interested actions and how they, once in exist¬
ence, are maintained through the same (but redirected) self-interest.
And from this basis he is to explain how we come to attach a moral value
to them. We can thus see how the whole plan is well suited to convey
the idea of justice as something developing, as a natural growth, in
the sense that it is non-arbitrary and has natural causes in man's
nature and situation; and as an unintended growth, in the sense that
it is not rationally planned in any of the major turns of its develop¬
ment.
How do people come to hate themselves - and, of course, others - for
not acting in accordance with the rules of justice, and thus to develop
a sense of duty on top of the interest they have in such behaviour?
In one central paragraph Hume invokes his principle of sympathy. He
first points out that as society grows larger, the self-interested
motive to observe the rules of justice grows fainter for the individual,
where his own matters are concerned: a single exception to a so
wide-ranging rule does not seem to do much harm. But this tendency
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is countered by the sympathy we have with others when they are being
treated unjustly by some third person, as well as by the resentment we
feel when we ourselves are the subject of injustice (this latter could,
of course, be construed as spectator-sympathy with ourselves):
MTho' in our own actions we may frequently lose sight of
that interest, which we have in maintaining order, and may
follow a lesser and more present interest, we never fail
to observe the prejudice we receive, either mediately or
immediately, from the injustice of others; as not being in
that case either blinded by passion, or byass'd by any
contrary temptation. Nay when the injustice is so distant
from us, as no way to affect our interest, it still displeases
us; because we consider it as prejudicial to human society,
and pernicious to every one that approaches the person
guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy;
and as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions,
upon the general survey, is call'd Vice, and whatever produces
satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue;
this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil
follows upon justice and injustice." (T. 499)
By and by those individual cases of sympathy, and consequent moral ap¬
proval/disapproval of just/unjust actions, grow into a general rule which
"we fail not to extend ... even to our own actions". And this exten¬
sion is supported by the fact that "we naturally sympathize with others
in the sentiments they entertain of us". (T. ib.) With this last
point Hume is undoubtedly thinking of our ability to become spectators
of our own actions and thus to come to evaluate them (or, rather, their
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motivation) by sympathy with their effects (or, more correctly, their
tendency). All this seems very clear and we readily allow Hume to
draw his general conclusion:
"self-interest is the original motive to the establishment
of justice, but a sympathy with public interest is the
source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue."
(T. 499-500)
But if we ask how we are to get the moral obligation to justice out of
this account, we get into difficulties. For exactly what motive is
missing if we behave unjustly? What motive do we come to hate our¬
selves for not having? It cannot be the sympathy with public
interest, for sympathy is nothing but a principle of communication and
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not a motivating force, as we have seen. The obvious answer is that
the motive is the one which we come to approve of through sympathy
with its effect (or tendency). Now, the effect (or tendency) is the
public interest. But the motive? Well, as long as the sense of
duty is not established yet the only motive is self-interest. But as
we know that the motive is only taken as an indication of a quality of
character when we evaluate morally, and as it is hardly likely that
Hume thought self-interest, as a general character trait, morally
approved by men (which, of course, does not entail that it is generally
disapproved); the conclusion must be that there is no motive which we
could come to hate ourselves for not having. It thus seems as if
Hume fails to give us the motive which could form the link between the
interested motivation for just behaviour and the moral obligation to
such behaviour. He does, however, not fail us completely. For if
we turn to his treatment of promises again, we will find sufficient
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indications to allow us to fill in what is missing to make the theory
coherent:
"The difficulties, that occur to us, in supposing a moral
obligation to attend promises, we either surmount or elude.
For instance; the expression of a resolution is not commonly
suppos'd to be obligatory; and we cannot readily conceive
how the making use of a certain form of words shou'd be
able to cause any material difference. Here, therefore,
we feign a new act of the mind, which we call the willing
an obligation; and on this we suppose the morality to
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depend." (T. 523, first italics mine)
If we draw in what we know from the case of justice, we can put the
following interpretation upon this. When promising, motivated by
self-interest, becomes a regular behaviour and when we through
sympathy with its beneficial tendency come to approve of this be¬
haviour, then the natural tendency in men to see behaviour as an
expression of motives and motives as expressions of qualities of
character, leads them to imagine that there is a natural motive (and
thus a character trait), namely the willing of an obligation, behind
promises. And it is thus this imagined motive they, through sympa¬
thy, come to approve of. And when they find that they, for very good
reasons, do not have this motive themselves, they come to hate them¬
selves, and this self-hatred creates the sense of duty to fulfil
their promises. Or in other words, certain actions done out of a
morally neutral motive (self-interest) have on the whole so good
consequences and seem so clearly aimed at those consequences, that
men naturally come to imagine that there is a specific motive for the
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actions which directs them towards those consequences. They naturally
come to approve of this non-existing motive and to hate themselves for
not having it. And this self-hatred is the magic formula, for it
constitutes the real moral motive to do justice and fulfil promises,
viz. our sense of duty.
Let me stress that this suggestion about the imagined motive is a con¬
struction of mine. I put it forward for the following reasons.
1) It is needed at a vital turn in Hume's argument, namely the develop¬
ment of moral obligation out of interested motivation. 2) There is
the quoted indication of such a view - and it seems quite a strong
indication, when read in this context. 3) The idea is in line with
Hume's general position, that moral approbation is about motives and
through them about persons. 4) And it is in line with his general
idea of obligation as self-hatred for lack of a motive.^
Section 9. Two Difficulties
The whole preceding account of the moral value and obligation of the
artificial virtues in general and of justice in particular makes one
significant presupposition. It is taken for granted that Hume's theory
can account for how we sympathize with those who benefit from the use¬
ful tendency of these virtues, once they have been established as
social institutions in the way described earlier. But it seems to me
that this is precisely what Hume's theory is not able to do. It is
self-evident from Hume's description of the sympathy mechanism that
we can only have sympathy with specifiable individuals. It may be
virtually any man, however strange, but it has to be a concrete,
individual man. But this condition is clearly not fulfilled with the
artificial virtues, and particularly not justice. Here the useful¬
ness is for a group (even an open-ended group) of non-specific persons,
and it may not even be present for those of them whom one knows as
concrete persons. This in a way is the whole point in the distinction
between the natural and the artificial virtues: whereas the former
are useful in each individual case, the latter need not be.
This failure in the theory of sympathy to provide a necessary step in
the theory of moral evaluation is not only of significance in itself.
It also seems to me to be the most obvious reason Hume could have for
leaving the technical concept of sympathy behind when he came to
write the second Enquiry, and instead bring in the broad concept of
fellow-feeling which "solves" the problem in that it does exactly not
require the concreteness of object which the sympathy of the Treatise
does.
As indicated in the first Section of the present Chapter, this diffi¬
culty - serious as it is - should therefore hardly be taken as a more
or less complete breakdown of Hume's original theory of the connection
between the passions and morality, but rather as the occasion for
renewed speculation. And the Enquiry constituted some such specula¬
tion.
Whether Hume was content with this speculation we do not know, but
Adam Smith was not. Although we do not have direct evidence for
this, I suggest that it is a fruitful perspective on Smith to see his
ideas of situational propriety, which we will discuss in the following
Chapter, as an attempt to connect the two strands of Hume's theory of
justice, the origin of justice and the moral value of justice, into one
theory and thereby solve the difficulties in each of these two parts.
The difficulty in the former part, the origin of justice, is the one
we pointed out at the end of Section 5 above, viz. that Hume fails to
spell out the details of how the spread of just behavioural practice is
psychologically possible. And the difficulty which Smith saw in the
latter part of the theory, the moral value and obligation of justice,
can, I suggest, be formulated as the following dilemma. Either moral
value and obligation have to be accounted for in terms of sympathy
(Treatise solution), but that requires a concreteness of object which
is just not present in the case of justice in the "anonymous" society,
i.e. the society beyond the family group; or they are accounted for
by means of "fellow-feeling" (Enquiry solution), which avoids this diffi¬
culty, but which is so optimistically forward looking, and in that
sense rationalistic, that it is not to be found in ordinary men, but
is rather a philosophers' speculation. How Smith retained the con¬
creteness of the Treatise without running into Hume's difficulties,
and how he thus avoided the second horn of the dilemma, the excessive
reliance on the "tendency of affections" (TMS, I, i, 3, § 8),
will be part of the theme for the next Chapter.
Section 10. The Role of History
"Men are mightily addicted to general rules" (T. 551), "they cannot
even pass each other on the road without rules", yes, "it is impossible
for men so much as to murder each other without statutes, and maxims,
and an idea of justice and honour." (E. 210-11) This ability and
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tendency to create rules by following a uniform pattern of behaviour
is a basic feature of human life, and we have now seen how it gives
rise to some of the most important rules of all, namely the fundamental
"laws of nature". These laws are not in any way derived from state¬
ments about human nature, they are caused by certain elementary features
of human nature, when the latter is placed in a world like the
present one. And because men have an ability to balance long term
interest against short term interest, they come to be bound by the
rules they themselves happened to bring into being and the rules, there¬
fore, in a sense win a certain independent status. This is further
increased when the rules get a moral quality. This moral quality is
also not "derived" in any mysterious sense from descriptions of man's
nature. It consists of a set of indirect passions, which men (in
contrast to animals: T. 326) have a natural ability to come to feel
when they are exposed to certain causal circumstances. What Hume is
proposing is, therefore, an (intendedly empirical) hypothesis about a
possible sequence of causes and effects, the end-result of which is
far beyond the plans and intentions that any individual could have.
As laws they are laws without a legislator. As social institutions
they carry all the marks of being an "artificial invention" in spite
of their wholly "natural" causes. They are universal, or general,
in the sense that they do not allow of any exceptions. They are thus
"impersonal", because they do not take into regard the individual
merits in a given case. (T. 531-32) Which is again just another way
of saying that they do not allow of any overriding values - a point to
be explored more closely below. The same is shown by the fact that
they, unlike the natural virtues, do not allow of any degrees. They
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are absolutely precise and sharp and "property, and right, and obliga¬
tion [and therefore justice] admit not of degrees".(T. 530; see the
whole paragraph pp. 529-31) The result of following these rules is
the establishment of an over-all order, called society. For justice
and society are coinciding (T. 492-93), yes, justice is "of all circum¬
stances the most necessary to the establishment of human society."
(T. 491)
It is difficult to understand Duncan Forbes's remark that if
"Hume caught a glimpse of a very real alternative:
order coming into things without the deliberate construction
of some mind ... , he did not carry this insight into
social philosophy".^
For it would seem that his whole theory of justice is a major example
of just this insight, as I have argued above. And, as Forbes him¬
self so excellently points out, it is in his social philosophy that
Hume is more Newtonian than the Newtonians in ruling out all talk of
final causes and in insisting on a clear "bracketing off of the natural
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from the supernatural". Nevertheless, Forbes is quite right in
cautioning us not to read a thoroughgoing social evolution into Hume's
texts and see this as the central thing for him.^ And he is equally
right in insisting that Hume "still subscribed to the classical idea
of the Legislator creating social order out of chaos"^* - provided we,
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with Forbes, understand "chaos" as still a social situation, and not
any kind of state-of-nature situation. For in reminding us of those
two points, Forbes forces us to face two decisively important questions.
What is the relation between Hume's theory of justice, as stated above,
and historical evolution? And what is the relation of justice to other
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values that men could invoke - or in other words, in what sense is
justice a fundamental law for men?
I have argued that Hume's conception of justice was evolutionary, but
this must not be understood to mean that he put forward a theory of
how justice did in fact evolve. His argument is firmly rooted in his
theory of human nature. But on the basis of this he shows that just¬
ice is such a kind of phenomenon that it must necessarily have an evolu¬
tion behind it. In a way his argument could be said to be negative:
he tries to show that justice is neither the effect of a separate
faculty in the human mind, nor a deliberate construction of human
reason, and he does this by showing that it is a necessary by-product of
men's natural responses to their situation in the present world. He
is thus not writing the history of justice, but he is showing that
given the ever-present features of human nature (self-love and confined
benevolence) and the equally universal features of the world (relative
scarcity), justice must have a history and this history must be a
purely natural one. But the theory does clearly not say anything
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about what course this development takes in particular cases. Thus
not only the question of who owns what is contingent, (T. 502) but
one would also imagine that the very idea of what kind of things could
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count as property would be variable and subject to development.
The same point, that Hume's theory is of such a design that it fairly
clearly points out the place of history, without itself being a histor¬
ical theory, is brought home to us when we attend to the moral quality
of justice. This arises through sympathy from the utility of just
acts, as is the case with all the social virtues. (E. 214-15) But
if we look at this concept of utility, it turns out to be more a frame
work or principle than a concept with a concrete content:
"Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation.
This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation.
But, useful? For what? For somebody's interest, surely.
Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our approba¬
tion frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be
the interest of those, who are served by the character
or action approved of." (E. 218)
But obviously this interest is extremely variable, and the concept of
utility must be equally so. This is a rather important point, for
it shows the room for improvement in morals and thus the role of
knowledge. The better people understand human nature and its situa¬
tion, the better will they be able to see what men's true interests
are (given their basic passions of self-love and confined benevolence)
and to evaluate accordingly. One of Hume's finest examples of such
revaluation in the light of improved knowledge is the case of luxury:
"Luxury, or a refinement of the pleasures and conveniences
of life, had long been supposed the source of every corrup¬
tion in government, and the immediate cause of faction,
sedition, civil wars, and the total loss of liberty. It
was an object of declamation to all satirists, and severe
moralists. Those, who prove, or attempt to prove, that
such refinements rather tend to the increase of industry
civility, and arts regulate anew our moral as well as political
sentiments, and represent, as laudable or innocent, what had
formerly been regarded as pernicious and blameable." (E. 181)55
We must agree that
"Hume's 'general psychology' is concerned with the function
and mechanism, not the content of mind, which is various and
supplied by social and historical circumstances.""^
And this conclusion allots philosophy, criticism (in the broad, Humean
sense), and history their proper functions. What I have been con¬
cerned with is to show how the "general psychology" itself leads to a
demand for historical evolution in the case of justice. Whether
Hume's historical and "sociological" writings fit the bill is not part
of my proposed problem in the present thesis.
Section 11. Utility and Natural Justice
We have already been brought a long way into the second large problem
that was suggested by Duncan Forbes, namely in what sense justice is
a fundamental law for men. There are certain difficulties with such
an interpretation which we must now face. We know that justice gains
its moral character through sympathy with its utility and that this
leads Hume to maintain that the force of the obligation to be just
tends to be proportional to the utility. This clearly indicates that
justice is not so fundamental that it cannot be overruled by other
values. And it thus appears that Hume comes down firmly on the side
of utility, with justice as more of less an epiphenomenon, a mere
function of utility. The matter is, however, much more complicated
than that. For we must remember that the utility in question is the
public utility, which on an enlightened view comprises each individual'
private utility and which the individual takes part in by means of
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sympathy. This means that justice can only be overridden if it is no
longer of public use. But as justice is the very cement of social
life, this can only happen in the most extreme cases where society is
threatened with dissolution from "external" pressures:
"Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever
means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without
regard to former limitations of property? Or if a city
beseiged were perishing with hunger; can we imagine, that
men will see any means of preservation before them, and
lose their lives, from a scrupulous regard to what, in
other situations, would be the rules of equity and justice?
The use and tendency of that virtue is to procure happiness
and security, by preserving order in society: but where
society is ready to perish from extreme necessity, no
greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice;
and every man may now provide for himself by all the means
which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit." (E. 186.
Cf. e.g. the parallel case of international law, T. 567-
569)
In other words, only where the public interest cannot be affected can
other motives, like prudence or humanity, take over from justice.
The connection between the general rules of justice and the public
utility they create is so close that only in very few circumstances
does it allow of exceptions. But the connection is obviously an
empirical matter, or at least that is Hume's intention, and the task
for his philosophical politics is to show men this connection. With
a better understanding follows a stronger obligation and in this way
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Hume's new science fulfils much the same function as political propa¬
ganda and parental indoctrination (cf. T. 500-501, E. 214) for those
who can understand it. And these latter become the "moderate men" in
whom Hume invested so much hope for the future. Only when men are not
so informed do they become "a kind of political fanatics", like the
levellers (E. 193), and start acting against the laws of nature on the
basis of their own evaluations.
If we now look closer at the kind of utility that is involved, i.e. the
public utility, we will see that Hume's view also on this point is
rather complicated and unusual. When he presents his account of how
justice gains its moral quality, he does so by showing how injustice
is a vice. (T. 499) Men have a strong tendency to sympathize with
the effects of injustice and accordingly to disapprove of it. Implied
in this is, apparently, that just behaviour is what is left when injustice
is ruled out. Justice is, so to speak, a negative virtue and "We may
often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing
nothing", as Smith was later to express the idea. Only when justice
is done under difficult circumstances do we directly and actively
approve of it as more than the absence of injustice. This negative
form of the rules of justice means that they in a way only say some¬
thing about what is not to be done: don't infringe on anybody else's
property; don't break promises, etc., but nothing is said about the
rights that are protected in this way. The property and the contract
that are protected and only exist by means of the rules of justice can
be used for any purpose one wants, as far as justice is concerned.
And of course such actions can be subject to further general moral
evaluation, but that is outside the scope of justice. Now this means
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that the interest that justice promotes and protects is not any con¬
cretely specifiable one. It is simply the sum total of individual
interests that are compatible within a society, i.e. which are not un¬
just. And this is the public interest (which, through sympathy, is
the ultimate cause of our moral approval of justice):
"as the self-love of one person is naturally contrary to
that of another, these several interested passions are
oblig'd to adjust themselves after such a manner as to
concur in some system of conduct and behaviour. This
system, therefore, comprehending the interest of each
individual, is of course advantageous to the public".
(T. 529)
This again means that the laws of justice are useful in the sense
that they serve as a weans to an end, the ends being the public interest.
But this idea of "means-utility", as we could call it, is clearly
different from the idea of utility which we find in the later utili¬
tarian theorists. For them utility is more or less identified with
pleasure or happiness of a kind, and it is thus the end towards
which actions should aspire.
This distinction between means-utility and end-utility is extremely
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valuable, but it is very doubtful how clearly Hume himself saw it.
If we stick narrowly to the way in which he uses the concept of
utility, it may appear as clearly the means sense. When he talks of
the public interest as useful to the private, the content of the
latter is clearly irrelevant. It may, of course, be pleasure or
happiness; but that is another matter which lies outside the utility-
justification of justice. For as far as justice is concerned, all
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that can be said about the individuals' ends is that they must be
compatible, i.e. that they are not unjust: that is the public inter¬
est .
And it is not just in connection with justice that Hume uses the means
sense of utility. When we morally approve of a character trait
because of its tendency to promote the interests of another person, in
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the way described above, this is clearly means-utility.
"Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end."
(E. 219)
And it is obviously this means-utility which makes possible the "cor¬
rection" of our impressions, so that we as "a judicious spectator"
can judge morally, i.e. impartially, about our servant as well as
Marcus Brutus, and aesthetically, i.e. impartially, about the forti-
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fications of any city.
But all this clarity is rather blurred by Hume's constant reference to
the happiness which these various "means" tend to create. There is,
of course, nothing wrong in talking of means and ends together. But
in the absence of a direct clarification of the concept of utility it
does make one wonder how clearly Hume saw the consequences of his
dual uses of it. And when we come to deal with Adam Smith we will
still be kept wondering about this problem.
In view of the strong presence of the means sense of utility it is,
however, clearly misleading to say that Hume's moral theory in general,
and his theory of justice in particular, is utilitarian, for this
label is unambiguously connected with the end-utility of Bentham and
the Mills. For Hume the moral justification of justice, or the cause
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of our approval of it, is that it creates a "system of conduct or
behaviour" which allows the optimal pursuit of individual interests
which is compatible with living together in a society. Exactly what
relevancy the content of these individual interests has for his argu¬
ment is the doubtful point.
But it must be stressed that this does not preclude that we can give
further moral evaluations of just acts, for all those individual inter¬
ests which pass the test of justice, i.e. which are not unjust, may
cause all sorts of other moral feelings. We may thus find that
although an action is just, in that it does not transgress the laws of
justice, it is yet wanting in benevolence, or, on the contrary, that
an action is unjust, and yet humane. But the point is that such
further moral evaluations are irrelevant as far as justice is concerned
and therefore outside the law, because they do not affect the public
interest as this has been defined above. Only when the public inter¬
est is out of the picture, "where the society is ready to perish from
extreme necessity" (E. 186), can other moral and non-moral evaluations
replace justice.
When is an action then just, according to Hume? The simple psycho¬
logical answer is, when it is the expression of a character trait which
on the whole has a tendency to be useful as a means towards another
person's interests which we can appreciate through sympathy. But in
a way the circumstances under which this sympathy can take place is
the really important and interesting thing. It can only take place
from an impartial point of view, i.e. it must not be dependent upon
the particular persons involved. But this again is tantamount to
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saying that the action must be in accordance with a general rule:
anybody should be able to be willing to do it. This is, however, just
another way of saying that the action, or at least the motive behind
it, should be compatible with the highest possible number of other
aims in the society or group concerned, otherwise not "anyone", or as
near as possible to "anyone", would be able to be willing to do the
action. This is the significance of our "correcting" the particular
perspective from which we in each case judge of the actions of other
people as well as our own actions, so that we can take our stand in
the shape of "anyone", or the judicious spectator, as Hume more ele¬
gantly expresses it.
This way of formulating the central points in Hume's theory of justice
allows us to shed yet another ray of light on the role of history in
a Humean discipline of natural jurisprudence. If one of the central
tests of justice is the maximization of compatibility of aims, in the
way outlined above, then clearly knowledge of the "aims" which pervade
in a society at any given time will be of decisive importance. Such
knowledge would be contained in a natural history of the society, and
particularly a natural history of its law. It is exactly in this
sense that we can read Hume's point about the importance of de facto
possessions at the establishment of the rules of justice. If de facto
possessions were not respected as they happened to have developed in
a given society, then many more persons' aims would be thwarted than
was in fact the case with the rules of justice. This does, of course,
not mean that people actually calculated in this way. What it does
mean is that if anyone came in doubt about the justice of the rules,
then knowledge about the existing conditions (de facto possessions)
would be decisive in order to settle his doubt. What I suggest is
that we can read this as Hume's model for how to determine any question
of justice. And it would seem that this model extends well beyond
problems of justice: it explains Hume's respect for the importance of
the given situation for the evaluation of any social phenomenon, whether
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a past, a present, or a proposed future one.
All those reformulations of Hume's points lead us to show how his extra¬
ordinary combination of descriptive and normative disciplines completely
bypasses the usual "is/ought" problems as far as justice is concerned.
The whole point in Hume's denying that there is a state of nature is
that man's aims ard aspirations always exist in a context of other
men's aims and aspirations. This means that the normative question
of what to do always arises, so to speak, piecemeal: what can I do,
given all the other things which I and everyone else want to do?
Moral justifications can never be ultimate; they must take their start¬
ing point from a given social value-system. Such a system must
always be present where men are: at the very least there must be the
will to live and propagate and the confined benevolence amongst the
members of a family. But when this is the case the normative question
of what to do will never arise as a question of ultimate justification.
It is impossible for us to say whether an action or rule of action is
just in an absolute sense. All we can do is to check its justice,
given all the other aims and values we hold - and each of these can
again be checked in the same piecemeal fashion. In a sense this is
a coherence theory of moral validity, but it should be remarked that
a very firm link to nature is provided by the natural "aims" or
strivings of human nature.6^
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We can now see that the evolution behind justice and law does not as
such lend it any further weight. The antiquity of law does not in
itself make it obligatory. It is, therefore, misleading to see any
close relations between Hume's theory and the traditionalist justifi¬
cation of law which we find in e.g. the Common Law theoreticians, the
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Whig tradition, and in Burke, as has been suggested. In a sense
Hume is closer to the modern natural law theoreticians in claiming
that there are certain universal tests for justice. But he is quite
unlike them in letting the given system of values in a society play an
important role in these tests. Hume's theory is built around a
distinction between the origin and the moral value of justice, and his
treatment of the former gives a superficial affinity with the tradi¬
tionalist approach, his treatment of the latter a nearly as super¬
ficial affinity with natural law.
The alternative of historical justification or natural law is not the
only one which becomes obsolete in Hume's theory. The same applies
to natural law versus a positivist foundation for law, as has already
become clear. Natural justice is neither a set of eternally valid,
substantial laws; nor is it a deliberate human construction. It is,
rather, a few universal test principles, which necessarily refer to
the existing value system in a society. The implication of this view
would seem to be that justice is neither totally relative (to society,
age, class, or whatever), nor absolute in the sense that it is spelled
out in definite rules - although, given the world and human nature as
they as a matter of empirical fact nearly universally are (relative
scarcity and confined benevolence), the basic rules of justice will
take the form explained by Hume: "the stability of possession, .. its
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transference by consent, and ... the performance of promises. (T. 526)
But natural justice as such seems to be a kind of directive ideal, some¬
what in analogy with the way in which truth can be said to be a direct¬
ive ideal in our search for knowledge. And the search for justice
becomes a process without any natural end point - at least as long as
mankind remains an "inventive species" with ever new kinds of behaviour
to be tested for their justice.
Section 12. The Contract
Althouth all the above mentioned implications seem to follow clearly
enough from Hume's theory as he stated it, they are obviously well
beyond his own speculations, at least as these have come down to us in
his writings. It may, therefore, be appropriate to round off this
discussion of Hume's view of justice by seeing how it is used by him
as politically fundamental. This can, I think, be summed up in two
points: natural justice is both logically and temporally prior to civil
society and civil law.
It is logically prior in the sense that it is the ultimate rationale
for the existence of governments (i.e. civil society): it is to admin¬
ister it that governments are instituted and maintained. (T. 537-38,
E. 205) All civil law contains those essential elements of justice,
adapted to the particular social and historical situation:
"all questions of property are subordinate to the authority
of civil laws, which extend, restrain, modify, and alter the
rules of natural justice, according to the particular conven¬
ience of each community. The laws have, or ought to have, a
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constant reference to the constitution of government, the
manners, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the situa¬
tion of each society. ... What is a man's property? Anything
which it is lawful for him, and for him alone, to use. But what
rule have we, by which we can distinguish these objects?
Here we must have recourse to statutes, customs, precedents,
analogies, and a hundred other circumstances; some of which
are constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary.
But the ultimate point, in which they all professedly
terminate, is the interest and happiness of human society."
(E. 196-198; last set of italics mine.)
If we did not already know the special meaning Hume gives "the parti¬
cular convenience" and "interest and happiness of human society", and
if we did not pay attention to the "constant and inflexible", this
would sound like pure legal positivism. But when we do know that
there is a universal core of natural law which cannot be modified
away by socio-historical circumstances, we will not be surprized to
see that Hume clarifies his position here and states that natural law
can, if necessary, be used to criticize positive law:
"If the ideas of justice, sometimes, do not follow the
dispositions of civil law; we shall find, that these cases,
instead of objections, are confirmations of the theory
delivered above [i.e. that the foundation of justice is
utility]. Where a civil law is so perverse as to cross
all the interests of society, it loses all its authority,
and men judge by the ideas of natural justice, which are
conformable to those interests." (E. 197, note)
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That the fundamental rules of justice are prior to civil society in
time is equally obvious. First of all, they are a spontaneous growth
which, as we have seen, necessarily accompanies even the most primitive
human life in family groups and is a necessary condition for the ex¬
tension of the latter:
"The state of society without government is one of the most
natural states of men, and may* subsist with the conjunction
of many families, and long after the first generation. ...
But tho' it be possible for men to maintain a small unculti¬
vated society without government, 'tis impossible they should
maintain a society of any kind without justice, and the ob¬
servance of those three fundamental laws concerning the
stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the
performance of promises." (T. 541)
But not only are the laws of justice obligatory "antecedent to gov¬
ernment" (ib. ) , and not only is the protection of them the very
rationale behind government; the institution of governments is directly
dependent upon justice or, more particularly, promises.
Hume's idea is simply that in order to institute government, men have
to become obliged to obey it. But in a non-civil society the only
thing that conveys such obligation is the natural law about promises.
And accordingly men have to bind themselves to their government by a
promise. (T. 541) In so far as this is the case, the Whig tradition
is right that there is an original contract. (T. 542) But he then
goes on to state his famous argument that this does not mean, as the
Whig tradition thought, that all governments only gain their legit¬
imacy through promises. For once government is established it carries
its own obligation, without any influence from promises and contracts.
(T. 542-553) This part of Hume's argument is, however, beyond our
interests here. What is of relevance here is the idea that natural
law, by means of promises, is basic to the institution of all govern¬
ment.
To get a proper understanding of Hume's idea of the original social
contract it is important to remember that he clearly conceives this
contract to take place not only after, but as a result of, certain
social developments. He first points out that as a fairly sophisti¬
cated social life is quite possible without government, he will
"assert the first rudiments of government to arise from
quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among
those of different societies." (T. 539-540)
And he then adds a rather significant reflexion:
"A less degree of riches will suffice to this latter
effect, than is requisite for the former."
What is implied in this sentence is, of course, that governments, as
we know them, seem to have the protection of property as one of their
main tasks. But on the one hand property-accumulation on a large
scale must be a late growth in society, (cf. T. 541) and on the
other hand the "rudiments of government" are known in societies that
had not developed so far. Accordingly another cause of the insti¬
tution of government than internal conflict over property must be
found, and Hume proposes "international", i.e. inter-tribal, conflict.
In such conflicts there will necessarily be a war-leader, and although
he loses his authority in peace-time, the experience with
87.
"This authority ... instructs them [the members of the
tribe] in the advantages of government, and teaches them
to have recourse to it, when either by the pillage of war,
by commerce, or by any fortuitous inventions, their
riches and possessions have become so considerable as to
make them forget, on every emergence, the interest they
have in the preservation of peace and justice." (T. 540)
What Hume is pointing out in this argument is that men already before
the actual institution of governments have the opportunity of exper¬
iencing the public interest in some kind of leadership, so that when
they come to transfer this leadership from the conduct of war to the
administration of justice (ib. 541), they do it on the background of
this experience. And the fact that the public interest is involved
and understood, of course, ensures that the promises of allegiance
automatically carry both the interested and the moral obligation to
make them efficient.
If we take the original contract to be the effect of a development -
and a long one: "many years must elapse" etc. (T. 541) - then it
becomes much more plausible and much more in line with Hume's general
theory of the evolution of justice. And it demonstrates to us how
fundamental the natural law of justice is.
CHAPTER III
SMITH'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
Section 1. Hume and Smith on Sympathy
Turning from Hume's major philosophical work, the Treatise, to that of
Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, is in most ways a somewhat con¬
fusing experience. On the one hand there are all the similarities in
the problems dealt with and the theories proposed, the criticisms
and alignments of predecessors, and there are the recurring, more or
less clear references to Hume himself. On the other hand there is a
significant change in the tone and style of the discourse. While one
could say that Hume is constructing an abstract theory with its own
language, and trying to accommodate common experiences and their lin¬
guistic expressions within it; Smith is trying to accommodate an abstract
theory within the conceptual framework of ordinary language - or at
least with a minimal stretching of it. And this is presumably one of
the reasons why Hume scholars find it difficult to find much profund¬
ity in Smith, and why Smith scholars may tend to think that Hume's pro¬
fundity was bought at the cost of empirical content and relevance.
Nor is the difference just linguistic and stylistic. For it is pre¬
cisely Smith's complaint against Hume that his theory of morals was a
philosopher's construction which did not catch human morality as it is,1
a complaint which we will have occasion for returning to in the present
chapter.
Smith's use of the word "sympathy" is a prime example of the advant¬
ages and of the dangers in using ordinary language for theoretical
purposes. On the one hand we all understand it to some extent, but
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precisely because of this it is difficult for us to get at the tech¬
nical twist Smith gives it. Or, in sympathy with Augustine's diffi¬
culties with time, we seem to know what it is as long as we don't ask
Smith. Nevertheless, there seems to be some considerable consensus
among many of the most distinguished commentators on one point, namely
that Smith's concept of sympathy, whatever it be, is radically differ¬
ent from that of Hume. It is, therefore, with some hesitation that I
suggest that there are some striking structural similarities between
the theories of sympathy in our two philosophers and that the equally
striking differences come about because Smith broadens and generalizes
2
Hume's idea.
One key to the problem of sympathy in Hume and Smith seems to be to see
it as a problem of causation. When we have two similar passions and
one is said to be the effect of sympathy with the other, or the sympa¬
thetic reflection of the other, what does "sympathy" stand for? Hume
narrows his answer to a fairly simple psychological process in the
first instance: When a man perceives the expressions of a passion in
another man, he forms an idea of this passion on the background of his
own earlier experience and this idea is turned into an impression, i.e.
into a passion similar to the original one in the other person, by the
enlivening presence of the impression of the spectator's self. This
psychological process is the starting point for all evaluation, but in
order to create a proper moral or aesthetic evaluation, the sympathet¬
ically created passion has to be "corrected" in the light of the
situation in which the original passion and its expression occurred.
As we have seen in the previous Chapter, this is the way in which
objective evaluations come about.
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What Smith does is simply to broaden the causal factors in the creation
of the sympathetic reaction of the spectator to include the situation in
which the original passion and its expression occurred. According to
him the situation is not just a secondary and corrective factor. It
is not just the perception of the expression of another man's passion
that sparks off our sympathy. It is true that this may be the case to
some extent with fairly simple passions which do not point beyond the
person who has them, such as joy or grief, (TMS, I,i,l,§6 § 8)
but even in those cases the sympathy is rather imperfect until more is
known than the mere passion (or, rather, its expression. TMS, ib., §9).
Certainly more is required in the case of the morally more relevant
passions which point towards, or involve, other men (ib., § 7). The
cause of sympathy is, rather, the whole set of circumstances in which
the passion occurs, the situation:
"Sympathy ... does not arise so much from the view of the
passion, as from that of the situation which excites it."
(TMS, ib., §10)
This is extremely important, for it shows a distinction between the
object of sympathy, which is another man's passion, and the cause of
sympathy, which is the whole situation that gives rise to the original
passion. And this again shows that the original passion is only a
contingent part of the whole process. The causes may, for some reason,
have failed to produce the original passion and yet they may produce
the sympathetic passion in the spectator. Hence the possibility that
the spectator can say what the original passion should have been accord¬
ing to his view of the situation. Smith illustrates this very impor¬
tant idea by some well-known non-moral cases: the sympathy we can feel
with the affliction of being an idiot, although the idiot may be per-
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fectly happy; the sympathy a mother will feel for her sick baby's
future, although the child does not have the slightest possibility of
knowing anything about its future; and, the most extreme case of all,
our sympathy with the dead, although every possibility of feeling any
passions at all is ruled out for them. (TMS, ib., §§ 11, 12, 13)
Now, this account of the causes of sympathy is clearly different from
Hume's, but it is equally clearly compatible with it. For all Smith
is doing, so far, is to point out that the cause Hume singles out,
the perception of expressions of passion, is insufficient in itself
and far from universally present when the effect, namely sympathy, is
present.
Hume's theory makes actions and their motives in a sense forward-looking,
and accordingly we judge of them under this viewpoint. Motives and
actions are seen as aiming at certain results, intentionally or unin¬
tentionally, and moral judgements in a way consist of estimates of
their merit in this regard. By contrast, actions and their motives
are backward-looking for Smith; they are reactions to a situation.
And it is in this view we judge of them, as proper or improper to the
situation. This change is of consequence not only for the contents
of moral theory, as we will see below, but also for its epistemological
status or, rather, for the epistemological status of moral judgments.
On Hume's own epistemological terms moral judgment must in the end take
its beginning from an illusion for it starts with imagining the essen¬
tially private and inaccessible reaction of one man to the action (or
motive) of another. It is based upon a kind of analogical "inference"
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called sympathy; and it is upon this that the situational "corrections"
are superimposed, thus creating moral (or aesthetic) judgment proper.
This is significantly changed in Smith, for in taking moral judgment
as primarily a problem of fitting the action judged of to its situa¬
tion, Smith switches the problem of knowledge on to the situation.
To be able to judge is to be able to know the situation and hence the
ideal of the impartial and informed spectator. This is obviously an
advance in the explanation of the communal character of our moral
world; for at least parts of the situation will normally be open to
the public view and the whole exertion of sympathy makes as much of
the situation as possible common between spectators and the person
principally concerned. In other words, in Smith's view moral judg¬
ments have a much broader empirical basis already as their starting
point than they have for Hume.
Smith is able to put this to good theoretical use, for the view of the
situation as the primary basis for moral judgment allows him to make a
rough division of situations and their attending sentiments according
to their normal accessibility to spectators through sympathy. This
is what he is doing in Part I, Sec. ii of The Theory of Moral Senti¬
ments. Thus it is e.g. difficult for us to enter into passions
arising from another's body (ib., ch. 1) and it is more difficult
with those which have internal causes, than with those which have
external causes which we can see (ib., 1, § 10). Equally, it is dif¬
ficult for a spectator to get sympathetic understanding of passions
which are somehow unique for the person concerned (ib., ch. 2),
such as love (2, § 1). But though we are unable to go along with the
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particular passion, we know its general type and this enables us to
enter into all the surrounding or attending passions. Love
"interests us not as a passion, but as a situation that
gives occasion to other passions which interest us".
(ib. 2, § 2)
Smith then goes on to discuss three much more important categories of
passions; the unsocial, the social, and the selfish. These we can all
enter into, i.e. understand, by sympathy, and his main theme is to
what extent we can sympathize with them in the sense of approve of
them as proper. (This is in a way the main theme of the whole section
but it forces him to treat of the theme we are interested in here, the
accessibility of the various kinds of passion.)
Hume's explanation is in terms of the chain of association. Smith
uses the broader "imagination". But obviously it would have been
quite possible for Smith to explain the function of imagination by means
of association. Presumably he did not do so because it for his pur¬
poses would have been an unnecessary detail in the general theory.
Be that as it may, there are some striking parallels in the further
details of the two theories. For Hume, the sympathetic feeling arises
when we expose ourselves to the influence of the expression of the
original feeling and although it resembles the original, the sympa¬
thetic feeling is our own as spectators since it comes about through
the enlivening influence of the impression of the self. Whether or
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not this can be described in modern psychological terms as empathy
is rather irrelevant. The main point is to notice that it is a simple
condition for sympathy that the sympathetic feeling exists as the
spectator's.
According to Smith, the sympathetic feeling arises when the spectator
exposes himself to the influence of the circumstances which gave rise
to the original feeling. This can only be done by means of the famous
imaginary change of situation: we imagine that we are in another man's
situation in order to see what our reactions would be under such in¬
fluence. And the feelings that we, as spectators, come to have by
this use of imagination are the sympathetic feelings, "sympathy, or
the correspondent affection of the Spectator". (TMS, VII, ii, 3, § 21)
The point which has always caused difficulties is, of course, how we
are to understand this imaginary change of place for the spectator.
What is it he changes: just the situation, or himself as well? It
seems to me that there is not and cannot be any clear general answer
to this. It necessarily varies with a number of factors, such as the
personalities of both spectator and agent (the man who has the original
feeling), their mutual relationship, the nature of the situation and
the feeling concerned etc.
But there are a couple of points to be made about it. Firstly, the
personality of the agent is in itself a very important part of the
total situation and, therefore, the better the spectator is able to
identify in imagination with this personality, the better will be his
understanding of the situation and the more accurate, therefore, his
sympathetic feeling.^ But secondly, it must be pointed out that for
Smith, just as for Hume, the act of sympathizing must necessarily be
accompanied in the spectator by a consciousness of his own self. The
whole drive behind all sympathizing is, as we will see, a basic wish
to relate or compare our own reactions to those of others. It is
only this "tension" between persons that gives rise to all evaluations
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of persons, of which the act of sympathy is the necessary first
step.
It is, therefore, necessary and, in my view, rather a matter of course
that Smith right from the beginning of his discussion of sympathy
makes it plain that the spectator's own consciousness always in some
degree accompanies the act of sympathy and that however successful he
may be in approaching the actual state of the agent, what he feels
"will, indeed, always be in some respects different from
what [the latter] feels, ... because the secret conscious¬
ness that the change of situations, is but imaginary, not
only lowers it in degree, but in some measure varies it in
kind, and gives it a quite different modification." (TMS, I,i,
4, § 7)6
Indeed, one can say that it is only on condition that Smith retains
the spectator's self-consciousness in all acts of sympathy that he will
be able to use the sympathy mechanism as the foundation for evaluations
at all for, as we have already seen, we are perfectly able to sympa¬
thize, and thus evaluate, even where there is either no, or a com¬
pletely subnormal and un-reachable person to sympathize with, i.e. where
there is absolutely no other person with whom to "identify". In
short, the degree to which the spectator can take up the place of the
agent in his imagination is a matter of many degrees, but there is a
point beyond which he cannot possibly go in his identification: he
must retain some consciousness of his own self as that which sympathizes.
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Section 2. Sympathy and Moral Approval
Smith opens The Theory of Moral Sentiments by pointing out the reality
of sympathy as a principle in human beings, even in the worst of them.
But it is important to remember that he does not let the matter rest
there. He does in various places make it clear that sympathy is
put to work by an even more fundamental principle in human nature,
the desire to agree, to be in accord with our fellow-men. Thus he
says e.g.:
"The great pleasure of conversation and society ... arises
from a certain correspondence of sentiments and opinions,
from a certain harmony of minds, which, like so many musical
instruments, coincide and keep time with one another. But
this most delightful harmony cannot be obtained unless there
is a free communication of sentiments and opinions. We all
desire, upon this account, to feel how each other is
affected, to penetrate into each other's bosoms, and to
observe the sentiments and affections which really subsist
there." (TMS, VII, iv, § 28)
This nearly compulsory interest in other men is extremely important.
On the one hand it leads men to let themselves be led by others;
on the other hand it makes them try to lead others. And it is
basically this continuous exchange that underlies all human culture.
It probably underlies language; through vanity it is the foundation
for all distinctions of ranks in society; in the form of bartering it
is behind any economy; and through the mechanism of sympathy it gives
rise to human morality.
The seeking of agreement does, however, only require sympathy when the
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object about which agreement is sought is somehow closely connected
with one person but not the other(s), so that the former will be in¬
fluenced in a significantly different way, i.e. be in a different
situation. This is not the case with e.g. the objects of "science
and taste". Here all
"look at them from the same point of view, and we have no
occasion for sympathy, or for that imaginary change of
situations from which it arises, in order to produce, with
regard to these, the most perfect harmony of sentiments
and affections." (TMS, l,i,4, § 2)^
But if the object is such that one man is particularly affected by it,
say, another man's being resentful against him, everybody else, i.e.
all spectators, can only understand and evaluate his response by
means of sympathy, by trying to let the object and the whole situation
affect them in imagination, (ib., §§ 5,6) It is this difference
in situation which, together with the desire for understanding and
agreement, leads to sympathy.
However, the spectators' feelings are nothing but sympathetic reflec¬
tions of the original feelings and agreement will therefore be difficult.
"The person principally concerned is sensible of this, and
at the same time passionately desires a more complete
sympathy." (TMS, I,i,4, § 7)
This leads him to sympathy with the situation of the spectator. It is
thus only by a mutual sympathy in this sense that the maximum degree of
agreement can be reached. This will never be complete because of the
spectator's own accompanying consciousness but it can be quite "suffi¬
cient for the harmony of society". (Ib.)
Sympathy in the sense now explained is the means for all judgment of
other men and, as we will see later, also of ourselves. The basic
act of evaluating or judging simply consists in a comparison between
the original reactions of the person principally concerned and the
sympathetic reactions of the spectators. If they are in agreement,
the spectators approve of the man concerned, otherwise they disapprove
"To approve of the passions of another ... as suitable to
their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely
sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such,
is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely
sympathize with them." (TMS, I,i,3, § 1)
Here is clearly implied that distinction between sympathy and approba¬
tion resulting from sympathy which Smith had to clarify for Hume in a
later footnote:^
"It has been objected to me, that as I found the sentiment of
approbation, which is always agreeable, upon sympathy, it is
inconsistent with my system to admit any disagreeable
sympathy. I answer, that in the sentiment of approbation
there are two things to be taken notice of; first, the sympa¬
thetic passion of the spectator; and, secondly, the emotion
which arises from his observing the perfect coincidence
between this sympathetic passion in himself, and the original
passion in the person principally concerned. This last
emotion, in which the sentiment of approbation properly
consists, is always agreeable and delightful. The other
may either be agreeable or disagreeable, according to the
nature of the original passion, whose features it must always
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in some measure, retain." (TMS, I,iii, 1,89, note)
This is the abstract clarity reminiscent of Hume which any scholar
would like to have seen more of in Smith. There is, however, suffi¬
cient of it to enable us to see the following distinctions in Smith's
theory of sympathetic evaluations. Firstly there is the imaginary
change of situation by which the spectator tries, as far as possible,
to expose himself to the same causal influences as the man originally
concerned. We will often find this process alone called sympathy
in Smith. Secondly, there is the result of the influence of this
cause, namely the reaction of the spectator. This too is called
sympathy, or the sympathetic feelings, sentiments etc. Thirdly, there
is the comparison of the original and the sympathetic sentiments.
And fourthly, there is the emotion arising from this comparison, which
is either a kind of pleasure called approval when the original and
the sympathetic sentiments coincide, or a kind of pain called dis¬
approval when they do not coincide. This pleasure is also often
called sympathy, while the pain ought to be, and occasionally is,
called antipathy. It is clear that when Smith uses sympathy in the
first two senses it is neutral and may result in antipathy as well as
in sympathy in the last mentioned sense. This usage is technical
and presupposes an understanding of his theory while the last sense
seems to be closer to the ordinary sense of the word where it implies
some kind of positive attitude. What is most confusing of all, how¬
ever, is that Smith frequently uses sympathy to denote all three of
the senses mentioned plus the comparison, i.e. he often talks of sym¬
pathy as the whole process including its result, which in that case
can only be "positive" (approval).
I mentioned that approval and disapproval for Smith are special kinds
of pleasure and pain, namely those arising from the comparison of ori¬
ginal with sympathetic sentiments. This needs some justification.
Smith never treats this very explicitly but, first of all, he does in
the footnote already quoted call the positive case, approval, "agree¬
able and delightful". Furthermore, he has a whole chapter, called
'Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy', (TMS, I,i,2) in which he points
out that sympathy has its own distinctive pleasure, both for the man
who receives the sympathy (ib., §§ 1-5), and for the man who gives
it (§ 6) and it is quite clear that sympathy here must mean, or include,
approval. In the same chapter he also deals with the negative case,
i.e. what we would like him to call antipathy or disapproval, in a
parallel way. The conclusion must be that in this basic question of
the character of approval, Smith was in virtually complete agreement
with Hume: they would both maintain that approval and disapproval
consist of distinct emotions or passions.^ Their whole argument
is over the chain of causes leading to those passions.
Section 3. The Mutuality of Sympathy
I have already more than once indicated that sympathy for Smith is
something mutual between men. This feature of sympathy is, I suggest,
completely crucial for Smith's whole moral theory and, indeed, his
idea of sympathy is in itself hardly intelligible without it. Yet it
is easy to undervalue the importance of the mutual character of
sympathy because of the way in which the Theory of Moral Sentiments is
composed. For although he already in the second chapter of the book
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treats "Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy"; although he as early as
I,i,4, § 7 gives a fairly good description of the idea; and although
one cannot get an adequate understanding of Parts I and II without
presupposing it, it is not till Part Third that the reader is presented
with a really thoroughgoing treatment.
One can say that in Parts I and II Smith tells us how sympathy is
given, whereas he in Part III shows how it is taken or received. But
as one of Smith's maybe most original points is that the moral senti¬
ments which he wants to explain are the outcome of both, the first
two Parts lose much of their significance if they are not read in the
light of Part III.
Smith always takes it as a matter of course that man is social, that
he is bound to be together with his fellows. This means that he will
always literally have to look upon them; he is forced to watch them
and see what they are like, physically and morally, i.e. as to
behaviour:
"Our first ideas of personal beauty and deformity, are drawn
from the shape and appearance of others, not from our own ...
In the same manner our first moral criticisms are exercised
upon the characters and conduct of other people". (TMS, 111,1,
§§ 4,5)
Irrespective of the fact that men are naturally searching for agree¬
ment with their fellows, as mentioned earlier, they are forced by
their social circumstances, by their mere togetherness, to give
sympathy in the neutral sense of trying to understand each other.
But the important thing is, that men will immediately discover by this
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means, that their fellows are watching them in the same way:
"We soon learn, that other people are equally frank
with regard to our own [characters and conduct (and look)],
(ib., § 5)
Once we realise this, we for the first time become aware of ourselves
as persons with a certain physical and, more important, moral look
which can be the subject of evaluation. The awareness of other
people's observation and evaluation of us makes us see that there is
something to be observed and evaluated and we naturally try to
imagine what it can be, i.e. how we suppose we look to other
people:
"We begin ... to examine our own passions and conduct, and
to consider how these must appear to [others], by considering
how they would appear to us if in their situation." (TMS, III,
1, § 5)
It is thus the perception or, in my earlier terminology, the reception
of other men's sympathetic endeavours that makes us conscious of our
own mind. And if man, per impossibile, grew up outside society, such
consciousness simply would not develop:
"Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to
manhood in some solitary place, without any communication
with his own species, he could no more think of his own
character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments
and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than
of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are
objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does
not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with
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no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him
into society, and he is immediately provided with the
mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the counte¬
nance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always
mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his
sentiments". (TMS, ib., § 3)
This idea that the mutuality of sympathy with sentiments creates aware¬
ness of the sentiments is closely parallel to Smith's treatment of the
tactile sense in his essay "On the External Senses". He there
singles out the tactile sense as unique because it alone is able to
create an awareness of itself. If one part of our body touches
another the other, so to speak, answers back and we in this way become
conscious of our body as one large tactile sense in contrast to the
rest of the world:
"When [a man] lays his hand upon his foot, as his hand feels
the pressure or resistance of his foot, so his foot feels that
of his hand. They are both external to one another, but
they are, neither of them, altogether so external to him. He
feels in both, and he naturally considers them as parts of
himself ... When he lays his hand upon the table, though
his hand feels the pressure of the table, the table does not
feel, at least he does not know that it feels, the pressure
of his hand. He feels it therefore as something external,
not only to his hand, but to himself ...". (Essays, p. 439)**
Once this awareness of ourselves as subjects of judgment has been
awaked in us the desire of agreement drives us to try and judge our¬
selves as we imagine others would. This means that we have to act
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as spectators of ourselves at the same time as we are the agents who
are judged of:
"When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour
to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it,
it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it
were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge,
represents a different character from that other I, the person
whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first
is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own
conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his
situation, and by considering how it would appear to me,
when seen from that particular point of view. The second
is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and
of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was
endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the judge;
the second the person judged of." (TMS, III, 1, § 6)
By means of sympathy we try to create a spectator position towards
ourselves, we try to take up that view-at-a-distance which we perceive
others take of us. This is a first sympathetic move. Next we try
to imagine whether and to what extent such a spectator would be able
to enter into our real position. This is a second sympathetic move.
We then try to estimate the outcome of this second sympathetic move
to see whether there will be agreement between our original motives
and sentiments and those sympathetically created ones of the imagined
spectator, i.e. whether the imagined spectator approves or disapproves
of our original sentiments and motives. Finally, we try to make this
spectator approval or disapproval our own by a third sympathetic move
consisting of a sympathy with the spectator. In this way we come to
judge of our own behaviour by the same standard with which we judge of
the behaviour of others, viz. whether it is proper br improper in
the eyes of a spectator of our situation. All those moves are, I
think, summarized in one single paragraph right at the beginning of
Smith's treatment of the mutuality of sympathy, although his prose may
not disclose it at first reading:
"We either approve or disapprove of our own conduct,
according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the
situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his
eyes and from his station [First sympathetic move], we either
can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the
sentiments and motives which influenced it [second sympathetic
move and comparison]. We can never survey our own sentiments
and motives, we can never form any judgment concerning them,
unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural
station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance
from us [first move]. But we can do this in no other way
than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other
people, or as other people are likely to view them. ... We
endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other
fair and impartial spectator would examine it [second move].
If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly
enter into all the passions and motives which influenced it,
we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this
supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his
disapprobation, and condemn it [third sympathetic move]." (TMS
III, 1, §2)
Section 4. Common Standards, Ideal Standards and Social Adaptation
It is of the very greatest importance to understand exactly what role
others, as spectators, play for the development and character of men's
standards for moral self-evaluation. So far we have seen how they
are a necessary condition for men's catching sight of themselves
and their behaviour as objects of moral evaluation, and we have seen
that this brings men to judge themselves by the same standard as
they use for others, the standard of propriety. The question is, how¬
ever, what propriety? Smith uses the whole first Part of The Theory
of Moral Sentiments to explain propriety of action and the very first
Section is 'Of the Sense of Propriety'. It is, therefore, natural
to turn to that for an explanation:
"In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or
disproportion, which the affection seems to bear to the
cause or object which excites it, consists the propriety or
impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness, of the consequent
action." (TMS, I,i,3, S 6)12
This may sound as an attempt at an absolute criterion of moral Tight¬
ness. But one should, of course, not overlook the little "seems":
propriety is a principle to be used by men when they as spectators
judge of each others' behaviour. And propriety-in-use clearly means
the coincidence or agreement between the original sentiment of the
agent and the sympathetic one of the spectator with approval conse¬
quent upon the latter. And it is difficult to see how propriety
could be anything but such propriety-in-use by particular spectators
for as Smith explains:
"Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges
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of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by
my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my
reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love
by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way
of judging about them." (TMS, I,i,3, § 10)
This sounds like a rather impossible subjectivism. But, of course,
Smith's real feat is to show how men do have a common moral world with
common standards. How do they get it? That is our problem, and the
problem to which I alluded above by asking about the precise signifi¬
cance of the spectators. Now, if we stay in the first Part and the
first Section, we will see that Smith already there goes some way to¬
wards what looks like an answer. He first points out how transitory
and weak sympathetic feelings often are in comparison with their
objects, the original feelings. He then goes on to say that this is
normally anticipated and forestalled by the agent:
"The person principally concerned is sensible of this, and
at the same time passionately desires a more complete
sympathy. He longs for that relief which nothing can
afford him but the entire concord of the affections of the
spectators with his own. ... But he can only hope to
obtain this by lowering his passion to that pitch, in which
the spectators are capable of going along with him. He
must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so, the sharpness
of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony
and concord with the emotions of those who are about him.
What they feel will, indeed, always be in some respects dif¬
ferent from what he feels ...; because the secret consciousness
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that the change of situations, from which the sympathetic
sentiment arises, is but imaginary, not only lowers it
in degree, but in some measure varies it in kind, and gives
it a quite different modification. These two sentiments,
however, may, it is evident, have such a correspondence
with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of
society. Though they will never be unisons, they may be
concords, and this is all that is wanted or required."
(IMS, I,i,4 § 7)
This early passage is a prime example of how an adequate understand¬
ing presupposes knowledge of doctrines only stated later in the work.
For quite clearly he is here using the idea of the mutuality of
sympathy, of how sympathy is "received", which I have presented
already as it is developed in Part III. The "lowering" of the passion
on the part of the person sympathized with can only be understood in
this way.
The reason for quoting the passage is that it ends by formulating a
very important point rather clearly, namely that the operation of
mutual sympathy unintendedly creates common social standards: standards
which are at least sufficiently common to make social life possible.
This again gives occasion for remarking various other points of very
central importance in Smith. First of all, it shows that mutual sym¬
pathy is a mechanism for the selection of behaviour that is adequate
to the situation, primarily the social situation, and that this is the
efficient cause lurking beyind much of the teleological talk in Smith.
This is possibly Smith's greatest contribution to social theory and
it must be left for more extensive treatment at a later stage.
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Secondly, we are led to ask whether, according to Smith, the socially
accepted and necessary is all there is to morality, or whether parts
of morality can gain some independence of the commonly received, i.e.
whether moral ideals are possible. A theory to explain this must be
able to account for how moral ideals develop out of social morality,
since the latter is the empirically given morality. It must there¬
fore be a theory of how moral ideals can detach themselves from social
morality, how ideal morality can emerge from and become independent of
de facto morality.
It is exactly such a theory Smith is proposing. The standard by
means of which men judge of themselves is the same as that by which
they judge of others: propriety. And, as we remember, propriety is a
question of the aptness of a given action and its motive to its situ¬
ation. This means that although it is our appreciation of others'
judgment of our behaviour, through the mutual sympathy mechanism,
that starts us judging ourselves, this leads us to do so in terms of
a standard different from the opinion of others. We are started off
by asking whether others would think our behaviour proper but this
leads us to ask whether it is in fact proper. And this latter question
can only be answered if we take up the position of a spectator of our¬
selves; not any concrete spectator, for he will have his own particular
interests and biases, just as we have ours. It must be the position
of "a third person", an impartial spectator who is an ideal whom both
agents and actual spectators can approach. Instead of the propriety
of social morality, of the actual spectators, we are thus led to try and
judge ourselves in terms of an "absolute" propriety for each given
situation.
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In this way it is possible for men to detach their morality, at least
to some extent, from the social circumstances which created it. And
parallel with this independence goes a desire to reach absolute pro¬
priety, for once men feel that there is a distinction between that and
what is thought to be proper by society, they also realize that if
there is any difference between them, this must be due to misinforma¬
tion on the part of the latter and that only the former is genuine.
There is here a healthy Socratic element in Smith, as in Hume, to the
effect that once the basic pattern of evaluation is given the rest is to
a large extent a matter of knowledge of the situation.
Just as a displacement can take place in the moral principle applied
so it will be accompanied by a displacement in moral ideals. We are
started off in moral life trying to apply other men's ideas of pro¬
priety and aiming at their approval and consequent praise; but we soon
end up trying to apply propriety as such, i.e. the impartial spectator's
idea of propriety, and aiming at the approval and praise of the impartial
spectator, aiming at absolute approval and praiseworthiness. (Ill, 2)
This displacement is in no way mysterious for in prying into our own
behaviour and motives we must inevitably gain knowledge which is
inaccessible to other men, and this makes it possible for us to judge
of and criticize other men's judgment of us. If we thus come to the
conclusion that we are either approved and praised or disapproved and
it,
blamed without deserving, being "worthy" of /this diminishes, or takes
away, the pleasure/pain we receive from the judgment of others. We
do not consider their judgment morally correct any longer. (111,2,
§4 and §11, respectively for praise and blame.) in the same way, if
we are not in fact praised or blamed but come to the conclusion that we
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deserve it, we put our own approval/disapproval in its place,
(ib. §5 and §§9-10 respectively)^
When men in this way develop and internalize a morality which aspires
to a certain independence, we can talk of the operation of their con¬
science, or of the impartial spectator in them:
"reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant
of the breast, the man within, the great judge and
arbiter of our conduct". (TMS, III, 3, §4)
When men regulate their behaviour by this means we talk of their
self-command, which is in a way a kind of meta-virtue since the other
main virtues (prudence, justice, and benevolence) only gain their
moral value when men are in command of themselves to perform them:
"Self-command is not only itself a great virtue, but
from it all the other virtues seem to derive their
principal lustre." (TMS, VI, iii, §11)
We have now seen how Smith's theory is able to explain the possibility
of a morality which is independent, or at least partly independent, of
social morality although it develops out of the latter by a displace¬
ment of actual spectators with the ideal of the impartial spectator.
This distinction between "high"* morality and mere social opinion
must, however, be handled with care, for although the former develops
out of the latter, it will in its turn have a decisive influence on the
latter. The subtleties of this relation are rather important to keep
clear.
First of all, we must notice that Smith insists that the seeking of
social approval is not enough for the existence of society; a search
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for moral approval proper is necessary:
"Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an
original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend
his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favour¬
able, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered
their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him
for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying
and most offensive. - But this desire of the approbation,
and this aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren,
would not alone have rendered him fit for the society for
which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has endowed him,
not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a
desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being
what he himself approves of in other men. The first desire
could only have made him wish to appear to be fit for
society. The second was necessary in order to render him
anxious to be really fit." (TMS, III, 2, §§ 6-7)
This may sound as little more than a traditional piece of homiletic
natural theology, but in Smith it is always wise to think twice on
such occasions. We will leave the problem of teleological explanations
till later and concentrate on the major question here: why is the
search for social approval not enough for social life? Why is it
necessary that men seek higher moral approval? First of all we must
remember that for Smith it is a simple matter of fact that men do seek
such approval once society has started them in their moral life in the
way we have already seen. But furthermore, we must remember that the
seeking of social approval, of the approval of the actual spectators,
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is bound to lead to disagreement because we are differently related to
our own behaviour in comparison with our spectators; we are naturally
partial and we are often, in a sense, better informed. It is precise¬
ly this disagreement that starts us looking for a third and better
standpoint from which to judge and this search for a third standpoint
is undertaken by agent and spectator alike. This is the point of
Smith's simile with the landscape seen through the little window and
the landscape as well as the window seen from a third position equi¬
distant from both. (TMS, III, 3, §2) it is in this sense we must
understand that,
"Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite
interests [our own and the spectator's], we must change our
position. We must view them, neither from our own
place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet
with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third
person, who has no particular connection with either, and
who judges with impartiality between us." (TMS, III, 3> §3)
In other words, the very seeking of social approval, of the approval
of the actual spectators, has a strong tendency to become a search
for another and higher judgment and approval which is common between
agent and spectator. This search for a third standpoint of absolute
impartiality may never, or very rarely, be completely successful, but
the really important point, and the point which Smith tried to make in
the previous quotation (TMS III, 2, §§ 6-7), is that it is the search
itself which makes social life possible; it is the search for a common
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standpoint that is common, not necessarily the standpoint. It is
therefore this process of continuing search that really constitutes
social morality.
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But what does it mean that the morality which keeps society together
is such a process? It means that it is a continual weeding out of
behaviour which is incompatible with social life. The operation of
mutual sympathy in the search for a common, "higher" standpoint is a
mechanism for the adjustment of behaviour to the circumstances of
society. Smith shows this by means of some striking examples. First
on the small scale of the individual's adjustment to his given social
circumstances, the most charming being the case of the child:
"A very young child has no self-command; but, whatever
are its emotions, whether fear, or grief, or anger, it
endeavours always, by the violence of its outcries, to alarm,
as much as it can, the attention of its nurse, or of its
parents. While it remains under the custody of such
partial protectors, its anger is the first, and, perhaps,
the only passion which it is taught to moderate. By noise
and threatening they are, for their own ease, often obliged
to frighten it into good temper; and the passions which
incites it to attack, is restrained by that which teaches it
to attend to its own safety. When it is old enough to go
to school, or to mix with its equals, it soon finds that
they have no such indulgent partiality. It naturally
wishes to gain their favour, and to avoid their hatred or
contempt. Regard even to its own safety teaches it to do so;
and it soon finds that it can do so in no other way than by
moderating, not only its anger, but all its other passions,
to the degree which its play-fellows and companions are
likely to be pleased with. It thus enters into the great
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school of self-command; it studies to be more and more
master of itself; and begins to exercise over its own
feelings a discipline which the practice of the longest
life is very seldom sufficient to bring to complete perfec¬
tion." (TMS, III, 3, § 22)15
The real spectator introduces the impartial spectator"^ and the result
is a life-long adjustment of behaviour. This idea of mutual sympathy
as a selection procedure does, however, get a perhaps still better
illustration when applied to the broader case of how a society adjusts
to its situation. Smith goes into some detail about this in Part
Fifth, 'Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion', chapter 2. At first
reading what he has to say here may sound as a rather vague function-
alism:
"The different situations of different ages and countries
are apt ... to give different characters to the generality
of those who live in them, and their sentiments concerning
the particular degree of each quality that is either blameable
or praiseworthy, vary according to that degree which is
usual in their own country and in their own times. ...
Every age and country look upon that degree of each quality
which is commonly to be met with in those who are esteemed,
among themselves, as the golden mean of that particular talent
or virtue; and as this varies according as their different
circumstances render different qualities more or less habitual
to them, their sentiments, concerning the exact propriety of
character and behaviour, vary accordingly." (TMS, V, 2, § 7)
But the following §§ show that Smith has a real explanation to offer for
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this. His procedure is to compare "civilized" society with "savage"
or "barbarian" society:
"Every savage undergoes a sort of Spartan discipline, and, by
the necessity of his situation, is inured to every sort of
hardship. ... His circumstances not only habituate him to
every sort of distress, but teach him to give way to none of
the passions which that distress is apt to excite. He can expect
from his countrymen no sympathy or indulgence for such weakness.
... A savage, ... whatever be the nature of his distress,
expects no sympathy from those about him, and disdains upon
that account to expose himself, by allowing the least weakness
to escape him." (TMS, ib., §9; my italics)
And Smith goes on to describe in picturesque details the hardiness of
savage lifestyle before switching to the contrasting society:
"This heroic and unconquerable firmness, which the custom
and education of his country demand of every savage, is not
required of those who are brought up to live in civilized
societies. ... A humane and polished people, who have more
sensibility to the passions of others, can more readily enter
into an animated and passionate behaviour, and can more
easily pardon some little excess. The person principally con¬
cerned is sensible of this; and being assured of the equity
of his judges, indulges himself in stronger expressions of
passion ...." (ib., § 10; my italics)
More reasoning of the same kind at length allows Smith to draw his
conclusion:
"In general the style of manners which takes place in any nation
may commonly, upon the whole, be said to be that which is
most suitable to its situation. Hardiness is the character
most suitable to the circumstances of a savage; sensibility
to those of one who lives in a very civilized society."
(TMS, ib. §13)
We can now see that there is nothing mysterious in this conclusion.
Smith is very well able to specify the efficient cause for why be¬
haviour in general is fitting to its situation: it is simply that all
behaviour that is not so fitted will tend to be weeded out by means of
antipathy conveyed through the mutual sympathy mechanism, whereas
behaviour that is fitting will tend to be reinforced by approval
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conveyed in the same way. This is of outstanding importance for
it shows that however much teleological talk Smith allows himself he
can do so perfectly legitimately. He has an efficient cause which
can explain the seeming purposefulness of human behaviour, a problem
to which we will return.
We have so far allowed a certain amount of equivocation in our treat¬
ment of Smith's idea of the selection of behaviour through mutual
sympathy. The point he is mainly trying to make in the chapter from
which we last quoted is that although the selection always takes place
by means of mutual sympathy, this may not lead to the implication of
the impartial spectator in certain limited areas of behaviour because
of the influence of customs, habits, and fashions. In such limited
areas the search for his standpoint, i.e. for "natural" or absolute
propriety, is not invariably required for the very existence of society
and accordingly a certain straying away from this search can take
place under the guidance of customs and fashions without being weeded
118.
out. But this influence of custom and fashion can only concern "the
propriety or impropriety of particular usages" and not "the general
style of character and behaviour" (V, 2, §12):
"The different manners which custom teaches us to approve of
in the different professions and states of life, do not
concern things of the greatest importance. We expect truth
and justice from an old man as well as from a young, from a
clergy man as well as from an officer; and it is in matters
of small moment only that we look for the distinguishing marks
of their respective characters. ... It is not, therefore,
in the general style of conduct or behaviour that custom
authorizes the widest departure from what is the natural
propriety of action." (ib., §§ 13-14, my italics)
Smith then goes on (§ 15) to give a particularly horrifying example of
a "particular usage", the exposition of children in ancient Greece.
This practice had its origins in savage times when it was necessary
and could be approved of as proper; but it was continued into civil¬
ized times through the influence of "uniterrupted custom", reinforced
by "farfetched considerations of public utility", although it must
obviously be considered highly improper in that situation if judged
from an impartial viewpoint. When a thing like this could happen
under the influence of custom, one might think that everything in human
morality could be swayed by custom and fashion. But this cannot be
the case, according to Smith:
"There is an obvious reason why custom should never pervert
our sentiments with regard to the general style and character
of conduct and behaviour, in the same degree as with regard to
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the propriety or unlawfulness of particular usages.
There never can be any such custom. No society could
subsist a moment, in which the usual strain of men's
conduct and behaviour was of a piece with the horrible practice
I have just now mentioned" (i.e. the exposition of children.
TMS, V, 2, §16)
In other words, if men did not in general search for "the natural pro¬
priety of action", instead of just resting content with what is socially
customary or fashionable, then society would be in imminent danger of
breaking down, thus extinguishing such behaviour.
This discussion in Smith is, of course, designed to show how deviations
from the search for the standpoint of the impartial spectator can occur
in human life when we know that this search is a natural development
for man as a social being. Apart from the influence of custom and
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fashion, Smith discusses the influence of considerations of utility
(Part IV), a discussion we will return to later, and on and off he
naturally deals with the influence of men's partiality and egoism.
This latter is particularly important as it introduces the general
rules of morality. (Ill, 4, §7)
Section 5. General Rules and Moral Value
Smith's contrast between "particular usages" and "the general style of
conduct" in the discussion of the selection of behaviour above must not
be confused with a discussion of general rules. Obviously, the kind
of "particular usages" he has in mind may very well be formulated in
general rules. Nevertheless, there is an intimate connection between
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the selection of behaviour and the general rules: the result of the
selection of behaviour is simply general rules. Certain actions are
repeatedly selected through sympathy as proper, others as improper, in
the way we have had described above. By and by this recurrent pattern
will stand out clearly and men can so to speak read it off as rules or
guidelines for their behaviour:
"Our continual observations upon the conduct of others
insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general
rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done
or to be avoided. Some of their actions shock all our
natural sentiments. We hear everybody about us express
the like detestation against them. This still further
confirms ... our natural sense of their deformity. It
satisfies us that we view them in the proper light, when
we see other people view them in the same light. ... It
is thus that the general rules of morality are formed.
They are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in
particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense
of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of. We do
not originally approve or condemn particular actions, because,
upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent
with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the
contrary, is formed by finding from experience that all
actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain
manner, are approved of." (Ill, 4, §8)
The general rules of morality are thus the unintended outcome of a
multitude of individual instances of natural moral evaluation, but once
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they are in existence they are quite capable of directing our moral
evaluations. Then,
"we frequently appeal to them as to the standards of judgment,
in debating concerning the degree of praise or blame that is
due to certain actions of a complicated and dubious nature.
They are upon these occasions commonly cited as the ultimate
foundations of what is just and unjust in human conduct",
(ib. § 11)
Like Hume, Smith is one of the few philosophers who have really under¬
stood the decisive importance of general rules for the very possibility
of social life. If people did not follow such rules in the most
central parts of their behaviour, it would simply be impossible to
orientate oneself among them. The man who was friend one moment
could be foe the next:
"Without ... sacred regard to general rules, there is no man
whose conduct can be much depended upon. ... such are the in¬
equalities of humour to which all men are subject, that without
this principle, the man who, in all his cool hours, had the
most delicate sensibility to the propriety of conduct, might
often be led to act absurdly upon the most frivolous occasions,
and when it was scarce possible to assign any serious motive
for his behaving in this manner. ... But if without regard
to these general rules, even the duties of politeness, which
are so easily observed, and which one can scarce have any
serious motive to violate, would yet be so frequently violated,
what would become of the duties of justice, of truth, of chastity,
of fidelity, which it is often so difficult to observe, and which
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there may be so many strong motives to violate? But upon the
tolerable observance of these duties depends the very existence
of human society, which would crumble into nothing if mankind
were not generally impressed with a reverence for those
important rules of conduct." (ib. Ill, 5, §2)
General rules are attempts at summing up mankind's approaches to the
judgments of the impartial spectator, and they are obligatory upon men
because of their sympathy with the impartial spectator. This means
that if we break the rules without an over-riding moral reason, i.e. a
"higher" rule, we will incur antipathy (cf. ib. § 7); and this is, of
course, very much like Hume's idea of self-hatred.
All Smith's ideas of how a social morality is formed and of how an
ideal morality develops out of it are held in purely descriptive terms.
It is a science of morals. And yet I venture to suggest that it is of
clear normative import as well. As are all good scientific laws,
Smith's is universal. It covers himself as well as all other human
beings and thus shows us how he understands moral ideals, how he
evaluates. Just as with Hume, we must remember that in Smith's view
men can never start morally from scratch: they are always living in a
society and thus in a context of aims, values, and ideals. Moral
evaluation is therefore only relevant in such a context. It is never
a matter of goodness or badness, justice or injustice, or whatever,
per se\ but of goodness or badness, etc. on the background of, or
given, a number of other values. Each of these other values, aims
etc. may themselves be questioned but never the whole system, for that
would be equivalent to a state of nature. It would, in other words,
be impossible.
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It is in this light that I suggest we see Smith's idea of the impartial
spectator. When we strive towards his standpoint we are in reality
seeking the position which is most widely compatible with existing
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values, which fits the moral context. This is obviously not an
absolute and final test. On the other hand it does not make moral
judgments completely relative to the given system of morality for, as
we have seen, the standpoint of the impartial spectator implies a uni¬
versal rule and it is by seeking this that we can gain independence
from the given social morality. So it would seem that when we judge
of the moral value of an action we consider whether it is in accordance
with a general rule and whether the type of action prescribed by this
rule is generally compatible with existing values. Smith's strong
stress on the primacy of the situational factors in the very constitu¬
tion of moral evaluations makes his explanation of the formation of the
common moral ideals, the standpoints of the impartial spectator, more
straightforward than Hume's. And also Smith's theory of the mutuality
of sympathy is considerably more detailed than anything in Hume.
Despite these differences the basic approach is, however, the same.
The decisive element in our understanding as well as in our exercise of
moral evaluation is the social context or situation in which it takes
place.
This view of moral knowledge seems to fit in very well with Smith's
general conception of knowledge. Although it is well beyond the purposes
of the present work and although it would be more than hazardous to
attribute a proper theory of knowledge to Smith, it is of some interest
here to attempt a characterization of his general view of human knowledge,
so far as one can with the sources available. The one thing which runs
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through all Smith's reasoning concerning men's perception of the world
is the idea of coherence. Whatever particular thing in the world
men watch it must fit with its surroundings, its situation, if it is to
be understood. And if it does not it creates a reaction called sur¬
prise or wonder which normally covers a craving for the re-establish-
ment of order. This is a well-known theme from Smith's methodological
reflections in the essay on the history of astronomy; but it is obviously
the same fundamental idea that is at the bottom of his theory of moral
judgment as well. When men judge each other's and their own behaviour
in terms of propriety this is in fact judgment in terms of fittingness
to the situation. If the behaviour is in this sense fitting it meets
with the quiet reaction called approval, but if it is somehow unusual
in the situation, i.e. if it goes either below or above the point of
propriety, it causes wonder and surprise. If the behaviour is below
this surprise takes the form of blame, if it is above it takes the form
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of praise. In morality the adjustment consequent upon this is, in
a way, twofold. On the one hand it consists in the obvious change
in the judging person's, i.e. the spectator's, expectations about the
person judged, and perhaps about the kind of situation concerned, but
on the other hand, the mechanism of mutual sympathy makes it likely
that also the person mainly concerned, the agent, changes his outlook by
internalizing the reaction of the spectator in the way we now know.
Sympathy is a means by which men can attempt to view themselves in
their situation and thus judge themselves in the same way as they judge
of others.
The view of human knowledge which Smith thus indicates may be broadly
labelled as a contextualism. Men cannot understand things and events
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unless they are brought into a context. Individual pieces of informa¬
tion do not form part of men's knowledge till they are formed into some
kind of order.
This is, of course, not a very sharp characterization of human know¬
ledge. The important thing is, however, that it is sharp enough to
exclude a significant alternative view which we might call epistemolog-
ical atomism. According to the latter knowledge consists exactly of
individual pieces of information and any kind of context, any kind of
order, must be built up of the individual pieces.
How clearly Smith himself saw that he was getting towards this funda¬
mental problem situation is, of course, very doubtful and we have
rather little to go by. But it is certainly remarkable in this
particular connection that he at least tried to view the senses as a
system which by means of mutual controls brings order in our perception
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of the external world.
Be this last as it may, the important thing in the present
inquiry is that Smith's contextualist view of human knowledge gives
a better understanding of his claim that human behaviour is judged
on the background of its situation, i.e. in terms of propriety. Not
least, it gives us a better understanding of Smith's treatment of the
influence on our judgement of what follows upon any action judged
of, for in Smith's various treatments of this problem one can see it as
a common general feature that there can only be such an influence, if
what follows upon the action is somehow put in relation to the situa-
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tion in which the action took place. So the basic pattern of evalu¬
ation remains the same, situational propriety. The main places where
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Smith is concerned with this are his treatment of judgment in terms
of merit/demerit in Part II, and his ideas of how utility influences
"the sentiment of approbation", Part IV. But the theme also occurs
in many other places throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Section 6. Merit and Demerit
Smith introduces the problem of propriety versus merit already in Part
I, Section i, where he in Chapter 3, §§ 5-7 points out that men in fact
judge of human behaviour and its motivation
"under two different aspects, or in two different relations;
first, in relation to the cause which excites it ...;
secondly, in relation to the end which it proposes, or the
effect which it tends to produce. - In the suitableness or
unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion, which
the affection [behind the action] seems to bear to the cause
or object which excites it, consists the propriety or im¬
propriety, the decency or ungracefulness, of the consequent
action. - In the beneficial or hurtful nature of the
effects which the affection aims at, or tends to produce,
consists the merit or demerit of the action, the qualities
by which it is entitled to reward, or is deserving of
punishment."
Smith then goes on to make the contrast between "philsophers" and
men "in common life" which we noticed at the beginning of this
chapter:
"Philosophers have, of late years, considered chiefly the
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tendency of affections, and have given little attention to
the relation which they stand in to the cause which excites
them. In common life, however, when we judge of any
person's conduct, and of the sentiments which directed it,
we constantly consider them under both these aspects."
(I, i, 3, § 8)
The end of this quotation seems to suggest that the two principles of
moral judgment are on a par and supplement each other but this impres¬
sion is deceptive, for when we turn to Smith's main treatment in Part
Second , 'Of Merit and Demerit', we will see that his whole point is
that judgment in terms of propriety is the basic feature, whereas judg¬
ment in terms of merit is dependent upon this.
The foundation for judgments of merit and demerit is, naturally, two
passions, gratitude and resentment, respectively. When an action meets
with gratitude we say that there is some merit in it. If the reaction
is one of resentment we say that the action has demerit. The first
reaction naturally points towards reward, the second towards punishment,
in a broad sense. (I, i, ch.l) Smith takes care to point out that those
two kinds of reaction are always tied up with the original action in
the sense that the gratitude and reward, or resentment and punishment,
is always given for, or because of, the action. This distinguishes
gratitude and resentment from love and hatred which are likewise passions
concerned with the happiness or misfortune of others, for the two latter
passions need not be felt because of anything specifically done to the
person who feels them, (ib., §§ 5-6) This characteristic of gratitude
and resentment leads directly to the heart of the matter. One can say
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that when a spectator tries to evaluate a judgment of merit or demerit,
he is really concerned with two actions, on the one hand the original
action, and on the other hand the action consisting of a feeling of
gratitude/resentment plus the consequent judgment of merit/demerit
and conferring of reward or punishment. This means that the spectator
can only judge the latter if he first judges the former; as the latter
is a reaction to the former, the former constitutes an essential part
of the situation in which the latter occurs. The propriety of reward
or punishment is naturally to be judged of in terms of the spectator's
sympathetically created, natural feelings of gratitude or resentment,
(ib., ch. 2, §§ 1-3) but he can only reach this through an adequate
picture of the situation and this involves a judgment of the propriety
of the original action. And so, in the words of the long heading to
ch. 3,
"where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person
who confers the benefit, there is little Sympathy with the
gratitude of him who receives it: and ..., on the contrary,
where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the
person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy
with the resentment of him who suffers it." (II, i, 3).
The moral evaluation of one action is dependent upon the moral evalua¬
tion of another when the latter is part of the former's situational
logic, but both evaluations are conducted by means of sympathy and in
terms of propriety:
"If in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to
have been no propriety, how beneficial soever its effects,
it does not seem to demand, ..., any proportional recompence. ...
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In the same manner we cannot at all sympathize with the
resentment of one man against another, merely because this
other has been the cause of his misfortune, unless he has
been the cause of it from motives which we cannot enter into."
(II, i, 4, §§ 1 § 3)
This leads Smith to the conclusion that "the sense of merit [and the
sense of demerit] seems to be a compounded sentiment". (II, i, 5, § 2,
§ cf. § 5) It involves two sympathetic moves, with two consequent
moral sentiments of approval or disapproval, one for the original action
and one for the reaction which consists of gratitude or resentment.
"As our sense, therefore, of the propriety of conduct arises
from what I shall call a direct sympathy with the affections
and motives of the person who acts, so our sense of its merit
arises from what I shall call an indirect sympathy with the
gratitude of the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon.
- As we cannot indeed enter thoroughly into the gratitude of
the person who receives the benefit, unless we beforehand
approve of the motives of the benefactor, so, upon this
account, the sense of merit seems to be a compounded sentiment,
and to be made up of two distinct emotions; a direct
sympathy with the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy
with the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his
actions." (II, i, 5, §§ 1-2)
And equally in the negative case, the case of demerit, there are
"two distinct emotions; a direct antipathy to the sentiments of
the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the
sufferer." (ib. § 5)
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Smith's distinction between direct and indirect sympathy here may seem
somewhat curious. As far as I can see, all there is to it is that in
order to reach the indirect sympathy and its attending evaluation, one
has to go through the direct sympathy and its attending evaluation.
We can conclude that Smith stays firmly within his theory of moral eval¬
uation in terms of propriety by this dissolution of judgments in terms
of merit/demerit into two propriety-judgments. But we can conclude
more than that. Smith's analysis shows that the moral evaluation of
the motives behind the original action is independent of whether or not
the action in fact results in invoking gratitude/resentment in those
who are affected by the action. When we judge we try to do so as
independent spectators, i.e. in terms of our own sympathetically created
feelings of gratitude/resentment and not in terms of the actual feelings
of gratitude/resentment in others.
We must, however, be wary of inferring from this that moral judgment,
according to Smith, is solely in terms of propriety without any influence
from regard to consequences. His theory is much more subtle than
that. In order to reach an understanding of it, we must proceed to
an analysis of Part IV, 'Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of
Approbation.'
Section 7. The Role of Utility
Part IV is one of the most intricate pieces of argument in the whole
book. It is divided into two chapters; in the first Smith introduces
the problem by showing what influence utility has on our evaluation of
"all the Products of Art" while he in the second transfers the discussion
to moral evaluation. He starts off by a presentation of what he takes
to be Hume's idea of utility, as a means to happiness, and of his idea
of how utility pleases "by perpetually suggesting", through the imag¬
ination, this pleasant end-result which the useful object of evaluation
"is fitted to promote", and he reminds us of how this becomes a common
standard for evaluation through spectator sympathy. (IV, 1, §§ 1-2)
By presenting Hume's views in this way Smith clearly shows that he did
not think that Hume distinguished between the two meanings of utility
which his dual use of the concept led us to suspect that he was getting
at, namely means-utility and end-utility (see above Chapter II, Section
10). Furthermore, Smith himself does not clarify this distinction.
For him the concept of utility encompasses both means and ends, but it
should be noticed that the ends are never dealt with as anything of
specific importance, let alone presented as of any particular content.
This is a point of significance when we come to deal with the relation¬
ship between justice and utility below.
In a way it is puzzling that Smith does not achieve this clarification
of the concept of utility for he clearly has, as it were, the means to
do so. This is demonstrated throughout Part IV. His strategy is
first to criticize Hume for not distinguishing between the influence of
means and the influence of ends in our evaluations and for operating
with utility, in the sense of means-and-ends. Nevertheless, he never
connects these two points into a distinction between two senses of
"utility". He then devotes the bulk of Part IV to showing the import¬
ance of distinguishing between means and ends for the understanding of,
first, aesthetic evaluation, then, moral evaluation. Taken in that
order Smith's argument proceeds as follows.
Although Hume is quite right that we often conduct our evaluation of
artificats by reference to the value of the end they produce, it has
generally been overlooked that very often the end itself is out of view
and the evaluation proceeds entirely in terms of the means. That is
to say, we judge a thing in terms of its goal-directedness without
considering the goal, in terms of how well-contrived it is without
taking into regard what it is contrived for:
"But that this fitness, this happy contrivance of any
production of art, should often be more valued than the
very end for which it was intended; and that the exact
adjustment of the means for attaining any conveniency or
pleasure should frequently be more regarded than that very
conveniency or pleasure, in the attainment of which their
whole merit would seem to consist, has not, so far as
I know, been yet taken notice of by anybody." (ib. § 3)
Smith first illustrates this with three well-known and rather charming
examples of an "aesthetic" character; the man who absolutely must re¬
place the chairs, the man who cannot get his watch precise enough,
and the "many people [who] ruin themselves by laying out money on
trinkets of frivolous utility", (ib. §§ 4-6) In all cases the
general aim is lost view of and the system and order of the means is
regarded as the main thing. This has been called "value-displace-
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ment". In so far as this is taken as a literal description it may
be rather unfortunate; it may very well be the case that no actual
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dis-placement takes place, if by this is meant a process of switching
from a view of the goal to a view of the means. The goal may never
actually have been clearly to mind for any individual. This is shown
by the following, much more important illustration. Smith simply
argues that most of the striving for social betterment that goes on in
society and which takes its beginning already from childhood and youth
is motivated by "the same love of system, the same regard to the beauty
of order, of art and contrivance", rather than by any clear view of
what it is all supposed to lead to. (ib. § 8) This is his theory of
vanity which is the focal point for some of the most important themes
in Smith, including the idea of the mechanism that makes society a
continuous process. We will store these themes for later commentary
and just take those important paragraphs (8-10) as illustrating the
structure of an important species of human evaluation.
As if it was not enough for Smith to suggest to us the parallel between
the replacement of chairs and social mobility in the broadest sense, his
concluding paragraph allows us to see the parallel between "frivolous
trinkets" and the political institutions of society, as far as the
mode of their evaluation is concerned, that is. The latter are also
often judged more with a view to whether they constitute a "grand
system" or not than whether they
"tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them.
This is their sole use and end. From a certain spirit of
system,^ however, from a certain love of art and contrivance,
we sometimes seem to value the means more than the end, and to
be eager to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures,
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rather from a view to perfect and improve a certain beautiful
and orderly system than from any immediate sense or feeling of
what they either suffer or enjoy." (ib. § 11)
This idea of evaluation in terms of means, rather than the end to which
the means lead, is a prime example of what I above called Smith's
contextualism. Men understand a thing in terms of the immediate
order, system, situation, in which it occurs, rather than in terms of
what is more remote. This is so much so that it even takes place with
small things which are plainly directed towards a limited and easily
understood aim, like showing the time. Can one wonder that it happens
with a trinket like the state?
This particular example carries elegantly over into the following chap¬
ter 2 where Smith starts by making the point that, since various insti¬
tutions in civil society serve to make up for deficiencies in human
nature and since such institutions are evaluated according to how use¬
ful they are in creating happiness, it might be thought that the
virtues which could make the institutions redundant, if such virtues
were the rule among men, would be evaluated in the same way. In other
words, Smith presents Hume's idea that human character and its motives
are judged in terms of their tendency to be useful or harmful.
(IV, 2, §§ 1-2) Here follows Smith's second great "But" to Hume in
this context. This theory of moral judgment in terms of the tendency
of the character judged of is, says Smith, a philosopher's construction
and not a viable theory of how men in fact judge.
In order to carry this criticism through Smith invokes his contexual-
ism to good measure. When the philosopher looks upon human behaviour
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he does so from a general and abstract point of view. He relates
characters and motives to their tendencies and evaluates and classifies
them accordingly. This, however, inevitably leads him to neglect the
situation, the context, in which the particular character functions
in each individual case and it is precisely in terms of this context
that men in common life judge morally. Moral judgment is a particular
judgment, not a general and typifying judgment. The general considera¬
tion of tendencies and effects is an afterthought which may come in
later and which may gain some influence, but it is bound to be as an
influence upon situational judgment which must remain the basic thing,
(ib. § 3) It is thus Smith's contextualism that is the real background
to his criticisms of Hume's "Philosopher's mistake":
"This beauty and deformity which characters appear to derive
from their usefulness or inconveniency, are apt to strike in
a peculiar manner those who consider, in an abstract and
philosophical light, the actions and conduct of mankind.
When a philosopher goes to examine why humanity is approved
of or cruelty condemned, he does not always form to himself,
in a very clear and distinct manner, the conception of any
one particular action either of cruelty or of humanity, but
is commonly contented with the vague and indeterminate idea
which the general names of those qualities suggest to him.
But it is in particular instances only that the propriety or
impropriety, the merit or demerit, of actions is very obvious
and discernible. It is only when particular examples are
given that we perceive distinctly either the concord or dis¬
agreement between our own affections and those of the agent, or
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feel a social gratitude arise towards him in the one case,
or a sympathetic resentment in the other. When we consider
virtue and vice in an abstract and general manner, the
qualities by which they excite these several sentiments seem
in a great measure to disappear, and the sentiments them¬
selves become less obvious and discernible. On the contrary,
the happy effects of the one, and the fatal consequences of
the other, seem then to rise up to the view, and, as it were,
to stand out and distinguish themselves from all the other
qualities of either." (IV, 2, § 2)
I think we can now see Smith's general strategy in Part IV. He begins
by pointing out that Hume is right in his theory of evaluation in so
far as artificial things are concerned. We do in fact to a large
extent judge such objects in terms of their "utility", i.e., as Smith
reads Hume, their tendency to create happiness. But even here it is
important to distinguish between what we have called means-utility and
end-utility, for it is the former which determines our evaluation
much more than the latter. In other words, it is more the immediate
context than the more distant, possible result that is determining.
He then goes on in Chapter 2 to say that in judgments of human charac¬
ter, i.e. in moral judgment, the grip of the context is even firmer
and the inspiration of the end even fainter.
He spends the rest of the chapter backing up this conclusion about moral
judgment by making two considerations. The first takes up seven lines,
the second more than eleven pages, and yet it would be a bold man who
would say which is the more important. The first reads as little more
than a mere assertion:
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"first of all, it seems impossible that the approbation of
virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by
which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building;
or, that we should have no other reason for praising a man
than that for which we commend a chest of drawers." (ib. § 4)
The "convenient and well-contrived building" which appears here is a
reference to Hume's Treatise, p. 617, where "a convenient house" also
appears and this little paragraph is a contention of a central theme
in Hume's theory. In the Treatise, p. 617, and, in greater detail,
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pp. 471-73, Hume tries to face up to the problem Smith mentions in
the quotation above:
"if virtue and vice be determin'd by pleasure and pain, these
qualities must, in every case, arise from the sensations;
and consequently any object, whether animate or inanimate,
rational or irrational, might become morally good or evil,
provided it can excite a satisfaction or uneasiness."
(T. 471)
His answer is, briefly, that although there is a sufficient family
resemblance between the various kinds of pleasure and pain "to make
them be expressed by the same abstract term", (T. 472) the pleasure
and pain attending moral judgment are, as a matter of empirical fact,
distinct:
"a convenient house, and a virtuous character, cause not the
same feeling of approbation; even tho' the source of our appro¬
bation be the same, and flow from sympathy and an idea of their
utility. There is something very inexplicable in this varia¬
tion of our feelings; but 'tis what we have experience of with
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regard to all our passions and sentiments." (T. 617)
Smith did not find "this variation of our feelings" so "very inex¬
plicable". Although he would agree with Hume that both evaluations
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of artifacts and evaluations of moral matters are pleasant or painful ,
he would claim that he could explain their differences by detailing the
difference in their causes. The former is plainly the pleasure/pain
of utility/disutility. The latter, the pleasure/pain of moral approval/
disapproval, is obviously the pleasure/pain of agreement/disagreement
between spectator and agent, and such agreement or disagreement is only
to be found through a sympathetic inquiry into the situation of the
person principally concerned, i.e. through understanding of his back¬
ground and context. When Hume, therefore, points out that,
'"Tis only when a character is considered in general, without
reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a
[peculiar] feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally
good or evil", (T. 472)
Smith would quite agree, but he would at the same time point out that
such a general and impartial point of view is reached through sympa¬
thetic understanding of another's situation and not through understand-
27
ing of useful tendencies in the character concerned. It is, I think,
in this sense we must understand Smith's statement at the end of the
second chapter of Part IV,
"that so far as the sentiment of approbation arises from the
perception of this beauty of utility, it has no reference of
any kind to the sentiments of others", (ib. § 12)
It is not the useful tendency as such that interests us in, or refers
us to, others; but when we, through social life, (see the rest of § 12)
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in fact have got an interest in others, by means of mutual sympathy,
then utility can gain moral importance. This is what Smith can hide
under the cloak of a mere assertion.
His second way of arguing against the idea that the useful tendency of
characters and motives is the basis for moral evaluation is to show that
the qualities of the human mind which are in fact useful either to the
person himself or to his fellow men are rarely judged in terms of this
as "the first ground of ... approbation", (ib. § 5) He does this by
taking up a number of examples where those qualities (reason and self-
command; humanity, justice, generosity, and public spirit) are approved
of, not because of any useful tendency, and often in spite of harm to
the persons themselves, but because they meet with the approval of the
actual and/or the impartial spectator(s). The motive for moral
behaviour is not utility but spectator-approval and, if possible, the
spectator-praise and admiration which follow when we are able to surprise
the spectator and make him wonder through an exertion above the normal
and expected, (ib. §§ 7-11)
Part IV constitutes a formidable piece of argument against utility as a
source of moral evaluation, but Smith takes care not to overstate his
case. He does not say that consideration of utility has no influence
upon moral judgment. What he says is:
"that it is not the view of ... utility or hurtfulness which
is either the first or principal source of our approbation
and disapprobation", (ib.. § 3)
The question is, then, how does consideration of utility come to influ¬
ence moral judgment, and thus behaviour? This is one of the most
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exciting questions one can ask in connection with Smith for it opens up
a most extraordinary theoretical construction. Let us however take
one step at a time and the small ones first. Smith's immediate answer
to our question is simply that the idea of utility is an "afterthought".
(cf. I, i, 4, § 4) The useful tendency of a human character or action
is something we can recognize after the event and this recognition may
thus strengthen our original judgment which was based upon propriety:
"utility, when we come to view it, bestows upon [moral actions]
undoubtedly a new beauty, and upon that account still further
recommends them to our approbation." (IV, 2, § 11)
But this recognition of the utility of moral behaviour is not a common
thing in men's moral judgments. It is a kind of abstraction because it
(as mentioned earlier) goes beyond the context in which the action
occurs and it is, therefore, more a matter for philosphical speculation:
"This beauty, however, is chiefly perceived by men of reflection
and speculation, and is by no means the quality which first
recommends such actions to the natural sentiments of the bulk
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of mankind" (continuation of op. cit.).
Such philosophical speculation will, however, be evoked not only by
pure philosophical curiosity but also when moral judgments are chal-
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lenged , a theme we will return to in connection with justice. Pre¬
sumably regard to utility will come into men's moral outlook from both
sources, functioning as a support for their ordinary moral judgment in
terms of situational propriety. The reality of this influence is
touched upon a number of times by Smith. Thus he does e.g. in his
treatment of the broad classes of virtue in Part VI point out that,
"In our approbation of all those virtues [of prudence, justice,
141.
and beneficence], our sense of their agreeable effects, of
their utility, either to the person who exercises them or to
some other persons, joins with our sense of their propriety,
and constitutes always a considerable, frequently the greater,
part of that approbation. - But in our approbation of the
virtues of self-command, complacency with their effects some¬
times constitutes no part, and frequently but a small part,
of that approbation." (VI, Conclusion, §§ 6-7)
Moreover when Smith in Part VII criticizes Hutcheson's moral sense
theory he points out that the following four sources of moral evaluation
seem to be exhaustive, not leaving room for any special moral sense:
1) judgment of the propriety of the motives of the agent; 2) judgment
of the propriety of the motives of the patient; and then two supporting
sources: 3) the general rules formed out of, and afterwards to some
extent regulating, judgments of propriety, and 4) regard to the useful
tendency of motives and actions. (VII, iii, 3, § 16)
Utility is a real source of moral judgment, although a secondary one.
But in what sense secondary? Here the parallel with general rules is
suggestive. Just as the general rules, as we noted earlier, arise out
of individual actions which are judged morally in terms of situational
propriety, so useful consequences tend to follow from such moral actions.
In both cases this unforeseen product of moral behaviour and judgment
is only recognized afterwards and it is only then that it comes to have
an influence on moral judgment and behaviour.
Clearly Smith is here making the enormous presupposition that moral
behaviour does in fact tend to have useful consequences in the world as
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we know it. This is, however, not merely a presupposition in Smith,
30
it is an explicitly stated doctrine. When men act in the morally
proper way the outcome of such behaviour is, in general, of a useful
tendency. Or, to put it bluntly, by and large virtue pays in this
world:
"virtue is upon all ordinary occasions, even with regard to
this life, real wisdom, and the surest and readiest means of
obtaining both safety and advantage." (VII, ii, 2, § 13)
We may take this as a rather extreme case of Enlightenment optimism or
as one of the traditional teleological non-explanations of natural
theology. We may also look closer at the text, for Smith goes on in
the following manner:
"Our success or disappointment in our undertakings must very
much depend upon the good or bad opinion which is commonly
entertained of us, and upon the general disposition of those
we live with, either to assist or to oppose us. But the
best, the surest, the easiest, and the readiest way of obtaining
the advantageous and of avoiding the unfavourable judgments of
others, is, undoubtedly, to render ourselves the proper objects
of the former and not of the latter." (ib.)
Men are bound to live in society and in most of their doings they
are dependent upon the assistance of their fellow men, at least in the
minimal sense that the latter do not obstruct their activity, and often
in the sense of positive help. To have this condition fulfilled is
one of the greatest advances towards success in one's actions. To
obtain this it is, however, necessary to reach some conformity with
one's fellows about the way in which one can go about one's business.
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Since such conformity is sought from all sides, it amounts to an adapt¬
ation which renders the behaviour of individuals as compatible as possible.
This seeking of conformity in the outlook upon behaviour is, as we know,
reached by means of mutual sympathy and, as we also know, mutual sympathy
has a tendency to gravitate towards a common, impartial standpoint, or at
least to create the idea, and ideal, of such a standpoint. Obviously,
the more this impartial standpoint is followed, the more compatible will
the behaviour of individuals become; which is just another way of saying
that the more people pursue their various aims in accordance with the
impartial spectator's standards of virtuous propriety, the less resistance,
and the more assistance, will they meet from their fellows, i.e. the more
useful will they be to themselves and to their fellow men. Optimism or
not, Smith certainly has an explanation to offer.
Smith is, however, not unduly optimistic. What he is saying is that
unless men in general approached moral behaviour pretty closely and unless
this in general led to successful results, it would simply be impossible
to understand how society, and thus mankind, could survive (cf. V, 2,
§16); but this does, of course, not preclude that this may not be the
case in individual instances and in particular kinds of behaviour (see
V, 2, §§ 12-16, and III, 5, §8).
Section 8. The Role of Religion
If one still finds Smith too optimistic and unrealistic because it is
difficult to understand how disappointments in individual cases should
not be enough to cause a more widespread breakdown of morality and thus
of society, then one should remember two further features of his theory.
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First of all, the theory of the impartial spectator is, in a way, a
theory of how the reaction to such disappointments can be internalized.
In cases where the virtue of a way of behaving is not understood and
appreciated by the surrounding society, man has, at least to a certain
extent, the ability to take up the standpoint of the impartial spectator
which gives him the possibility of gaining the approval of the "man
within" independently of the judgment of the "man without". This
approval can function as a compensation and consolation for lost oppor¬
tunities in the social world. (Ill, 2, § 32, and II, iii, 3, § 6)
Secondly, if this is not enough, man has "an appeal to a still higher
tribunal", to God. (Ib. § 33, and VII, ii, 1, § 45)
When Smith's theology is touched upon the sympathy of most commentators
seems to become very weak indeed, but again I recommend caution and a
close reading of what he has to say. Let us begin with a rather central
formulation:
"When we ... despair of finding any force upon earth which can
check the triumph of injustice, we naturally appeal to heaven,
and hope that the great Author of our nature will himself
execute hereafter, what all the principles which he has given
us for the direction of our conduct prompt us to attempt even
here; that he will complete the plan which he himself has thus
taught us to begin; and will, in a life to come, render to
every one according to the works which he has performed in
this world. And thus we are led to the belief in a future
state, not only by the weaknesses, by the hopes and fears of human
nature, but by the noblest and best principles which belong
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to it, by the love of virtue, and by the abhorrence of
vice and injustice." (Ill, 5, § 10)
The first thing to note about religious belief is that it is a conse¬
quence of, a function of morality. Men believe in God -and an after¬
life because they are led to it by their moral convictions. The
former is a continuation and completion of the latter and religion
thus becomes a strong support of morality, "religion enforces the
natural sense of duty." (ib. § 13)"^ This idea of religion as
primarily a function and continuation of morality is so striking in
Smith, that it seems reasonable to call his view moral theology, with
due respect for Kant and no wish to make a comparison in the present
context.
There is, however, more to Smith's theology than that. When one goes
through all the theological passages in The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
it stands out as a striking feature in many, if not most, of them that
he is really proposing a theory of human nature. Phrases like "we
naturally appeal", "we are naturally led to believe", "nature teaches
us to hope", "a hope and expectation deeply rooted in human nature",
"the natural principles of religion", etc. abundantly show this to be
his intention. With a bit of care I think we can spell out this
theory. We have already noted Smith's idea of religious belief as a
continuation and completion of moral sentiments, and in the quotation
already given on the previous page we heard that men "naturally ...
hope that the great Author of our nature ... will complete the plan
which he himself has taught us to begin". Elsewhere we hear that men
can only give universal benevolence on the supposition that this con¬
tributes to, or is part of, a great universal system of happiness
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supervised by God. (VI, ii, 3, § 2) All this, of course, shows that
religious belief is yet another example of the contextualism which
Smith sees as the hallmark of human knowledge. Many, or most, aspects
of moral life seem incomplete, unfinished, and for man, whose nature
it is to seek order, system, coherence, in order to understand, this
naturally leads to a belief in a completion beyond the present life
and a divine guarantor of universal order.
It thus seems clear that Smith proposes a naturalistic theory of relig¬
ious belief and that this theory is part and parcel of his theory of
moral sentiments which again is part of a broader conception of human
knowledge. This naturalistic character of Smith's theory is confirmed
by the charming bits of a natural history of religion which he gives
away, e.g. in the well-known few lines that replaced the so-called
atonement-passage:
"The justice of God, ..., we think, still requires, that
he should hereafter avenge the injuries of the widow and
fatherless, who are here so often insulted with impunity.
In every religion, and in every superstition that the world
has ever beheld, accordingly, there has been a Tartarus as
well as an Elysium; a place provided for the punishment of
the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just."
(II, ii, 3, § 12)
Although Smith thus can account for religion in terms of natural principles,
we must note that he always makes it quite clear that religion is specu¬
lation and philosophy just as the consideration of utility is. It
seems as if his meaning is that it is most natural and common, when it
occurs as the continuation of individual cases, whereas it is a
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philosopher's construction when it appears as a system. However that
may be, he insists that religion is not, and ought not to be, concerned
with action. It is a matter of consoling contemplation:
"Nature has not prescribed to us this sublime contemplation
as the great business and occupation of our lives. She
only points it out to us as the consolation of our misfortunes."
(VII, ii, 1, § 46)
The only way it has to do with action is as a strengthening factor upon
our natural sentiments of morality, which is, of course, just another
way of saying that man's life and morality constitute an independent
sphere which is governed by its own natural principles:
"The administration of the great system of the universe, ...
the care of the universal happiness of all rational and
sensible beings, is the business of God, and not of man.
To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one much
more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrow¬
ness of his comprehension - the care of his own happiness, of
that of his family, his friends, his country ... The most
sublime speculation of the contemplative philosopher can
scarce compensate the neglect of the smallest active duty."
(VI, ii, 3, § 6)32
Religion is a more or less philosophical speculation which is naturally
superimposed upon men's natural sentiments of morality, more so for some
men than for others. But to substitute the former for the latter, as
monks try to do, (III, 2, § 34) is contrary to nature and therefore
ruled out for the bulk of mankind. In other words, men's religious
beliefs are themselves selected according to natural principles:
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"To compare ... the futile mortifications of a monastery,
to the ennobling hardships and hazards of war; to suppose
that one day, or one hour, employed in the former should, in
the eye of the great Judge of the world, have more merit
than a whole life spent honourably in the latter, is surely
contrary to all our moral sentiments; to all the principles
by which nature has taught us to regulate our contempt or
admiration. It is this spirit, however, which, while it
has reserved the celestial regions for monks and friars, or
for those whose conduct and conversation resembled those
of monks and friars, has condemned to the infernal all the
heroes, all the statesmen and lawgivers, all the poets
and philosophers of former ages; all those who have invented,
improved, or excelled in the arts which contribute to the
subsistence, to the conveniency, or to the ornament of
human life; all the great protectors, instructors, and bene¬
factors of mankind; all those to whom our natural sense of
praiseworthiness forces us to ascribe the highest merit and
most exalted virtue." (Ill, 2, § 35)
Could anything be more like Hume's denouncement of "the whole train of
monkish virtues"? (Enquiry, 270) And could the reasoning behind it
be any more similar to Hume's idea of "artificial lives and manners"?
(A Dialogue, 340-43)
Just like Hume, Smith never makes clear his own personal attitude to the
religious hypothesis. He limits himself to pointing out that men's
teleological inferences about God and an afterlife are conducted along
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the same lines as the rest of human understanding but that it is purely
speculative. He does not say that such speculation is invalid. From
the tone of various of his passages one may get the feeling that he has
brought Hume's criticism of such inferences thoroughly home to himself.
His insistence upon the great gulf between the world of religion and
the world of human action seems to indicate this. Indeed, one might
say that Smith's insistence upon this gulf as far as the praxis of life
is concerned brings men fully as close to a Kierkegaard!an "leap-of-
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faith" view of religion as does Hume's criticism of religion.
Whether either of them wanted to make the leap remains unknown.
The really important thing i^, however, that it is irrelevant whether
one wants to take the leap or not as far as moral theory and understand¬
ing is concerned. Nothing hinges on teleological explanations and
thus on a guarantor of a teleological order. I think it is safe to
say that wherever a piece of teleology turns up in Smith it is fairly
clear where we have to look in order to find a "real" explanation in
terms of what we may broadly call efficient causes. We have already
seen this done with large areas of human behaviour and we have been
able to read off Smith's philosophical principles in this matter from
his explanatory practice. We need, however, not rest content with
this, for he does very clearly and forcefully formulate his views of
explanation.
Section 9. Teleology
In dealing with the problem of teleological explanations Smith starts
off from the assumption that men do in fact perceive a teleological
order in the universe in general and in the physical world in particu¬
lar. Whether this is true is, of course, doubtful; it may well have
been more true about 18th Century men than it is about 20th Century men
but irrespective of this, it clearly serves the rhetorical purpose of
throwing in relief his criticism of teleology as a mode of explanation:
"In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted
with the nicest artifice to the ends which they are intended
to produce; and in the mechanism of a plant, or animal
body, admire how every thing is contrived for advancing the
two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual,
and the propagation of the species." (TMS, II, ii, 3, § 5)
One thing is, though, the general order which may be perceived by men,
or, rather, by certain men, the philosophers; another thing is to
explain the operation of the individual parts and thus the order. So
Smith goes on:
"But in these, and in all such objects, we still distinguish
the efficient from the final cause of their several motions
and organizations. The digestion of the food, the circu¬
lation of the blood, and the secretion of the several juices
which are drawn from it, are operations all of them
necessary for the great purposes of animal life. Yet we never
endeavour to account for them from those purposes as from
their efficient causes, nor imagine that the blood circulates,
or that the food digests of its own accord, and with a view
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or intention to the purposes of circulation or digestion.
The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end
for which it was made, the pointing of the hour. All their
various motions conspire in the nicest manner to produce this
effect. If they were endowed with a desire and intention to
produce it, they could not do it better. Yet we never
ascribe any such desire or intention to them, but to the watch¬
maker, and we know they are put into motion by a spring, which
intends the effect it produces as little as they do." (Ib.)
In other words, in Smith's opinion the methodological discussion in his
day had reached clarity about the distinction between the contemplation
of order and the explanation of function as far as the physical world
was concerned. But such clarity was far from achieved in moral
matters. Here the perception of order was still so dominating that
the philosophical inquirer transferred it from his own speculation onto
the individuals inquired into as their principle of action.
"But though, in accounting for the operations of bodies, we
never fail to distinguish in this manner the efficient from
the final cause, in accounting for those of the mind, we are
very apt to confound these two different things with one another.
When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends
which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us,
we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient
cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends,
and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality
is the wisdom of God." (Ib.)
As stated thus far this is essentially a negative doctrine. It is a
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denial that human reason is a power which can shape or construct the
basic outlines of human life. Smith is, however, aware of this, as
is implied in all the above quotations concerning the contrast between
final and efficient causes, and, indeed, one can see it as his main
purpose to fulfil the positive task of pointing out the efficient causes
which create order in human life. He starts from the foundation of
men's existence, their mere physical survival:
"With regard to all those ends which, upon account of their pecu¬
liar importance, may be regarded, if such an expression is
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allowable , as the favourite ends of nature, she has con¬
stantly ... not only endowed mankind with an appetite for the
end which she proposes, but likewise with an appetite for the
means by which alone this end can be brought about, for their
own sakes, and independent of their tendency to produce it.
Thus self-preservation, and the propagation of the species,
are the great ends which nature seems to have proposed in
the formation of all animals. Mankind are endowed with a
desire of those ends, and an aversion to the contrary; with
a love of life, and a dread of dissolution; with a desire of
the continuance and perpetuity of the species, and with an
aversion to the thoughts of its entire extinction. But though
we are in this manner endowed with a very strong desire of
those ends, it has not been entrusted to the slow and uncertain
determinations of our reason, to find out the proper means
of bringing them about. Nature has directed us to the greater
part of these by original and immediate instincts. Hunger,
thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of
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pleasure, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those
means for their own sakes, and without any consideration of
their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great
Director of nature intended to produce by them." (II, i, 5, § 10)
Smith's real feat as a philosopher is, of course, to point out that
exactly the same applies to man's social life and to have worked out a
theory of the efficient cause which, so to speak, can take the place of
the kind of constructive rationality which he denies is a basic feature
of mankind. This is the theory of mutual sympathy as a selection
mechanism of behaviour, which renders social life possible.
"Though man ... be naturally endowed with a desire for the
welfare and preservation of society, yet the Author of nature
has not entrusted to his reason to find out that a certain
application of punishments is the proper means of attaining
this end; but has endowed him with an immediate and instinctive
approbation of that very application which is most proper to
attain it." (Op. cit., my italics)
All this amounts to a proper philosophy of unintended consequences: the
idea that when men act on their own individual purposes, guided by the
ordinary principles of human nature, something unforeseen and far
beyond those purposes emerges, and this something will afterwards
become recognizable as some kind of order. Smith is spelling out
fully this theory which Hume took the major steps to erect through his
treatment of the origin of justice.
The thing which brought Smith to greater clarity in this matter than
Hume was his clarification of the relative importance of the means-
perspective and the end-perspective in our moral judgments of actions
and characters. Once he got rid of Hume's troublesome concept of
utility and replaced it with his own idea of situational propriety as
the basic element in moral reasoning, he had a much clearer view of the
role of reason in human action and hence in our explanation of human
behaviour. Accordingly we never find the same difficult tensions in
Smith's theory which we found in Hume's between the rationally created
and the unintentionally occasioned. But then Smith never involves
himself in a discussion of the distinction between natural and artificial
which we hypothesized might be part of the explanation of Hume's diffi¬
culties. Whether Smith had any clear ideas of this or whether the
logic of the discussion pressed him into an unintended clarity, we do
not know.
Section 10. Pleasure. Pain, and Utopianism
The two passages where Smith criticizes teleological explanations
explicitly (II, i, 5, § 10 and II, ii, 3, §5), which I have dealt with
above and quoted extensively from, occur in connection with his theory
of justice and that is surely no coincidence. Nowhere is his theory
of the "efficient cause" which selects behaviour clearer and of greater
importance than in his account of how just behaviour is selected.
Justice was something of an enigma to both Hume and Smith. Although
neither of them set out with the primary aim of formulating a theory
of justice in their major philosophical work, both of them gave consider¬
able space to such a theory and both of them kept referring to it in
other contexts. The thing which struck them was that justice is so
different from all other virtues. It seemed to be more precise and it
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could therefore be formulated in strict and general rules. Further¬
more, men were always prone to enforce those rules. Now, what I suggest
is that Smith had a highly original theory of why justice is so precise
and, in close connection with this, why it is enforcible.
It may appear as a piece of the high-handed cynicism about man's lot
in the world which he always criticizes in the Stoics, when Smith main-
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tains that basically the bulk of mankind is in a position to be happy.
I will not deny that there may be an element of this in it, but this
should not, as is common, obscure to us that he also puts forward an
interesting theory about this matter. Surely, the point he is making
is that it is rather difficult to say much in general terms about what
is needed to make mankind happy and the reason is that the difference
between "the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of
debt, and has a clear conscience" and "the highest pitch of human
prosperity" is "but a trifle". (I, iii, 1, §§ 7-8) This trifle is
traversed by men, not out of any basic needs, (I, iii, 2, § 1) but under
the guidance of vanity, (I, iii, 2, § 8; IV, 1, §§ 8 § 10) a principle
which is as changing in its contents, as it is permanent in its influ¬
ence with mankind. In contrast to this narrow scope for happiness
the possible depths of misery are "immense and prodigious". (I, iii, 1,
§ 8) This fundamental asymmetry between happiness and misery is
connected with the fact that,
"Pain ..., whether of mind or body, is a more pungent sensation
than pleasure, and our sympathy with pain, though it falls
greatly short of what is naturally felt by the sufferer, is
generally a more lively and distinct perception than our sympathy
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with pleasure, though this last often approaches more nearly ...
to the natural vivacity of the original passion." (I, iii, 1,
§ 3) 56
Pain makes a greater impact than pleasure upon the person principally
concerned, and there is also a difference in the communication of the
two, although that is rather more complicated. Sympathy with pleasure
and joy is in itself pleasant, while sympathy with pain and sorrow is
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unpleasant ; we therefore have a natural tendency to like the former
and dislike the latter. (I, iii, 1, §§ 5 § 9) On the other hand
sympathy with pleasure is something of an "either/or" phenomenon: if
we do not sympathize completely, it is not really sympathy (ib. §2).
Sympathy with pleasure is a lively, but fickle kind of sympathy. Sym¬
pathy with pain and sorrow, on the contrary, is much more resilient;
although it is often not so close to the original feeling in vivacity,
it is always present in some degree:
"our sympathy with sorrow is, ... more universal, than that
with joy", (ib. §2)
The fact that the difference between "what may be called the natural
state of our happiness" (III, 2, § 15) and "the highest pitch of human
prosperity" "is but a trifle", (I, iii, 1, § 8) plus the fact that it
is pleasant for one in the former condition to go along with one in the
latter condition, are the reasons why this kind of sympathy is more
complete and the sympathetic feeling closer to the original. By con¬
trast the fact that "the distance is immense and prodigious" between the
state of natural happiness and "the lowest depth of misery" (I, iii, 1,
§ 8) means that sympathy with the latter condition is much more strongly
desired by one in that condition.
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"It is to be observed ... that we are still more anxious to
communicate to our friends our disagreeable, than our
agreeable passions; that we derive still more satisfaction
from their sympathy with the former, than from that with the
latter, and that we are still more shocked by the want of it.
... The agreeable passions of love and joy can satisfy and
support the heart without any auxiliary pleasure. The
bitter and painful emotions of grief and resentment more
strongly require the healing consolation of sympathy." (I, i,
2, §§ 3 8 5)
So although sympathy with pain and sorrow is disagreeable it is uni¬
versally desired. This means that it becomes a social necessity that
an emotional compromise is established through mutual sympathy.
(I, iii, 1, §§ 12-15)
The idea that pain and misery is more pungently felt than pleasure and
happiness and that sympathy with the former is more distinct and uni¬
versal is of the greatest importance in Smith. For one thing it seems
to be behind the indications of a political theory he gives now and
then. Thus when he attacks the "men of system", (VI, ii, 2, §§ 14-18)
one of his main points is that they try to create a complete happiness
instead of trying to alleviate concrete misery. They
"seldom fail to hold out some plausible plan of reformation,
which, they pretend, will not only remove the inconveniencies
and relieve the distresses immediately complained of, but will
prevent in all time coming any return of the like inconveniencies
and distresses." (VI, ii, 2, § 15)
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Smith points out that this is an expression of extreme intellectual
arrogance:
"The man of system ... is apt to be very wise in his own
conceit, and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty
of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer
the smallest deviation from any part of it." (ib. § 17)
This he then goes on to illustrate with the famous chess-board analogy,
the real point of which, of course, is that the knowledge which the
rulers of a society can have about the citizens is very limited indeed
and that the laying down of rules for the latter is correspondingly
difficult.
The man of system is to be contrasted with the man of real public spirit:
"He will accommodate, as well as he can, his public arrange¬
ments to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the people,
and will remedy, as well as he can, the inconveniencies which
may flow from the want of those regulations which the people
are averse to submit to. When he cannot establish the right,
he will not disdain to ameliorate the wrong; but, like Solon,
when he cannot establish the best system of laws, he will
endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear."
(ib. § 16)
This criticism of utopianism and suggestion of its replacement with the
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piecemeal alleviation of concrete evils does, of course, fit in
nicely with Smith's criticism of any kind of utility-interpretation of
human morality. One can simply understand utopianism as a political
exploitation of the latter. It is a philosopher's construction which
is excessively speculative and does not respect the concrete situa¬
tions in which individual men in fact act. A piecemeal approach in
politics which does not aim much higher than to remedy given evils will,
by contrast, respect those individual situations to as high a degree as
is possible, for it will only be guided by those elements in the situa¬
tions which are most "pungently" felt and which are most "universally"
39
and "distinctly" sympathized with, namely pain and misery.
This criticism of excessive rationalism, or utopianism, in politics
must not be misunderstood. The intention is not the abdication of
reason but rather a realization of its limits. Political philosophy
is still necessary to formulate and give consistency to political ideals
The Utopian mistake is to think that such principles are sacrosanct
in action:
"Some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection
of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for directing
the views of the statesman. But to insist upon establish¬
ing, and upon establishing all at once, and in spite of all
opposition, every thing which that idea may seem to require,
must often be the highest degree of arrogance. It is to erect
his own judgment into the supreme standard of right and wrong.
It is to fancy himself the only wise and worthy man in the
commonwealth, and that his fellow-citizens should accommodate
themselves to him, and not he to them." (VI, ii, 2, § 18)
This does, in its turn, presuppose that there are some quite fundamental
or "natural", principles which universally aim at the protection of
each man in his individuality and which, therefore, render utopianism
into "the highest degree of arrogance". This is exactly Smith's
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meaning. The fundamental, or natural, "laws of justice" are exactly
such principles and they are founded upon the "primacy of the negative"
in morals, the primacy of pain, misery, unhappiness.
Section 11. Positive and Negative Virtues
It is no surprise to find that the contrast between "the positive" and
"the negative" in morals is the theme with which Smith opens his dis¬
cussion of justice. What he does is to compare beneficence and
justice. (II, ii, 1) He does so through a comparison of the lack
of either and the reactions to this:
"the mere want of beneficence tends to do no real positive
evil. It may disappoint of the good which might reasonably
have been expected, and upon that account it may justly
excite dislike and disapprobation: it cannot, however,
provoke any resentment which mankind will go along with."
(II, ii, 1, § 3)
The man who does not show beneficence can at most be
"the object of hatred, a passion which is naturally excited
by impropriety of sentiment and behaviour; not of resentment,
a passion which is never properly called forth but by actions
which tend to do real and positive hurt to some particular
persons." (ib.)
And accordingly,
"Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force,
the mere want of it exposes to no punishment", (ib.)
So much for the positive side. But there is a negative correlate:
161.
"There is, however, another virtue, of which the observance
is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be
extorted by force, and of which the violation exposes to resent¬
ment, and consequently to punishment. This virtue is
justice: the violation of justice is injury: it does real
and positive hurt to some particular persons, from motives
which are naturally disapproved of. It is, therefore, the
proper object of resentment, and of punishment, which is the
natural consequence of resentment." (ib. §5)
The whole distinction between the two virtues is thus drawn in terms of
the reactions, first of the patient, afterwards of the spectator, to
the lack of them, and the point is that the lack of justice "does real
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and positive hurt" while the lack of beneficence does not. Hence
the former meets with a much clearer and stronger response than the
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latter, with resentment rather than hatred. This greater strength
is shown in the fact that resentment is normally followed by action,
i.e. punishment.
This is a natural pattern of reaction, which is approved of as proper
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by any impartial spectator. Not only is it approved of; often the
sympathetic feeling is so strong as to lead to action as well, in the
form of assistance to the injured in his pursuit of punishment. Such
an "active" sympathy would obviously never gain any approval and
support in the case of hatred at the lack of beneficence, (ib. § 7)
This spectator-reaction is, of course, communicated by mutual sympathy
to all members of a social group and everyone contemplating an act of
injustice will thus know it and fear it:
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"The person himself who meditates an injustice is sensible of
this [kind of reaction], and feels that force may, with the
utmost propriety, be made use of, both by the person he is
about to injure, and by others, either to obstruct the execution
of his crime, or to punish him when he has executed it." (ib. § 5)
Smith thus uses his idea of the moral primacy of the negative to draw
a sharp distinction between all positive virtues, represented by bene¬
ficence, and justice:
"that remarkable distinction between justice and all the other
social virtues ... that we feel ourselves to be under a stricter
obligation to act according to justice, than agreeably to
friendship, charity, or generosity; that the practice of these
last-mentioned virtues seems to be left in some measure to our
own choice, but that, somehow or other, we feel ourselves to
be in a peculiar manner tied, bound, and obliged, to the obser¬
vation of justice." (ib. § 5)
This distinction is also clearly seen if we turn our attention from the
lack of the virtues to the reactions to the virtues themselves, for
we will then see that beneficence naturally is rewarded with gratitude
while justice is judged to be nothing but proper:
"There is, no doubt, a propriety in the practice of justice, and
it merits, upon that account, all the approbation which is due
to propriety. But as it does no real positive good, it is
entitled to very little gratitude. Mere justice is, upon
most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us
from hurting our neighbour. ... We may often fulfil all the
rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing." (ib. § 9)
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This contrast between the negative virtue of justice and all the posi¬
tive virtues is pursued even further by Smith. He always insists
that the fundamental rules of justice are absolutely precise, whereas
the rules of the positive virtues are rather unclear and uncertain:
"There is ... one virtue, of which the general rules determine ,
with the greatest exactness, every external action which it
requires. This virtue is Justice. The rules of justice
are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions
or modifications but such as may be ascertained as accurately
as the rules themselves, and which generally, indeed, flow from
the very same principles with them." (Ill, 6, I 10)
As far as the rules of all other virtues are concerned, we go by their
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"spirit", but with justice we follow the rules to the "letter":
"In the practice of the other virtues, our conduct should
rather be directed by a certain idea of propriety, by a certain
taste for a particular tenor of conduct, than by any regard
to a precise maxim or rule; and we should consider the end
and foundation of the rule more than the rule itself. But
it is otherwise with regard to justice ... Though the end of
the rules of justice be to hinder us from hurting our*neighbour,
it may frequently be a crime to violate them, though we could
pretend, with some pretext of reason, that this particular
violation could do no hurt ... When once we begin to give way
to such refinements, there is no enormity so gross of which
we may not be capable." (ib.)
This reasoning leads Smith to the following, rather nice comparison:
"The rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar;
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the rules of the other virtues to the rules which critics
lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant in
composition. The one are precise, accurate, and indispensable.
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The other are loose, vague, and indeterminate ...".(ib. S 11)
Whence this great accuracy in the rules of justice? Smith never spells
out his explanation, but in view of what we have already seen to be the
foundation of justice the explanation seems rather obvious. The rules
of justice are precise because they are derived from spectator-
reactions which are unusually "universal" and "distinct", namely the
"pungent" feeling of sympathetic resentment occasioned by "real and
positive hurt". Smith's idea seems to be that clarity and accuracy
is transferred in the following chain; the action (negative: hurting),
the reaction (resentment fj punishment), the spectator reaction through
sympathy (sympathetic resentment § assistance in punishing), the general
rule arising from spectator reactions.
The negative character of justice also implies that the general rules
of this virtue arise somewhat differently from the rules of the other
virtues. The latter arise from spectator-approval of the practice of
those virtues, but the rules of justice arise from spectator-disapproval
of injustice, of the non-performance of the virtue. If nobody had ever
been unjust the rules of justice would never have been thought of, for
they are but a specification of mere propriety.
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Section 12. Utility and the Foundation of Justice
The stronger the sympathetic resentment of the impartial spectator is,
the more important is the rule that arises from it. Hence the rule
protecting life and personal safety is the most important rule of
justice; next comes the rule protecting property; and thirdly rules
protecting contracts:
"The most sacred laws of justice ... , those whose violation
seems to call loudest for vengeance and punishment, are the
laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the
next are those which guard his property and possessions; and
last of all come those which guard what are called his personal
rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others."
(II, ii, 2, § 2)
One of the more remarkable differences between Smith's and Hume's theory
of justice is that Smith in this way gives the rule about the protec¬
tion of life a fundamental role, while Hume does not really treat it
but gives his whole account in terms of property. The reason why
Smith is able to do this is his theory of the primacy of the negative.
The rules of justice are linked to the sympathetic spectator reactions
to injury done and accordingly the rules vary with those reactions.
It seems a true empirical observation that the reaction to personal
injury, to attack on life, is significantly stronger than the reaction
to attacks on possessions.
Occasionally Smith expresses this by distinguishing between natural
rights and acquired rights. This would seem to be a clear echo of
Hume's troublesome distinction between natural and artificial, but
Smith does, significantly, not expand on this distinction itself: even
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in the most primitive and "natural" stage of society man would have at
least some acquired rights. Nevertheless, the distinction is of some
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importance because only the acquired rights can have a history.
Their content will change as man's situation changes.
The major difference between Hume and Smith is, however, to be found in
their views of how justice is based upon men's natural moral judgment.
This may, paradoxically, best be approached through their points of
agreement. They agree that while all the positive virtues are an
"extra" which make society flourishing and happy,(II, ii, 3, § 1)
social life is quite possible without them, (ib. § 2) but there can
be no society without justice:
"Beneficence ... is less essential to the existence of society
than justice. Society may subsist, though not in the most
comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of
injustice must utterly destroy it. ... [Beneficence] is the
ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which supports
the building, ... Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar
that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great,
the immense fabric of human society ... must in a moment
crumble into atoms." (ib. §§ 3-4)
This analogy inevitably recalls Hume's analogy in the Enquiry (p. 305)
between benevolence and a wall and justice and a vault and it reminds
us of how strongly Hume both in the Enquiry and in the Treatise stresses
that justice in serving the public interest or utility, in the very
special sense explained above in Chapter II, is the minimum condition
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for any kind of social life in the present world.
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Equally for Smith, justice is the very minimum of a social framework,
without which "no social intercourse can take place among men"; and,
he points out, this extraordinary utility of justice has by some been
taken as the very foundation for this virtue:
"the consideration of this necessity [of justice], it has
been thought, was the ground upon which we approved of the
enforcement of the laws of justice, by the punishment of
those who violated them." (ib. § 6)
Smith then goes on to sketch this argument, and he formulates it so
broadly that one can see both Grotius, Hume, and Hobbes alluded to:
"Man, it has been said, has a natural love for society, and
desires that the union of mankind should be preserved for its
own sake, and though he himself was to derive no benefit from
it [Grotius]. The orderly and flourishing state of society
is agreeable to him, and he takes delight in contemplating
it. Its disorder and confusion, on the contrary, is the
object of his aversion, and he is chagrined at whatever tends
to produce it [Hume-like]. He is sensible, too, that his
own interest is connected with the prosperity of society, and
that the happiness, perhaps the preservation of his existence,
depends upon its preservation [Hobbes and Hume, so far as a small
society is concerned]." (Ib.)
This understanding of the utility of society leads to "an abhorrence
at whatever can tend to destroy society". As "injustice necessarily
tends to destroy it", "every appearance of injustice ... alarms" the
individual "and he runs, if I may say so, to stop the progress of what,
if allowed to go on, would quickly put an end to everything that is
dear to him." (Ib.)
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This account of the moral quality of justice in terms of its utility
does, according to Smith, have certain virtues, for it explains the
most important strengthening factor upon justice:
"so far this account is undoubtedly true, that we frequently
have occasion to confirm our natural sense of the propriety
and fitness of punishment, by reflecting how necessary it is
for preserving the order of society." (ib. § 7)
This is e.g. relevant when people are to be punished for their crimes.
Very often men will feel pity for the criminal about to suffer punish¬
ment and
"here therefore, they have occasion to call to their assistance
the consideration of the general interest of society." (ib.)
It is the same case when the rules of justice are criticized. We will
then very often point to their social necessity. (§ 8)
This is, nevertheless, not the correct explanation of justice, for such
social utility is very rarely thought of by the bulk of mankind, although
it is very obvious. Yet they by and large abide by the laws of
justice:
"But though it commonly requires no great discernment to see
the destructive tendency of all licentious practices to the
welfare of society, it is seldom this consideration which first
animates us against them. All men, even the most stupid and
unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and delight
to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the
necessity of justice to the existence of society, how obvious
soever that necessity may appear to be." (ib. § 9)
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In other words, justice is a prime example of how philosophers have
made use of an excessive rationalism, in the form of utility considera¬
tions, to interpret human morality. Smith accordingly invokes his
criticism of this, which is that such considerations are foreign to the
bulk of mankind. Indeed, he uses this discussion of the utility of
justice as the occasion for formulating his general theory of efficient
versus final causes in moral science which we have already dealt with
above.
As far as justice and social utility are concerned Smith also introduces
a new and, as it seems to me, very valuable argument. He points out
that it would be very odd if the application of justice were based upon
a regard to the public, for the latter regard can only be made up of
individual instances of regard to particular persons, since all moral
judgment takes place through sympathy and sympathy can, of course, only
be with concrete individuals. In human morality there is, therefore,
a clear primacy of the individual over any kind of social wholes:
"The concern which we take in the fortune and happiness
of individuals, does not, in common cases, arise from
that which we take in the fortune and happiness of society.
We are no more concerned for the destruction or loss of a
single man, because this man is a member or part of society,
and because we should be concerned for the destruction of
society, than we are concerned for the loss of a single
guinea, because this guinea is part of a thousand guineas,
and because we should be concerned for the loss of the whole
sum. In neither case does our regard for the individuals
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arise from our regard for the multitude; but in both cases our
regard for the multitude is compounded and made up of the
particular regards which we feel for the different individuals
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of which it is composed." (II, ii, 3, S 10)
He then goes on to say that these "particular regards" do not presuppose
any special, personal relationship as far as sympathy with resentment
at injury is concerned. This is apparently so "pungent", "distinct",
and "universal" that no more is necessary "than the general fellow-
feeling which we have with every man, merely because he is our fellow-
creature". (ib.)
The foundation of justice and of the rules of justice is, then, proper
resentment and punishment, i.e. resentment and punishment which is
approved of by the impartial spectator in individual instances. Once
the rules exist on this foundation men may, however, occasionally
support and defend them by reference to the useful result they in fact
do produce, the maintenance of society.
In this connection there is a particularly interesting detail in Smith's
argument. He points out that when our fundamental laws of justice
and, in general, our "most sacred rules of morality" are met with vile
criticism and opposition, we will very often defend them by referring
to "their necessity to the support of society", though it is the
"intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness" of such criticism "which
originally inflames us against" it. This "reason, we think, would not
appear to be conclusive"; and yet, Smith asks, "why should it not; if
we hate and detest [such criticisms] because they are the natural and
proper objects of hatred and detestation?" It is the answer he gives
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to this that is interesting. When people can put forward such critic¬
ism, it shows that the natural value-community has broken down; they
have lost their sense of propriety. Accordingly we try to refer to
something else, which will normally be the utility of society:
"when we are asked why we should not act in such or such a manner,
the very question seems to suppose that, to those who ask it,
this manner of acting does not appear to be for its own sake
the natural and proper object of those sentiments. We must
shew them, therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of
something else. Upon this account we generally cast about for
other arguments, and the consideration which first occurs to us,
is the disorder and confusion of society which would result
from the universal prevalence of such practices." (II, ii, 3, § 8).
The way Smith formulates this point, in terms of how "we cast about"
and of what "first occurs to us" may give the reader the impression that
it is of little importance and just an oddity mentioned in passing.
This would, I think, be a mistake. I suggest that this case be seen as
a prelude to the one following in § 11, the socalled sentinel case which
has always been taken as an acknowledged counter-example to Smith's
general theory of justice.
This is the case of the poor sentinel who falls asleep on his watch and
is sentenced to death for endangering the whole army. In this and in
similar cases,
"we both punish and approve of punishment, merely from a view
to the general interest of society, which, we imagine, cannot
otherwise be secured." (II, ii, 3, § 11)
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The point of the case is, moreover, even stronger than that, for not
only does the punishment take place from a consideration of utility;
it is in actual conflict with our natural and spontaneous sense of
propriety:
"this punishment, however necessary soever, always appears
to be excessively severe. The natural atrocity of the crime
seems to be so little, and the punishment so great, that it
is with great difficulty that our heart can reconcile itself
to it. Though such carelessness [as that of the sentinel]
appears very blameable, yet the thought of this crime does
not naturally excite any such resentment, as would prompt
us to take such dreadful revenge." (ib.)
Now, from one point of view this is not so very curious. For all
Smith is pointing out is that men in fact do deviate from the funda¬
mental rules of justice, referring to considerations of utility. And
his theory does, of course, allow for such deviations. People may
simply not have understood, or not be very sensitive to, the natural
propriety in the situation, or they may be perverted and immoral.
But the curious thing is that he does not in any way indicate that this
is the case here; he does not suggest that the practice of such punish¬
ments stands condemned by the laws of natural justice. On the contrary,
the tone of his formulations seems to suggest that he endorses, or at
least accepts, this practice in the fields of "civil police" and
"military discipline".
On the face of it we have here Smith's acknowledgement of a rather
enormous set of exceptions to his whole theory of justice and, on top
of that, it seems to be a case of punishment of the innocent in the
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name of utility, the focus for so much later criticism of utilitarian¬
ism.
Anyone would hesitate before reading a thinker of Smith's stature in
this way, and yet it is by and large the received interpretation.
There are few circumstantial excuses for Smith to be found. The case
is not just mentioned in passing, but dealt with at some length. It
is not an ill-considered idea fitted into the text during a revision;
on the contrary, it has interested Smith from well before the first
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edition of the TMS. Smith himself does not seem to have any regrets
about the case; he deals with it in the same confident and straight¬
forward way in which he presents his main ideas. I think rightly so,
for the case is not all that puzzling.
Firstly, the sentinel is, of course, not innocent. He has clearly
committed a wrong and the whole discussion is about the proportion
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between crime and punishment. Secondly, it is of immense importance
to notice that Smith explicitly limits this "utilitarian" justification
of punishment to crimes within "civil police" and "military discipline",
for both of these institutions exist solely as convenient means to
protect a society in which men can live together according to the laws
of justice. They are, therefore, to be judged in terms of their means-
utility, or expediency towards this goal. The utility in terms of
which we justify "civil police" and "military discipline", and hence also
the breaches of them, is thus means-utility; and the end is clearly
public utility, or interest, in Hume's sense, which, if it is a basic¬
ally just society, means the maximum compatibility of all individual
interests in the society. Any narrowly utilitarian interpretation
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seems, therefore, to be a mistake, for there is never any reference to
any particular content of the interests served, nor of the interests
of any particular individuals.
We can see the case in § 8, which we dealt with above, as an introduc¬
tion to the sentinel case. Just as public utility there was presented
as a possible recourse in moral arguments when the communal sense of
propriety is missing, so utility in the present case provides a re¬
course when the spontaneous sense of propriety is likely to be confused.
Finally, the most difficult point in the sentinel case is the seeming
conflict between the sense of propriety and the judgment in terms of
public utility. This conflict is, however, only seeming, for surely
Smith's point is that the immediate sense of propriety is corrected once
it becomes more enlightened, i.e. once the possible consequences of the
sentinel's behaviour becomes part of the background knowledge of those
judging. Such knowledge is only rarely taken into regard by men when
they judge morally, but it is quite possible for them to do so in areas
like "civil police" and "military discipline" which are themselves
institutions that are only maintained on the background of such know¬
ledge .
It seems quite clear to me that the sentinel case, viewed in this way,
is in complete accord with Smith's general explanation of the influence
of utility on moral evaluation, as a rare, but quite possible, after¬
thought to ordinary judgments in terms of situational propriety. What
it shows is an extreme case of the influence of such afterthoughts.
This is as near as Smith comes to treating justice in the same way as
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Hume did the artificial virtues in general, and justice in particular;
and accompanying it we have the same ideas of public interest, and
approaches to the distinction between means- and end-utility.
The importance of this case must not lead us to neglect and confuse
the topic of the final Section of Part II where Smith considers the
influence of fortune on judgments of merit and demerit. The point of
this Section is the limited one of tracing one particularly important
source of distortion of men's sense of propriety, namely what he calls
fortune.
The only acknowledged object of moral judgment is human motivation; but
in fact the actual action and its consequences intrude themselves and
can often more or less steal the picture. (II, iii, Introduction)
"And, as the consequences of actions are altogether under
the empire of fortune, hence arises her influence upon the
sentiments of mankind with regard to merit and demerit."
(II, iii, 1, § 7)
This distortion can happen because the pleasure/pain which is created
by the actual consequences of an action is spontaneously referred back¬
wards to the motive or intention behind the action in the form of
gratitude/resentment. This happens to some extent even when the con¬
sequences cannot possibly have been intended; and although it is
corrected in the more extreme cases, like resentment at, and punishment
of, a stone we stumble over, it will always remain a feature in our
judgment of our fellow-men. Here both intentions and actual conse¬
quences do in fact function as exciting causes of our judgment and if
either of them is missing, the judgment is affected accordingly. (ib.,
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ch. 1) Smith summarises this effect thus:
"The effect of this influence of fortune, is, first, to
diminish our sense of the merit or demerit of those actions
which arose from the most laudable or blameable intentions,
when they fail of producing their proposed effects: and,
secondly, to increase our sense of the merit or demerit of
actions, beyond what is due to the motives or affections
from which they proceed, when they accidentally give occasion
either to extraordinary pleasure or pain." (II, iii, 2, § 1)
This twist to all judgments in terms of propriety is, naturally, com¬
municated by means of mutual sympathy throughout any social group.
Hence it is that although the ideal objects of our moral judgments are
motives and intentions, the actual objects are most often actions and
their consequences.^ This is a most extraordinary combination of
an ethics of intentions with an ethics of consequences. Moreover, it
serves Smith to good explanatory purpose, for it is precisely this
combination which enables him to interpret morality as a guide to
external action in a world of fortune and yet at the same time to see
this morality as ultimately concerned with ideal and absolute propriety.
As to the first point:
"If the hurtfulness of the design, if the malevolence of the
affection, were alone the causes which excited our resentment,
we should feel all the furies of that passion against any person
in whose breast we suspected or believed such designs or
affections were harboured, though they had never broken out
into any actions. Sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would
become the objects of punishment; and if the indignation of mankind
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run as high against them as against actions ... , every
court of judicature would become a real inquisition. ...
Actions, therefore, which either produce actual evil, or
attempt to produce it, ... are by the Author of nature rendered
the only proper and approved objects of human punishment and
resentment. Sentiments, designs, affections, though it is
from these that according to cool reason human actions
derive their whole merit or demerit, are placed by the great
Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every human jurisdiction,
... That necessary rule of justice, therefore, that men in
this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not
for their designs and intentions, is founded upon this salutary
and useful irregularity in human sentiments concerning merit
or demerit, which at first sight appears so absurd and unaccount¬
able." (II, iii, 3, § 2) 51
But this forum externum in no way excludes a forum internum where the
spectator tries to rid himself of all distortion in the search for a
judgment based upon a standard of absolute propriety, the standard of
the impartial spectator:
"Notwithstanding ... all these seeming irregularities of senti¬
ment, if man should unfortunately either give occasion to
those evils which he did not intend, or fail in producing that
good which he intended, Nature has not left his innocence
altogether without consolation, nor his virtue altogether
without reward. He then calls to his assistance that just and
equitable maxim, that those events which did not depend upon
our conduct, ought not to diminish the esteeem that is due to
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us. He summons up his whole magnanimity and firmness of soul,
and strives to regard himself, not in the light in which he at
present appears, but in that which he ought to appear, in
which he would have appeared had his generous designs been
crowned with success, and in which he would still appear, not¬
withstanding their miscarriage, if the sentiments of mankind
were either altogether candid and equitable, or even perfectly
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consistent with themselves." (ib. S 6)
Section 13. Science of Morals?
The greatness of Smith's theory is that it in this way is a theory of
social morality in any given society and at the same time a theory of
universal and ideal morality. The great simplicity in the theory,
once one has caught sight of it, is that it uses the same explanatory
principle for both, viz. selection through mutual sympathy. As we
have seen, it is mutual sympathy between actual spectators, patients,
and agents that establishes a social morality, but at the same time it
inevitably establishes the search for the ideal spectator and his moral
standards.
In spite of the importance of the impartial spectator it, nevertheless,
remains a fact that Smith's whole discourse is kept in descriptive
terms. We seem all the time to be told what people in fact consider
morally right, rather than what is morally right. This has led one
commentator to the conclusion that,
"it is possible to interpret Adam Smith as making no ethical
statements at all, that is, solely as a moral psychologist
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engaged in analysing and explaining acts of approval and
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disapproval
And another commentator agrees that,
"this is the correct interpretation of the Moral Sentiments
(provided that the term 'psychologist' is not taken to exclude
a sociological approach).
According to this view of Smith as the scientist of morals it was never
part of Smith's intentions to be the moralist who tells men what is
right and wrong. In so far as he brings in his own evaluations at all
it is on a contemplative level where he, with the few philosophers,
statesmen, and scientists, who are able to, tries to take a God's-eye-
view of mankind in its moral aspect, i.e. in society. From this
elevated vantage point he will judge everything in terms of its
utility, admiring how God has brought about a universal order which
secures the basic happiness of man. On weekdays this order provides
the scientist with his explanatory tasks, on Sundays it stands as the
object of the contemplative utilitarian's admiration. Whenever the
latter perceives that the order leaves something to be desired in
order to promote the happiness of man, the former will be in a position
to provide the statesman with the knowledge necessary to rectify it. ^
"Utility is, therefore, very much the meta-principle for
Smith." "It is the principle which provides many final
explanations, and which enables us to make ultimate assess¬
ments concerning the soundness of ordinary moral judgments
and the value of the whole mechanism of society; it is also
the principle according to which political reforms ought to
be conducted, and on which the citizen ought to base his
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decisions about political obligation, when this is in doubt."
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This is a coherent and very strong interpretation of Smith's basic
position. In a sense I can agree with it but, on the other hand, it
does seem to miss some of the subtlety and, particularly, the norma¬
tive bite of Smith's theory. As I argued in Section 5 above, when we
first stopped to consider this basic problem, the impartial spectator
provides the criteria which mankind must use in deciding whether an
action or character is morally valuable or not. This argument
seems to me to be best characterized by a term from a different philo¬
sophical tradition. It is a kind of transcendental argument, for it
spells out the principles which implicitly are the necessary conditions
for moral judgments and the existence and function of moral judgments
are matters of empirical fact. The principles are, as we know, in
essence that the judgment be undertaken from an impartial standpoint,
the standpoint of "anyone", i.e. in accordance with a general rule;
and that it fits the situation, i.e. that it is compatible with
whatever moral values are accepted as "valid-for-the-time-being", the
moral background knowledge, which always has to be taken for granted
at any given time.
If we read Smith in this way his science of morals does take on quite
some normative significance. Although it does not provide us with
final proofs of what is morally right and wrong, it does show us how
moral judgments can be objectively discussed or tested. Those moral
judgments which do not comply with the principles embodied in the
impartial spectator can, at least tentatively, be discarded. Smith's
theory is certainly not a set of basic moral doctrines, nor a prescrip¬
tion for how to build up such a set. On the contrary, it presupposes
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the existence of a moral life; but it specifies the principles accord¬
ing to which any discussion within the moral life must take place.
In such discussion our search for the standpoint of the impartial spect¬
ator may, of course, be enlightened by considerations of utility, in
the sense mentioned above. We should, however, not forget that for
Smith such considerations are correcting afterthoughts to the spect¬
ator's judgment in terms of situational propriety. Neither should
we forget that the utility in question is "public interest", and not
any utilitarian happiness calculation as far as action is concerned.
Whereas the order admired by the contemplative utilitarian is nothing
but a speculative completion of whatever partial order we find in the
world.
Section 14. Natural Justice and Positive Law
If we with these reflections in our mind return to Smith's theory of
justice and ask some twentieth century questions we are in for some
eighteenth century surprises. If we in the context of Smith's theory
of justice formulate the problem just discussed, we must ask whether
this is a normative theory of law, possibly a kind of "natural law"
doctrine, whether it is a social psychology of law, and even whether it
is the framework for a history of law. If we face these questions
with the usual alternative of Smith as either the traditional funda¬
mentalist moralist or as the scientist of morals, then we are in genuine
difficulties, for Smith's theory seems to be all of the three things
mentioned. It does, however, make very good sense to say this if we
accept something like the interpretation outlined above according to
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which the normative function of a predominantly descriptive doctrine
is restricted to a critical one.
That Smith's theory is a social psychology of law hardly needs further
argument. That it provides the framework for a history of law will be
outlined below. That it has a critical, normative function seems
evident from what we have already seen of it as a theory of natural
justice. Natural justice is that justice which is approved of as
proper by the impartial spectator. Which is to say, it is those rules
of behaviour which stand out from all cases where resentment at, and
punishment of, injury done is absolutely proper. This is completely
parallel with all the other virtues, except for the important circum¬
stance that because justice is a negative virtue, which is solely con¬
cerned with the ruling out of the negative in human life (pain and
misery) and because the negative is perceived as more "pungent", "distinct",
and "universal", the rules of justice are the only moral rules which
can be clear and precise and determined with certainty. This difference
between positive and negative is the whole point in the strong contrast
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drawn between natural jurisprudence and casuistry, casuistry being a
discipline which,
"attempted, to no purpose, to direct, by precise rules,
what it belongs to feeling and sentiment only to judge of";
for "what holds good in any one case would scarce do so exactly
in any other, and what constitutes the propriety and happiness
of behaviour varies in every case with the smallest variety
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of situation." (VII, iv, § 33)
But as the primacy of the negative "holds good" in every case, we can
see why "justice is the only virtue with regard to which ... exact rules
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can properly be given." (ib. § 7)
This idea of a set of rules of justice which function as a fundamental,
"natural law" naturally brings Smith to a criticism of legal positivism
and, like Hume, he chooses Hobbes as the target for this criticism.
According to legal positivism social life and civil society are identi¬
cal, (VII, iii, 2, § 1) and there cannot be any moral standards inde¬
pendent of the direction of the civil power. According to Hobbes,
"The very ideas of laudable and blameable, ought to be the
same with those of obedience and disobedience. The laws of
the civil magistrate, therefore, ought to be regarded as the
sole ultimate standards of what was just and unjust, of what
was right and wrong." (ib.)
To refute this, Smith joins forces with Cudworth in the first instance:
"In order to confute so odious a doctrine, it was necessary
to prove that, antecedent to all law or positive institution,
the mind was naturally endowed with a faculty, by which it
distinguished, in certain actions and affections, the qualities
of right, laudable, and virtuous, and in others those of wrong,
blameable, and vicious. - Law, it was justly observed by
Dr. Cudworth, could not be the original source of those distinc¬
tions, since, upon the supposition of such a law, it must
either be right to obey it, and wrong to disobey it, or indif¬
ferent whether we obeyed it or disobeyed it. That law which it
was indifferent whether we obeyed or disobeyed, could not, it
was evident, be the source of those distinctions; neither could
that which it was right to obey and wrong to disobey, since
even this still supposed the antecedent notions or ideas of right
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and wrong, and that obedience to the law was conformable to
the idea of right, and disobedience to that of wrong." (ib. §§ 3-4)
Although Smith can take over this fundamental criticism of legal posit¬
ivism from Cudworth he, of course, has to part with him concerning the
question of how men can have those ideas of what is naturally right or
wrong independent of civil society. For Cudworth this was possible by
means of universal human reason,
"and this conclusion ... was more easily received at a time
when the abstract science of human nature was but in its infancy,
and before the distinct offices and powers of the different
faculties of the human mind had been carefully examined and
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distinguished from one another." (ib. S 5)
Smith, however, has had the benefit of this development of the "abstract
science of human nature", consequently he has been able to do better
than Cudworth with his theory of the moral sentiments, of their communica¬
tion through mutual sympathy, and of their formation of the ideal morality
of the impartial spectator.
There is, then, a natural justice independent of civil society, for
"Among equals each individual is naturally, and antecedent to
the institution of civil government, regarded as having a right
both to defend himself from injuries, and to exact a certain
degree of punishment for those which have been done to him."
(II, ii, 1, § 7)
This gives a clear meaning to the old idea of rights: Our rights are
those areas of life which we can defend through punishment which is
approved of by the impartial spectator.
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This "natural law" is not only independent of civil society and its
positive law. It constitutes the ideal foundation for positive law,
the very principles upon which positive law ought to be formed, and
that is the reason why natural jurisprudence is such an important dis¬
cipline :
"The wisdom of every state or commonwealth endeavours, as well
as it can, to employ the force of the society to restrain those
who are subject to its authority from hurting or disturbing
the happiness of one another. The rules which it establishes
for this purpose constitute the civil and criminal law of
each particular state or country. The principles upon which
those rules either are or ought to be founded, are the subject
of a particular science, of all sciences by far the most
important, but hitherto, perhaps, the least cultivated - that
of natural jurisprudence." (VI, ii, Introduction, § 2)^
Natural justice is, therefore, an ideal standard which is to be searched
for, not only in the case of individual actions, but also in the total
legal code of aay given civil society:
"Every system of positive law may be regarded as a more or
less imperfect attempt towards a system of natural jurisprudence,
or towards an enumeration of the particular rules of justice."
(VII, iv, § 36)
Such a system "of what might properly be called natural jurisprudence"
would be truly universal for it would be
"a theory of the general principles which ought to run through,
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and be the foundation of, the laws of all nations." (ib. 9 37)
This universality is, of course, one of the principles embodied in the
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impartial spectator, and it reigns supreme in the virtue of justice
because of its negative, and hence precise, character.
An obvious implication is that such a system of natural law would be a
weapon for criticism of positive law which falls too short of its
standards, for
"In no country do the decisions of positive law coincide exactly,
in every case, with the rules which the natural sense of
justice would dictate. Systems of positive law, therefore,
though they deserve the greatest authority, as the records
of the sentiments of mankind in different ages and nations,
yet can never be regarded as accurate systems of the rules
of natural justice." (ib. § 36)
In view of all this it seems somewhat difficult to understand Professor
Campbell's remark that,
"When ... [Smith] contrasts laws that are in accordance
with nature with those that depart from this 'norm' he
simply means that the latter do not accord with the
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consensus of moral opinions in that type of society."
Whole systems of law deviate from natural justice, and there is no
reason to think that even "the consensus of moral opinion" should not
be capable of doing so on occasion. To identify natural justice with
the consensus is to overlook, not only Smith's outline of a new
doctrine of "natural law", as quoted above, but also most of what he
has had to say about the ideal, impartial spectator. Although the
origin of a man's understanding of the spectator's standpoint is the
"consensus" this does not affect its validity.
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Smith points out that,
"it was very late in the world before any such general system
was thought of, or before the philosophy of law was treated
of by itself, and without regard to the particular insti¬
tutions of any one nation." (ib. § 37)
He maintains that the attempts which have been made are all rather in¬
complete and imperfect, the best of these, that of Grotius, included.
6 3
(ib.) This is, of course, in spite of the fact that the moral
reasoning of men with regard to justice has at all times in the history
of man had an implicit, and in individual cases maybe explicit, refer¬
ence to natural justice. It is the standard they fall short of and
the ideal they in particular cases aspire to. Natural justice has
thus in a sense been with men since the beginning of time and been
developed through men's reactions in particular contexts. But exactly
because the laws of natural justice are rules which stand out uninten¬
tionally from such reactions in particular situations, the formulation
of the laws and their organization into a system will always trail
behind. The formation of such a system is a philosopher's task and
Smith thought of himself as such a philosopher:
"I shall, in another discourse, endeavour to give an account
of the general principles of law and government ...". (ib.)
It is, however, not a philosopher's construction for it is completely
dependent upon the general principles contained in the standpoint of
the impartial spectator.
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Section 15. The History of Law and Society
One of the most unusual features of Smith's plan for a discourse on law
is that it should not only deal with "the general principles of law and
government" but also with "the different revolutions they have under¬
gone in the different ages and periods of society". (TMS, VII, iv, § 37)
It should deal not only with the universal standards of the impartial
spectator but also with the history of all the actual approaches to
these standards, with how natural justice has fared in the hands of
positive law and particular institutions in different countries and ages.
Smith never came to write, or at least publish, this discourse. But in
the Wealth of Nations and in the student's lecture notes which have
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been preserved there are sufficient indications of his view of history
to let the world dispute and too little to make it agree. However,
if the interpretation of Smith's theory of natural justice outlined
above is accepted, then it does seem that the function of history with¬
in the framework of Smith's general argument becomes quite intelligible.
If the universal principles of justice are nothing but "negative"
tests for injustice within a given, pre-existing moral code, then ob¬
viously the history of this code becomes of the greatest importance.
This again shows that the history of morals in general, and of law in
particular, is part of the general science of morals and that it shares
in the indirect normative significance of the latter, as explained in
Section 13 above. It is important to notice that this is the only way
in which the history of law has such significance. As was the case
with Hume, Smith never allows the mere antiquity of law to lend it any
absolute validity.
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Although the function of history in Smith's theory of law seems clear,
it may not be so clear what view he took of the content of this history
and this has been the main source of argument in Smith-scholarship
during the past forty years.^ It would be stretching the framework
of the present work to go into Smith's historical views in any detail
but since the most generally accepted interpretation by implication
affects the view of justice presented here, it will be necessary first
to give a brief summary of Smith's history of law and society and then
discuss the significance of this for his theory of law.
Smith deals with law as part of the general history of society which he
divides into four broad stages:
"The four stages of society are hunting, pasturage, farming
and commerce." (Justice, p. 107)
In all stages of society the state of the law is dependent upon the
injuries which one man can inflict upon another since, as we know,
justice is a merely negative virtue, protecting against injustice, i.e.
injury. In any stage of society man can be injured in his person and
there will, therefore, always be a minimum of natural justice regulating
the affairs of men. Since, however,
"Envy, malice, or resentment, are the only passions which
can prompt one man to injure another in his person or
reputation" (W.o.N., V, i, b. 2)
and since
"the greater part of men are not very frequently under the
influence of those passions; and the very worst men are so
only occasionally" (W.o.N. ib.)
it follows that no substantial system of law will be established as
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long as men can not injure one another in other ways. Accordingly the
authorities which would dispense justice will not develop and the
society will live in a state of primitive equality. This is the con¬
dition under which men live in the earliest and "the lowest and rudest
state of society" (W.o.N-, V. i. a 2.):
"Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property,
or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three
days labour; so there is seldom any established magistrate
or any regular administration of justice." (W.o.N., V. i. b. 2)^
It is an extension of property which leads to an extension of the idea
of injury and thus of justice.^ On the institutional level the
development of property creates a need for its protection, i.e. for
social authorities which can administer justice.
The extension of property occurs when men start to domesticate animals
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instead of killing them. This is a dramatic change in society in
general and in law in particular for it leads not only to the need for
an authority to administer justice, it also creates such an authority.
In the society of hunters the only principles of stratification are the
"personal qualifications, of strength, beauty, and agility of body;
of wisdom, and virtue, or prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation
of mind", and "the superiority of age", neither of which are able to
create durable forms of authority. (W.o.N., V. i. b. 3ff; Justice,
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pp, 14-15) But the appropriation of herds leads to great inequali¬
ties of fortune and to the dependence of the poor upon the rich, since
the latter have no other way of using their riches. In this way not
only dependence but also institutionalized authority grows up:
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"A Tartar chief, the increase of whose herds and flocks is
sufficient to maintain a thousand men, cannot well employ
that increase in any other way than in maintaining a thousand
men. ... The thousand men whom he thus maintains, depending
entirely upon him for their subsistence, must obey his
orders in war and submit to his jurisdiction in peace. He
is necessarily both their general, and their judge, and his
chieftainship is the necessary effect of the superiority of
his fortune." (W.O.N., V. i. b. 7)
The conclusion is clear:
"Till there be property there can be no government, the very
end of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from
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the poor." (Justice, p. 15)
The extension of property to more durable riches also makes it possible
that the fortune and hence the authority will remain with one family
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over generations. As far as the law is concerned this starts the
development of inheritance laws which, however, will only receive their
full unfolding with the further extension of property to land.
As long as people are living as nomads no one will think of land as some¬
thing which anyone could have a separate property right to, but when
the cultivation of small plots of land spreads the idea of property in
land arises, first as communal, afterwards as private property. Clearly,
then,
"property receives its greatest extension from agriculture".
(Justice, p. 109)
Agriculture brings the possibility of surplus production over the needs
of the society and trade thus becomes a possibility. At the same time,
however, a problem of defence arises in so far as the neighbouring
societies which may not have reached the same level of development will
be tempted by the riches of the settled, agricultural community. A
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solution to this problem is to be found in the formation of cities,
and cities will, as Smith explains in Book 3 of the Wealth of Nations,
at this stage already be developing for another reason:
"Without the assistance of some artificers ... the cultivation
of land cannot be carried on, but with great inconveniency
and continual interruption. ... Such artificers too stand,
occasionally, in need of the assistance of one another; and
as their residence is not, like that of the farmer, necessarily
tied down to a precise spot, they naturally settle in the
neighbourhood of one another, and thus form a small town
or village." (W.o.N., III. i. 4)
Once such towns are settled they can be fortified and thus provide a
solution to the problem of defence. At the same time they are also
necessary for the emerging trade, first as the local market, later as
export centres.
At this point Smith's account becomes rather complicated and a number
of differences between developments in ancient Greece and Rome and in
Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire are introduced. We need not
go into these but must notice that as far as the law is concerned the
two developments of the very greatest importance during the agricultural
stage of society are the following. Firstly, the extension of property
to land leads to the full articulation of inheritance laws. This again
had to do with defence and security. In continuation of the status of
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the nomadic chief in the earlier age,
"every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His
tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in
some respects their legislator in peace, and their leader
in war." (W.o.N., III. ii. 3)
Consequently everyone's security depended upon the continued strength
of the landlord which again depended upon the land he commanded,
"The security of a landed estate ..., the protection which
its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended
upon its greatness." (W.o.N., ib.)
It was, therefore, necessary to keep the estate together as a unity,
"To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part
of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of
its neighbours." (W.o.N., ib.)
Under these circumstances the law of primogeniture would slowly begin
to develop and equally entail would be introduced. This securing of
the big estates made many of the landlords mighty enough to match even
the king, thus perpetuating the insecurity and violence of the times.
It was, at least partly, in an attempt to counteract this threat to
their power that kings granted the cities a larger and larger measure
of autonomy, through various tax laws and through royal charters of
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self-government. This gave a boost to the cities which made possible
the second great development of law in this stage of society. The
cities could maintain their independence of the landlords and, in time,
even of the kings provided the burghers acted together. At the same
time the city economy could only function if it was regulated by
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general rules. These two needs together turned the cities into "a
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sort of independent republicks" governed by rules which secured the
freedom of the individual. This contrasted markedly with the condi¬
tions on the land:
"Order and good government, and along with them the liberty
and security of individuals, were ... established in cities
at a time when the occupiers of land in the country were
exposed to every sort of violence. But men in this defence¬
less state naturally content themselves with their necessary
subsistence; because to acquire more might only tempt the
injustice of their oppressors. On the contrary, when they
are secure of enjoying the fruits of their industry, they
naturally exert it to better their condition, and to acquire
not only the necessaries, but the conveniencies and elegancies
of life. That industry, therefore, which aims at something
more than necessary subsistence, was established in cities
long before it was commonly practised by the occupiers of
land in the country." (W.o.N., Ill, iii, 12)
This contrast between town and country did, however, not last. The trade
and manufacture of the cities provided a new outlet for the wealth of
the landlords. Whereas they hitherto had had nothing to spend their
surplus on but the maintenance of dependents they could now suddenly
exchange it for manufactured and imported goods. This broke the tra¬
ditional powers of the landlords for, in Mr. Skinner's excellent summary,
it led to
"the dissipation of their fortunes, the dismissal of their
retainers, and the substitution of a cash for the service
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relationships which had previously existed between the
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owner of land and those who cultivated it."
Once the feudal powers of the landlords were broken the general rules
of justice could grow over the city walls and become country wide:
"The tenants having ... become independent, and the
retainers being dismissed, the great proprietors were no
longer capable of interrupting the regular execution of
justice, or of disturbing the peace of the country. Having
sold their birth-right ... they became as insignificant
as any substantial burgher or tradesman in a city. A
regular government was established in the country as well
as in the city, nobody having sufficient power to disturb
its operations in the one, more than in the other." (W.o.N.,
Ill, iv. 15)75
Once this has happened we have entered the fourth stage of society, the
commercial, for this is characterized by a regular administration of
justice more than by anything else. The mode of subsistence pre¬
supposes the maintenance of law:
"Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any
state which does not enjoy a regular administration of
justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure
in the possession of their property, in which the faith of
contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority
of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in en¬
forcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to
pay." (W.o.N. , V. iii. 7)
Such is in outline Smith's view of the history of society in general
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and of law in particular. Many elements in Smith's account have had
to be left out here. I have thus not considered how he adapts the
general scheme of development to particular cases such as ancient
Greece and Rome and especially modern Europe after the fall of Rome
where a number of complications occur. I have also deliberately avoided
the complex details of the development of feudal law, which may even
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be regarded as an anomaly in the "natural" development. Similarly I
have neglected many of Smith's qualifications and exceptions, such as
the fact that
"Some North American nations cultivate a little piece of
ground, though they have no notion of keeping flocks."
(Justice, p. 108)
The outline presented above should, however, be Sufficient to make
intelligible the following discussion of the nature of Smith's view of
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history and its relevance for his theory of natural justice.
Section 16. The Scope for Natural Justice
For many years the most commonly accepted view has been that Smith
"founds ... a new interpretation of society which is
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undoubtedly materialistic"
and that his idea of the development of society in four stages was
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"a, if not the, materialist conception of history".
Professor Meek in one of his articles formulates this interpretation of
Smith in six theses as follows:
1. "Everything in society and in history was bound together by a
succession of causes and effects."
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2. "Society developed blindly, but not arbitrarily."
3. "In the process of development the key factor was the 'mode
of subsistence'."
4. "In tracing out the process of development, particular emphasis
should be placed on the reciprocal interconnection between
property and government."
5. "Emphasis should also be placed on the emergence and growth of
a social surplus, upon which depended the rise of towns, the
arts, manufactures, new social classes, etc."
6. To each of the four stages of society "there corresponded
different ideas and institutions relating to property; to
each there corresponded different ideas and institutions
relating to government; and in relation to each, general
statements could be made about the state of manners and morals,
the social surplus, the legal system, the division of labor,
* H80etc."
Or, as Professor Meek puts it more bluntly elsewhere,
"Throughout all these successive stages [of society] ... the
way in which people get their living is conceived to
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determine the main lines along which they think and behave."
This is obviously an extremely forceful interpretation of Smith and,
furthermore, one which, at least intuitively, is inconsistent with the
reading of Smith offered above, according to which he considered natural
justice as an active force in the life of mankind. A discussion of
this point is, however, hampered by the vagueness of the economic, or
materialist, view of Smith's history. Apart from the last quoted
passage where the relationship between economic factors and social
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phenomena is said to be one of determination, this central relation is
normally described in rather unspecific terms, such as "reciprocal in¬
terconnection", dependence, and correspondence.
This non-committal caution is, further, illustrated in the most careful,
scholarly, and sophisticated version of this line of interpretation which
is presented by Mr. Skinner. He is very well aware that the argu¬
ments of the Scottish Historical School now and then are in danger of
lapsing into "vulgar marxism". He warns us, however, that
"Smith did not commit any such 'error' and would appear to
come close to Engels's general position in arguing that the
economic finally asserts itself as the 'ultimate', rather than
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as the sole, determining factor."
It would seem to me that the basic question to be asked here is whether
the ultimacy of "the economic" means that all social phenomena which
are not economic can be explained as ultimately determined by economic
factors; or whether it means that economic factors are always amongst
the determinants of all social phenomena and hence ultimately have to
be referred to in social explanations. My line of argument in the
following will be that the former view is untenable as an interpretation
of Smith and that the latter, while true of Smith, can only very mis-
leadingly be described as an economic, or materialist, view of society
and history.
We can take it as a starting point upon which everyone agrees that
according to Smith economic factors can only be socially determining
through their influence on individuals. One supra individual social
phenomenon does not bring about another without the intervening activity
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of human individuals. This does, of course, not mean that individuals
consciously and intentionally work to bring this about. On the con¬
trary, society in general and morality and law in particular, as we
have seen above, are the unintended results of individual human actions.
Professor Meek is, therefore, quite right that for Smith, "Society de¬
veloped blindly".
In this sense Smith is a methodological individualist but, as we know
from our detailed discussions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments above,
this does not preclude that the explanation of individuals, their motiva¬
tion, and their behaviour is conducted with reference to a social frame¬
work. What is excluded in Smith's methodology is ultimate explanation
in terms of social "wholes" alone and explanation in terms of individuals
alone. This is, of course, tantamount to saying that ultimate explana¬
tions as such are excluded, but that is a point which cannot be pursued
here.
With this point agreed upon it becomes clear that the whole discussion
of Smith's alleged "materialism" must be conducted in terms of human
motivation. It would seem that "materialism" here can mean two things.
Either it can mean that the motives behind the behaviour which shapes
society and its development ultimately must be "economic" or "materialist".
Or it can mean that only the "economic" or "material" factors in the
situation of the individuals are determining for their motivation and
hence for their behaviour when they act in ways which are decisive for
the form and development of society. In both senses I think that it is
a mistake to call Smith's view of society and history "economic" or
"materialist".
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Smith's ideas of basic human motivation seem far from "materialist".
It is not the procurement of the basic necessities for subsistence
which motivates men to create an existence which is distinctively human.
The necessities are in general provided for him by nature:
"nature produces for every animal everything that is sufficient
to support it without having recourse to the improvement of
the original production. Food, clothes and lodging are all
the wants of any animal whatever, and most of the animal
creation are sufficiently provided for by nature in all those
wants to which their condition is liable." (Justice, pp. 157-58)
What distinguishes man above the rest of the animal creation is rather
a certain "delicacy", or taste, as far as both body and mind are con¬
cerned:
"Such is the delicacy of man alone, that no object is produced
to his liking. He finds that in everything there is need of
improvement." Accordingly the "whole industry of human life
is employed not in procuring the supply of our three humble
necessities, food, clothes and lodging, but in procuring the
conveniencies of it according to the nicety and delicacy of
our taste." (ib„, pp. 158 and 160)
Just as man is motivated to rise above the other animals, not by
material need, but by delicacy and taste, so he tries to rise above his
fellow men for reasons quite other than those concerned with his sub¬
sistence. As far as subsistence is concerned all men are roughly equal:
"The rich ... consume little more than the poor", for the
"desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity
of the human stomach". (TMS, IV, 1, § 10, and W.o.N., I, xi, c, 7)
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Much the same applies to all the necessities of nature,
"The wages of the meanest labourer can supply them. We see
that they afford him food and clothing, the comfort of a
house, and of a family." (TMS, I, iii, 2, §1)
Therefore,
"In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of
life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself
by the side of the highway, possesses that security which
kings are fighting for." (TMS, IV, 1, § 11)
It is not economic needs which motivate men to make the world go around.
It is rather an aestheticized version of the taste and delicacy which
raised men above the rest of the animal creation:
"The pleasures of wealth and greatness ... strike the imagina¬
tion as something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the
attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are
so apt to bestow upon it. - And it is well that nature
imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which
rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind."
O *7
(TMS, IV, 1, §§ 9-10)
Combined with this aesthetic motivation is vanity, the real or imagined
pressure of the gaze of society upon us which is received and internal-
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ized through sympathy. The resulting race of man's social life in¬
spires Smith to some of his most eloquent, witty, and ironic observa¬
tions :
"from whence, then, arises that emulation which runs through
all the different ranks of men, and what are the advantages
which we propose by that great purpose of human life which we
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call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended
to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and
approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to
derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the
pleasure, which interests us." (I, iii, 2, § 1)
And hence it is that, "place, that great object which divides the wives
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of aldermen, is the end of half the labours of human life"! (ib. 9 8)
It is, therefore, not at all economic motives, but rather taste and
vanity which constitutes the "invisible hand" (TMS, IV, 1, § 10) that
leads and directs all the individual human lives into a more or less
orderly social process:
"It is this which first prompted [men] to cultivate the ground,
to build houses, to found cities and commonwealths, and to invent
and improve all the sciences and arts, which enoble and embellish
human life; which have entirely changed the whole face of the
globe, have turned the rude forests of nature into agreeable
and fertile plains, and made the trackless and barren ocean a
new fund of subsistence, and the great high road of communica¬
tion to the different nations of the earth." (TMS, IV, 1, § 10)
It should be remarked that Smith in fact does use those general ideas
when he comes to write history. It is thus exactly taste and vanity
which are behind the important dissolution of the large feudal estates
and therefore behind one of the decisive developments towards modern,
commercial society. For once the big landowners had
"sold their birth-right, not like Esau for a mess of pottage
in time of hunger and necessity, but in the wantonness of plenty,
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for trinkets and baubles, fitter to be the play-things of
children than the serious pursuits of men, they became as
insignificant as any substantial burgher or tradesman in a
city." (W.o.N., III, iv, 15)86
Maybe the most spectacular demonstation that it is not economic motives
which in general give form to a society is Smith's insistence that it is
only rarely in the history of mankind that such motivation is the basis
for political power and, in general, social authority. It is true
that in the nomadic stage of society the bulk of the population is
directly dependent upon the wealth of the chiefs. But beyond that
stage it is not the economic motives of the dependents which create
political power and authority,
"for in general the poor are independent, and support themselves
by their labour, yet, though they expect no benefit from
[the rich], they have a strong propensity to pay them respect."
(iJustice, p. 9)
The explanation of this remarkable phenomenon is men's aestheticizing
participation in the lives of the rich through sympathy, whereas hopes
of personal gain play little or no role:
"Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the
passions of the rich and the powerful, is founded the distinc¬
tion of ranks, and the order of society. Our obsequiousness to
our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for
the advantages of their situation, than from any private expec¬
tations of benefit from their good-will. Their benefits can
extend but to a few; but their fortunes interest almost
every body. We are eager to assist them in completing a system
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of happiness that approaches so near to perfection; and we
desire to serve them for their own sake, without any recom¬
pense but the vanity or the honour of obliging them.
Neither is our deference to their inclinations founded
chiefly, or altogether, upon a regard to the utility of
such submission, and to the order of society, which is best
supported by it." (TMS, I, iii, 2, § 3)
In saying that the human motivation behind social change is taste and
vanity, Smith is obviously not saying anything about the specific con¬
tent of human motives, but rather about the principles in accordance
with which they are formed. The specific content is filled in
according to the situation in which man finds himself and since men
through the ages are to be found in a multiplicity of situations they
will be acting on a plurality of motives, as we will see below. This
point is, however, also important in relation to a proposal about how
Smith, after all, could be seen to find one specific motive behind all
human activity which, although it is not in itself "economic", is more
easily turned into "economic motivation" proper than are motives formed
in accordance with the principles of taste and vanity. I am thinking
of Mr. Skinner's suggestion that man, according to Smith
"is self-regarding in all spheres of activity ... thus
explaining his pursuit of security, wealth, and that form of
satisfaction on which the development of productive forces
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may be seen to depend."
or, in other words,
"that man is motivated by a desire to seek pleasure and to avoid
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It should, however, be clear that this attempt to unify all human moti¬
vation does not work as long as a multiplicity of things can create
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pleasure and pain: it is simply vacuous for explanatory purposes.
And quite apart from that, Smith is rather emphatic that in connection
with
"that great purpose of human life which we call bettering
our condition ... [i]t is the vanity, not the ease, or
the pleasure, which interests us." (TMS, I, iii, 2, § 1)
It seems safe to conclude that Smith's view of society and its develop¬
ment was not "materialist" or "economic" in the sense that he held all
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human motivation to be ultimately of a materialist or economic kind.
The alternative understanding of this interpretation of Smith would be
that the situational factors which influence mankind as far as the
maintenance and development of society is concerned are "material" or
"economic".
I suggest that this is not a tenable view either, for throughout Smith's
account of the development and function of society he refers to a number
of non-economic factors with determining influence. On the most
general level it is well-known, but well worth to stress, that a com¬
mercial society, according to Smith, cannot function without a firm
legal framework:
"Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in
any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of
justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure
in the possession of their property, in which the faith of
contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority
of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in
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enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able
to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom
flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree
of confidence in the justice of government." (W.o.N., V, iii,
§ 7)
As we know from our sketch of the development of society above, it is
also Smith's opinion that the commercial society would never have
developed in the first instance if the cities had not provided regular
government through general rules, as well as security.
Equally Smith attached the greatest importance to the professionaliza-
tion of judges and the development of independent courts. He even
went so far as to suggest that the fact that the "Roman State ...
continued in its grandeur for above 500 years", whereas the "Athenian
state did not continue in its glory for above seventy years" is "in great
measure" to be attributed to the circumstance that the "courts at Rome
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were much more regular and in better order". (Rhetoric, p. 173)
The importance of laws and institutions for the possibilities of social
change is also shown by situations where they directly halt, or at least
Pfc.
slow down, developments which are economically quite possible:
"China seems to have been long stationary, and had probably
long ago acquired that full complement of riches which is
consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions.
But this complement may be much inferior to what, with other
laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and
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situation might admit of." (W.o.N., I, ix, 15)
It is hardly necessary to continue this list to make it clear that amongst
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the situational factors facing men at the various stages of society
there are quite a number of non-economic and particularly legal and in¬
stitutional ones. It may, however, be necessary to comment briefly on
another aspect of what is usually understood by a materialist concep¬
tion of history, namely that it is deterministic. Although it is never
made terribly clear it seems that those who see Smith as a materialist
of sorts also think of his view of history as deterministic. Thus
Professor Meek:
"Everything in society and in history was bound together by
a succession of causes and effects. ... Society developed
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blindly, but not arbitrarily."
Whether arbitrarily or not, Smith certainly does allow for accidental
events of historical importance. The all-important securing of
English liberty through the development of independent and professional
law courts was thus a matter of chance. When the sovereign got too
busy and when the honour attached to the regulation of justice declined,
he would simply leave it to a few other men to act as judges:
"And it may be looked upon as one of the most happy parts
of the British Constitution, though introduced merely by
chance and to ease the men in power, that the office of
judging causes is committed into the hands of a few persons
whose sole employment it is to determine them." (Rhetoric,
p. 170)
Equally it seems hard to find the law of history which would determine
that Elizabeth I, rather than one of her predecessors, "sold the royal
demesnes" "[i]n order to supply her exigencies", thus decisively
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weakening the Crown politically for future generations.
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Apart from chance, political intervention also plays a significant role
in the progress of history. Smith's criticism of mercantilist poli¬
cies and his alternative policy recommendations probably constitute the
most substantial illustration of his belief in the efficacy of politics.
It is, however, not only a wish for the future but a fact of the past
as well. There are many examples of this. A significant one which we
have already mentioned is the royal support to the developing cities.
As a final and rather dramatic example we may take a problem of defence.
We have already met examples of the importance Smith attaches to
security as a vehicle for the development of civilization and in one
place he even declares that "defence ... is of much more importance
than opulence". (W.o.N., IV, ii, 30) Accordingly it is a significant
element of his sketch of the development of society to show how the
people's attitude to defence, and hence the form of armies, changes
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with the different stages of society. This is well-known and needs
no comment. Particularly well-known is Smith's idea that
"When a country arrives at a certain degree of refinement it
becomes less fit for war." (Justice, p.26)
This has a number of important consequences, but the heart of the matter
is that it tempts such a developed society to depend on barbarian
mercenaries for its defence and consequently it becomes an easy prey
for these less developed people. It is in this way Smith accounts for
the fall of the Roman Empire. The idea that "arts and commerce", when
far advanced, tend to weaken the defence of a country is, however,
taken up again when Smith deals with a much later stage in history.
He simply declares that
"This is our present condition in Great Britain." (Justice, p. 261)
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It is following this observation that Smith introduces a number of
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policy recommendations for how the problem could be avoided. This
is quite important for it shows that what seemed a natural consequence
of the development of society can actually be countered by political
measures and civilization thus be rescued from the kind of downfall
which it had suffered in a similar situation earlier in the history
of mankind. It should, furthermore, be stressed that these political
measures are meant to thwart strong "economic" motives, for they con¬
sist essentially in getting landowners to divert part of their time and
energy away from their farms and businesses in order to become officers,
recruiting men to the army. There is thus no necessity that modern
Europe will meet the same fate as ancient Athens and Rome. Among
many other things it depends on the politics of governments. In view
of this and similar examples of the efficacy of politics and in view
of the influence of what Smith called chance we may seem to be led to
the conclusion that Smith, far from having a deterministic view of
history, saw a number of indeterminist factors in the progress of
history.
It would seem to the present author that the choice between determinism
and indeterminism in history, as far as Smith is concerned, is a false
alternative if we by indeterministic understand "arbitrary" (cf. Profes¬
sor Meek above). As a good Newtonian Smith, of course, did not believe
that there existed any arbitrary or undetermined events if this is taken
to mean that there is no more reason why event x should happen than why
non-x should happen. This does, however, not mean that someone with
Smith's views is forced to adopt a "hard" determinism. With phenomena
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as complex as human society there will nearly always be a number of
directions in which things can develop and which direction is taken will
depend on a multiplicity of factors, ranging from "hard" determining
ones, like the absence of sea transport for a country, to "soft" deter¬
mining factors, like an individual's appraisal of his social standing.
This means that although we in our social explanations often will be
unable to point out the necessary and sufficient conditions of events,
we will yet be able to make these events intelligible to some extent
by pointing out some of the more or less necessary conditions. If we
e.g. return to Elizabeth I's sale of the royal demesnes, we will find
that it was not totally arbitrary in the sense that she might as well
not have sold the property. But neither was it an absolute necessity
that she sold it; other funding sources might have been found, the sale
might have been delayed, her value scale might have been slightly
different, one of her predecessors might as well have sold the property,
etc. Smith gives a reason which makes the Queen's action quite intelli¬
gible but which is anything but a compelling cause. She did it
"In order to supply her exigencies" and because "she knew
that none of her offspring was to succeed her." (Justice, p.44)
Much the same interpretation can be given of how political action can
find some scope in history.
It is not my intention to suggest that Smith deliberately tried to go
between the traditional alternative between determinism and indetermin-
ism in history. What I am suggesting is that he in his actual histor¬
ical and social explanations did go between the two alternatives and
that it is only if we read him in this way that we can make full sense
of these explanations.
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This method of explanation has, I suggest, much in common with what
has in modern times been called situational analysis, for it seems
clear that what Snith is trying to do is to,
"give an idealized reconstruction of the problem situation
in which the agent found himself, and to that extent make
the action 'understandable' ..., that is to say, adequate to
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his situation as he saw it."
In such situational analyses it is obviously of importance to make
clear whether "situation" is taken in an objective or a subjective
sense, i.e. as the historian thinks that the situation in fact was, or
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as he thinks the agents in the situation saw it. As we can now see,
Smith is on this point clearer than nearly any other social thinker,
for the central point in his method of explanation is to show how the
objective situation "softly" determines the subjective situation, which is
again necessary in order to understand how a new objective situation
arises.
We should now be in a position to gather the fruits of our lengthy
discussion of the materialist interpretation of Smith's views of the
development of society. Firstly, I think I have shown that the prin¬
ciples governing the formation of men's motivation are not of a mater¬
ialist or economic character. Secondly, I hope it has become clear
that the situations which give the specific content to men's motivation
contain many factors beside the material and economic ones. And
finally, I have argued that in so far as an economic view of history is
taken to be determinist it can, for that reason too, not be Smith's
view.
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At the outset of this discussion I quoted Mr. Skinner's suggestion
that Smith comes
"close to Engels's general position in arguing that the
economic finally asserts itself as the 'ultimate', rather
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than as the sole, determining factor."
I pointed out that this can mean two quite different things, either
that all non-economic social phenomena can be explained as ultimately
determined by economic factors, or that economic factors are always
amongst the determinants of social phenomena and hence will ultimately
have to be referred to. In other words, is the suggestion that econo¬
mic factors in the end are the necessary and sufficient conditions to
be referred to for an understanding of society and its development, or
is it that they are only necessary conditions?100 The former, which
would undoubtedly have been Engels's view, is clearly untenable as an
interpretation of Smith in view of the arguments produced above; but
the latter would seem to be a fairly accurate description of Smith's
views. This explains the great emphasis he always lays upon the econ¬
omic elements in men's changing situations through history and, particu¬
larly, it explains why he can use the mode of subsistence as the basis
for his rough division of the development of civilization into four
broad stages. At the same time it does, however, also allow scope
for all the non-economic factors of which we have seen a number of
examples. That this is exactly Smith's view of the place of "the
economic" in history and society is in fact spelled out with admirable
clarity:
"Opulence and commerce commonly precede the improvement of
arts and refinement of every sort. I do not mean that the
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improvement of arts and refinement of manners are the
necessary consequences of commerce, - the Dutch and the
Venetians bear testimony against me, - but that [it] is a
necessary requisite(Rhetoric, pp. 131-32, my italics)
And in a similar vein he points out that
"Commerce gave the lowest of the people an opportunity
of raising themselves fortunes, and by that means power."
(ib., p.144, my italics)
It does, of course, not matter whether we call this an economic or
materialist view of history and society, but in view of the usual con¬
notations of these terms it seems highly misleading and, as we have
seen, it has in fact misled. Smith's view is much more accurately
described as pluralistic. There is at any given stage of society a
multiplicity of situational factors influencing men and thus society in
multiple ways. This is nowhere shown more clearly than in Smith's list
of factors which shape the course of positive law and make it deviate
from natural law:
"Sometimes what is called the constitution of the state, that
is, the interest of the government; sometimes the interest of
particular orders of men who tyrannize the government, warp
the positive laws of the country from what natural justice would
prescribe. In some countries, the rudeness and barbarism
of the people hinder the natural sentiments of justice from
arriving at that accuracy and precision, which, in more civil¬
ized nations, they naturally attain to. Their laws are, like
their manners, gross, and rude, and undistinguishing. In
other countries, the unfortunate constitution of their courts
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of judicature hinders any regular system of jurisprudence
from ever establishing itself among them, though the improved
manners of the people may be such as would admit of the most
accurate." (VII, iv, § 36)
The materialist or economic interpretation of Smith's view of history
and society provided the greatest single obstacle to the interpretation
of his theory of natural justice suggested in the present Chapter.
Once we have seen that his view is thoroughly pluralistic and that he
sees history as an open-ended process, it becomes clear that he is very
well able to find a place for natural justice as an "active" social
force. It can be an element in the social and political situation in
which people have to act but it will only be one element amongst others
and, as shown by the list quoted above, there are at various stages of
society enough elements to subdue it more or less completely. But if
the situation is right, as it often is in a highly developed commercial
society, it may very well be a worth-while social and political contri¬
bution for a philosopher, like Smith,
"to give an account of the general principles of law and
government"
but since these principles can only be understood with a reference to
the situations where they are applied, he would have to extend it to
include an account
"of the different revolutions they have undergone in the
1 C\ o
different ages and periods of society". (TMS, VII, iv, § 37)
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CHAPTER IV
NATURAL JUSTICE IN MILLAR AND CRAIG
Section 1. Moral Approval and Disapproval
In the previous two chapters we have followed the development of a
highly original theory of natural justice by two great philosophers.
In the present chapter we are going to see how this tradition is
continued, but also changed and in the end dissolved, in the work of
two much less well-known thinkers, John Millar and John Craig.
Millar's published work is mainly historical, as well as sociological,
and the crucial question which, as we will see, ultimately led Craig
to a dramatic change in the theory of natural justice was that of the
role of history within the theory. But until we face this important
problem, and also in order to locate it correctly, we will treat
Millar and Craig more or less as one, for in everything else they are
in basic agreement. I will use all the relevant texts by both; the
Ranks, the Historical View, the Sidney, the 'Life', and the Elements.
The last mentioned will, however, be our leading text until the
problem of the role of history arises, since it is by far the most
coherent and extensive treatment of our theme.*
The theory of justice in Millar and Craig is firmly founded in a
general theory of moral evaluation. Just as in Hume and in Smith
it is to a large extent a theory of the relation between morality
and law. Law is a branch of ethics, but a peculiarly distinct
branch which must not be confused with the rest. The former is dealt





In order to understand this it is necessary to see what the general
principles of moral evaluation are. Accordingly we find that both
in Millar's Civil Law lectures and in Craig's Elements, there is a
substantial treatment of those principles, and they even find a
prominent place in a polemical piece d'occasion like the Letters of
3
Sidney.
It cannot be said, however, that this part of the Millar-Craig theory
is of anything like the importance of Hume's and Smith's theory of
morals. It is in fact little more than a summary restatement of
Hume and Smith, and consciously so:
"Mr. Hume and Dr. Smith had written treatises [on the
principles of Moral Approbation], equally eloquent and
ingenious; and, to Mr. Millar, little appeared to be
4
wanting, but to combine their systems."
The starting point is the well-known distinction between judging an
action on the background of its "causes", i.e. its motives, and on
the background of its consequences [Elements, I, 1-2, 'Life',
xxviii-xxx, Historical View, IV, pp.272-74]. The former gives us
judgements of the propriety, the latter of the utility of the action.
Propriety is accounted for in terms of spectator sympathy as in
Smith [Elements, I, 3-8, 'Life', xxx-xxxi], although with rather
little detail. Craig is clear in his mind that the sympathetic
comparison of motives between the spectator and the agent leads to
pleasure/pain, and that those passions are the foundation for the
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spectator's judgement of propriety/impropriety [Elements, I, 5-7].
And he also makes it clear that our judgement of others forms the
principles for our judgement of ourselves [ib., 7-8],
Both Millar and Craig do, however, announce that they have an
addition to this theory. Propriety/impropriety are not absolutes;
they must be seen in the context in which they occur, and only if
the action judged of somehow is above or below what custom and habit
would lead us to expect in the context, will we actually form a
judgement of propriety/impropriety. In short, there must be some
"wonder and surprise" effect. To claim that this is new, as both
Millar and Craig do, or imply,^ is rather surprising and leads one
to wonder how they could forget Smith's chapter 'Of the amiable and
respectable virtues'.^
Judgement in terms of propriety/impropriety has much in common with
aesthetic judgement and is not as such inducing us to any action
beyond the judgement itself. When we judge an action in terms of
its effects, however, [its "utility", positive or negative], we are
likely to act in accordance with our judgement. Our approbation/
disapprobation takes the form of a desire to reward/punish the acting
person, but against this our judgement of the propriety/impropriety
of the action in question is a check [Elements, I, 16-17, 'Life',
xxvi-xxxi]. Our moral judgements would thus seem to be a combined
result of propriety and utility.
to
While it is fairly clear how we come/judge of an action according
to its consequences when we ourselves are the objects of it, an
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explanation is needed of how we come to judge according to this
principle when others are the objects of the action. Millar
and Craig here again take resort to the sympathy mechanism, and
although they are never very specific about the exact nature of
sympathy, it seems fairly clear that they follow Smith:
"The spectator ... sympathizes with all the emotions
of him who is immediately affected by an action.
When he attends to its consequences, he perceives
that it occasions some degree of happiness or misery;
by sympathy, he feels a portion of these sensations,
a degree of pleasure or of pain associated in the
strongest manner with the action." [Elements, I, 18;
and cf. 'Life', xxvii].
This sympathetic reaction will again often extend to helping the
patient in rewarding/punishing the agent [Elements, ib.]. In
general the feelings of the patient and the sympathetic reflections
of them in the spectator hold proportion to each other; but there
are some exceptions to this.l. Passions which are too strong for
the situation are not sympathized with.2. Under certain
circumstances passions which are too weak, or even quite missing,
can yet have sympathetic "opposite numbers", although, in general,
7
approval of the level of a passion is necessary for sympathy. 3.
Sympathy with gratitude is much more complete than sympathy with
revenge.4. And surprise and admiration can heighten the sympathetic
feelings disproportionally; here the spectator's imagination plays
a role, which Craig very nicely illustrates through an analogy with
g
Poussin's 'Massacre of the Innocents'! In the same way as we
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judge of the actions of others according to their utility, in the
same way do we judge of our own actions, acting as spectators of
ourselves.^
Basically our moral evaluation of actions is a function of
considerations of propriety and utility in the way sketched. This
is, however, not the full story. There is a third, complicating
factor which Millar and Craig call indirect utility.1^ Men are
creatures of habit and they tend to classify motives and actions
according to the good or bad overall effects they have, i.e. effects
beyond the immediate and intended ones. And those classifications
will very often gain some independent force over our moral judgements,
so that they constitute a third standard of evaluation beside
propriety and [direct] utility. It is in this way that we typify
persons and motives to such an extent that we often overlook the
propriety/impropriety and [immediate] merit/demerit in the concrete
case before us,*1 and it is also in this way that general rules gain
their importance in morality. General rules about actions stand out
as de facto patterns in human behaviou and form our habits about what
to expect from an action of a given kind. Whenever a new specimen
of action occurs we associate it with the kind to which it belongs,
and from this we associate to the general value of that kind of
action. If that value is, say, positive, we will tend to evaluate
the new specimen positively; and if it is a future action, we will
12
regard it as a duty that it be carried out. The indirect
consequences of an action, which may never have entered the mind of
the agent, will in this way gain quite some force in our moral
evaluations.13
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Summing up, we can say that for Millar and Craig moral approval and
disapproval are given on the basis of considerations of propriety/
impropriety and utility/disutility. The former we judge of through
sympathetic understanding of the situation of the agent, the latter
by sympathetic understanding of the situation of the patient. Both
judgements in terms of propriety and in terms of utility are
considerably influenced by whether the action in question is
customary and expected or novel and surprising. A similar influence
arises from the unintended consequences which we expect from the
action, or motive, according to the kind of action it is, i.e.
particularly the general rule under which it falls.
Before we leave this account of Millar's and Craig's basic principles
of moral evaluation, it is important to make sure that we do not
misunderstand their extensive use of "utility". Nowhere does this
concept take on anything like a utilitarian shape. It is always kept
in the broad terms of that which somehow benefits another, and benefit
seems simply to mean that which creates feelings which we, as
spectators, can sympathize with. In other words, the concept seems,
in spite of its vagueness, to be the same as in Hume and Smith, and
our authors make it clear that they see this ancestry:
"Mr. Hume, in his Enquiry concerning the Principles
of Morals, has accumulated a vast variety of observations
to illustrate the power of utility over our moral
sentiments. That it is by sympathy with the feelings
of the person who is benefited that the spectator derives
14
pleasure from utility can scarcely be doubted".
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Section 2. Of Positive and Negative Virtues, and in Particular
of Justice.
From the principles of moral approval we are naturally led to that
which we approve of, the moral virtues. Craig divides the virtues
into two main groups, the self-regarding or personal, and the other-
regarding or social virtues. The former he again divides into the
three classes of prudence, temperance, and fortitude; the latter he
divides into two groups, benevolence and justice.^ This well-known
division of the subject is also found in Millar's Historical View
where he, however, deals with it from a sociological and historical
point of view, asking about 'The Effects of Commerce and Manufactures,
and of Opulence and Civilization, upon the Morals of a People'.^
There is no need for us to go through the personal virtues in any
detail. The only important thing for us to notice is the principle
upon which they are distringuished from the social virtues. As the
personal virtues do not directly affect anybody but the agent himself,
they do not create any gratitude in spectators, nor does the lack of
them create any resentment; and hence they do not call forth either
desire of rewarding, or desire of punishing. We will feel some
pleasure/pain when we observe such virtues/vices, but nothing like
gratitude/resentment.
17
Craig never makes it quite clear in those pages whether or not the
personal virtues are judged of in terms of both propriety, direct and
indirect utility, or only in terms of propriety. At one place he does
drop a remark which could be read to support the latter view. He says
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that Smith
"explained that ... sympathy with the motives of the
agent, without which it would be difficult to account
18
for the high estimation of the personal virtues."
But read in the context it would seem that all he means is that
utility alone could not explain "the high estimation of the personal
virtues" and that we in fact combine it with consideration of
propriety. He does also talk freely about the benefit to ourselves
of the personal virtues. Furthermore it seems rather implausible
to deny that we do judge of the personal virtues both in terms of
propriety and utility. This, however, leads to a question in
connection with the distinction between personal and social virtues/
vices. The utility/disutility of the former does not evoke action,
that of the latter does. There thus seems to be two kinds of utility,
and Craig would have needed a more elaborate account of the
relationship between individuals in order to explain this.
Apart from that, we should remark that Craig already in dealing with
the personal virtues draws attention to the asymmetry between virtues
and vices, pointing out that the spectator reaction to the latter is
stronger than to the former, except in special circumstances. He
makes this point rather clearly in connection with the personal virtue
of temperance, where he remarks that,
"The approbation of the virtue is calm compared to the
19
warmth with which we reprobate the opposite vice."
Whereas this distinction between "positive" and "negative" is one of
degree in the personal virtues, it is one of kind in the social virtues.
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It is simply the basis for the distinction between benevolence and
justice, and it is this way of reasoning which sets justice off as
a unique virtue.
The social virtues are distinguished from the personal because the
former concern the happiness of others, whereas the latter only
directly concern the agent himself. All the virtues which directly
tend to increase the happiness of others Craig calls benevolent;
those which tend to prevent that the happiness of others is diminished
20
he labels justice [Elements, I, 63],
We judge of benevolence, firstly, in terms of propriety, secondly in
terms of utility [ib., 63-65]; but it is remarkable that it is
impossible to have these judgements directed by general rules. Firstly,
if an act of benevolence were done out of respect for a general rule,
we would not really consider it as benevolent, for it was done out of
respect for the rule, rather than out of benevolent motives [ib. 65-66].
Secondly, while the existence of general rules is the sign of some
certainty in our judgement, men's approval of benevolence is exactly
the opposite of certain. A spectator has to take into account the
situation of the agent, i.e. whether he really acts out of benevolence;
the situation of the patient, i.e. whether the action judged of really
is to his benefit; the relation between the action judged of and other
possible actions, i.e. whether the action really ought to be done in
the situation.
"How is the spectator to find his way in this labyrinth?
How is he to weigh all these circumstances, so as to
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decide with certainty that the action ought to have
been performed, or that it should be enforced?"
[Elements, I, 68],
When, however, "the rules of beneficence are lax in their nature and
uncertain in their application" [ib.] it becomes equally uncertain
whether they in any given case really have been transgressed or not,
and for that reason it is impossible for us to enforce them by
punishing their transgression.
Furthermore, the withholding of benevolence does not change the previously
existing situation, it does not positively inflict any injury or harm on
another person, and hence it does not give rise to resentment on the part
of the spectator. Lack of benevolence may be disappointing and betray
an unpleasant and immoral character, but it can only lead to moral
contempt and indignation, not to punishment [ib. 66-67], Accordingly
Craig can conclude that,
"The science of casuistry, which undertook to lay down
rules of beneficence applicable to a variety of
circumstances and situations, has become a generic name
for that subtility of distinction which, unfounded in
the nature of things, leads only to perplexity and
error." [ib. 69].
Benevolence is a virtue on account of our approval of it from consider¬
ations of propriety and direct utility, and experience teaches us to
appreciate it for its long-term benefits as well [Elements, I, 65].
In the case of justice, the approval which renders it a virtue is given
somewhat differently and hence it becomes a rather different kind of
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virtue. Propriety is a necessary condition also here, and that of
the strictest kind [ib. 69]. This does not in itself lead to any
very active and positive approval, for the ordinary expectations of
propriety are so high that only very unusual circumstances such as
a conflict between justice and positive law will render "an act of
mere justice" so surprising that it will call forth that admiration
which is a necessary element in positive approval [ib. 69-70]. As
to direct utility, "an act of mere justice" in a way has no such
utility for
"the tendency of this virtue is not to confer happiness,
but to prevent injury; not to increase enjoyment, but
to hinder the destruction of that degree of welfare which
already exists. After the most signal act of justice,
every thing remains as before; no one is rendered happier,
no distress is removed." [ib. 70-71].
Accordingly no positive approval is given on this account,
"There is here no room for gratitude, which is excited
by benefits, but which never seeks to reward mere
forbearance." [ib. 71].
Justice can, then, only be constituted a virtue by its indirect and
long-term utility, i.e. in so far as it is a general rule:
"The approbation merited by justice seems ... to arise
principally from the support which every instance of
this virtue affords to a most important rule of conduct."
[ib. 72].
In contrast to any attempted rule of benevolence, this general rule
of justice is exceedingly clear and definite for it is purely negative,
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a prohibition which tells man to abstain from injury. Although the
the rule is simple and easy, the approval we bestow on the virtue of
justice is, however, always much weaker than the approval of benevo¬
lence, for the former springs "from remote and less obvious views of
utility", whereas the latter to a large extent proceeds from direct
utility [ib. 72-73].
If we, however, look at the corresponding vices, the picture changes
AC
completely. Whereas the spectator's reation to lack of benevolence
is limited and always falls short of actual resentment and desire of
punishing, the reaction to injustice is always very strong, and
consists of sympathetic resentment and a wish to have the unjust
person punished. This proceeds from a view of the direct disutility
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[injury] of the unjust action, and it is strengthened from fear of
the character which is evinced by the action as well as from a regard
to the necessity of the rules of justice [ib. 73], The spectator
reaction in the case of injustice is not only strong; it also
contrasts with the case of lacking benevolence in being clear and
certain; and this is the case because injury is always immediately
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recognizable as such [ib. 74],
It is, then, only by understanding the vice that we gain insight into
the virtue. Injustice is clear and meets with strong reaction and
we do not understand justice till we see that it simply consists in
abstaining from injustice. It is in this sense it is a negative
virtue, and it is hence that the rule of justice derives its clarity,
for,
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"This rule is not, as in beneficence, indefinite in
its extent, or difficult in its application. To
abstain from injury is a maxim clear in its import,
and independent of all contingent circumstances."
[Elements, I. 72].
It is those qualities which make justice the basis for
"the introduction and province of all law, which
aims, not at inspiring virtue, but at repressing
one species of vice." [ib. 74].
It is the same qualities which distinguish justice from all other
virtues, personal, or social, and give it a special importance,
"The personal virtues may be neglected without
bringing suffering upon others; beneficence may
be disregarded, not indeed without preventing
possible happiness, but without occasioning
additional distress; but justice is the key-stone
of society, the removal of which would at once
crush to atoms human industry, and human enjoyments."
[ib. 73-74].
Clearly this view of justice is, at least in broad outline, the same
as the one we have traced in Hume and in Smith. It is not just to
be found in Craig's Elements; it is prominent in all the other Millar-
Craig sources which we have decided to use in the present discussion,
a claim which I now want to document, since the theory is our main
theme.
In his significant Essay [No. VII] on 'The Progress of Science
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relative to Law and Government', in Volume IV of the Historical View,
Millar starts off with a clear statement of
"this remarkable difference between justice and the
other virtues, that the former can be reduced under
general rules, capable, in some degree, of accuracy
and precision; while the latter, more uncertain and
variable in their limits, can frequently be no
otherwise determined than from a complex view of
their circumstances, and must, in each particular
case, be submitted to the immediate decision of taste
and sentiment." [Hist. View, IV, 266-267].
Millar goes on to describe how justice only requires that one abstains
from injustice against others, and concludes this side of the matter
by saying that,
"The line of duty suggested by this mere negative
virtue, can be clearly marked, and its boundaries
distinctly ascertained. It resembles a matter of
calculation, and may, in some sort, be regulated
by the square and the compass." [ib.].
This contrasts sharply with the ambiguity, uncertainty, and consequent
lack of rules in the other, positive virtues:
"the other virtues, those more especially which lead
us to promote the positive happiness of our neighbours,
admit of a greater variety of aspects, and are of a
more delicate nature. What is the precise behaviour
consistent with the most perfect friendship, generosity,
gratitude, or other benevolent affections, may often be
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a difficult question; and the situations which give
rise to the complete exercise of those virtues are
so diversified by a multiplicity of minute
circumstances, that there seldom occur two
instances altogether alike; and there is no room
for determining any number of cases according to
the same general view." [ib. 267-68].
Millar goes on to give a brief sketch of the history of mankind's
futile attempts at bringing some system into the multiplicity of
moral life [ib. 268-75], and he then contrasts this with the clarity
and simplicity of law which develops out of our basic sense of justice.
It should be added that although Millar clearly is reluctant in those
essays to get involved in discussions of basic moral philosophy, he
does make it plain that he subscribes to a sentimental view of moral
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values, and that he treats them from the spectator point of view.
That Millar held this view of justice is confirmed with all the clarity
we could wish for in Craig's brief description of the Lectures on Civil
Law in the 'Life'. First the distinction between positive and
negative and the difference in spectator reactions:
\
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"The rules of justice ... are satisfied, when a man
abstains from injuring others, although he should make
no addition whatever to general or particular happiness.
He who fails in prudence, in temperance, in courage, or
beneficence, may become an object of dislike; he may
destroy his own happiness, and disregard many
opportunities of promoting that of others; but, having
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done no direct injury, he can scarcely become the
object of general indignation. The infringement
of the rules of Justice, on the other hand, never
fails to excite resentment in the breast of the
person injured, and indignation in that of the
spectators." ['Life', xxxii-xxxiii].
Then the clarity and precision of justice:
"The rules of conduct prescribed by Justice, unlike
the dictates of the other virtues, are always clear
and precise. Frequently it may be a matter of some
difficulty to determine what measure, in the parti¬
cular circumstances of the case, may be most prudent
or most beneficent; but never can any person be at a
loss to know, when he deliberately diminishes the
comforts or enjoyments of others, or be unconscious,
that by so doing, he renders himself the object of
merited punishment." [ib. xxxiii].
Finally, justice in this sense is the basis for all law:
"For these reasons, it is on the virtue of Justice,
and on that virtue alone, that Laws, the object of
which is to maintain rights and repress injuries,
must be altogether founded." [ib. xxxiii-xxxiv].
On the background of all this it is hardly surprising that this view
of justice is clearly implied in the central passages of the decisive
ninth of the Letters of Sidney, where the author shows how the ultimate
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justification of property is that it is a basic rule of justice.
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Section 3. Natural Rights
We have now been presented with some of the most basic elements in
Millar's and Craig's theory of justice, and we have seen that they
intend this as the foundation for a full theory of law. In order
to see how they pursue this intention, we will first see how
evaluations in terms of justice lead to natural rights, and we will
then explore how those natural rights are the objects of protection
by the rules of natural justice, or "natural law". The former
discussion will show us how there can be special rights pertaining
to government, i.e. how government can be justified; while the latter
discussion will show us the boundaries within which government can
operate, i.e. the relationship between positive law, as well as
institutions, and natural justice. This is, of course, the strategy
used in the most extensive and detailed of our texts, Craig's Elements.
In the shorter works the two correlative ideas of natural rights and
natural law are treated together, but basically the same points are
made, as we will see.
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Craig begins his treatment 'Of the Natural Rights of Man' by taking
the same view of the state of nature as Hume had done, that is to say,
although man is always and everywhere a social being, and the state of
nature therefore a fiction, it can nevertheless be a useful
methodological device, "for the purpose of abstracting all considerations
of custom, institution, or convention" [Elements, I, 85]. This is
quite necessary, for behind all the changes brought about by "positive
law or ancient custom" are "those rights of man, which, being founded
on his original constitution, prevail in every country, except in so
232.
far as they have been modified by particular laws or forms of
government", [ib.].
If we in this way found our view of the rights of man, "not on
accident or particular systems of policy, but in the universal and
unvarying principles of human nature" [ib. 86], we will get a simple
and clear picture of these rights: we have a right to every action
which does not damage another person. As was done earlier, we can
distinguish between self-regarding and other-regarding actions. Now,
clearly we have a full right to all the former, for by definition
they do not do positive injury to others and hence they do not give
rise to that resentment which is the starting point for punishment.
Furthermore, if they were restricted by punishment, this interference
would in itself constitute injury and be unjust, [ib. 86-87].
Although our rights to perform self-regarding actions are unlimited,
we may yet have a duty not to perform certain of them, namely a moral
duty.
"In such instances, duties and rights are not correlatives.
It is the duty of every man to be prudent and temperate;
but this is a duty which he owes to himself, and which
gives rise to no corresponding right in others." [ib. 87].
In other words, morality lays its restrictions on men's behaviour,
even regarding themselves, but it cannot do so by being enforced as
law. In the case of other-regarding actions we must distinguish
between those which are beneficent and those which are harmful. The
former we, of course, have a complete right to perform as long as
this does not involve any injustice. On the other hand we have no
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obligation to perform them, for no spectator would go along with the
enforcement of them. In that sense benevolence is free. We may
have a moral obligation to perform certain benevolent acts, but that
does not involve any other constraints than the moral opinions of
our peer group of spectators [ib. 87-89]. Otherwise with those
actions which are harmful: these we have no right to perform, for
they are excluded by two opposing rights, "those of self-defence, and
of punishment". Self-defence and punishment are natural reactions
to damage about to be inflicted and damage actually inflicted,
respectively. To the extent that those reactions are performed in
such a way that the spectators can go along with it, to that extent
they are natural rights [ib. 89-90]. Craig can then conclude that
there are "two great classes" of natural rights:
"1st. Rights regarding our own actions, which extend to
every part of our conduct not injurious to the equal
rights of others: and,
2nd. Rights regarding the actions of our neighbours,
which extend to self-defence, and to the punishment of
crimes affecting our security and happiness." [ib. 91].
Craig goes on to point out that there are those who have denied the
existence of all rights because, one action always being better than
the alternatives, man will in every situation have a duty to perform
one particular action. As an example he quotes Godwin for this view.
This is, however, a confusion which arises when one neglects the clear
distinction between justice on the one hand and all the positive
virtues on the other. Only the former can be enforced, while all the
others cannot. Hence we are, so to speak, faced with two different
234.
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kinds of duty. Finally, Craig shows how clearly he had thought
about these matters by pointing out the ambiguity of the concept of
"right":
"Right, used as an adjective, expresses what is morally
proper, what is virtuous; used as a substantive, it
denotes either a claim against another founded in strict
justice, or that discretionary power over one's own
person and property, which cannot justly be controlled.
[ib. 93].
Section 4. Natural Rights and Positive Institutions
If we accept the view of justice outlined earlier, the argument leads
us to the conclusion that, in Millar's words, "There are natural rights,
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which belong to mankind antecedent to the formation of civil society".
However,
"When we look around us in the world, we cannot fail to
perceive that those rights, which arise out of the
principles of human nature, have in all ages and
countries been greatly circumscribed." [Elements, I, 94],
So in order to see the full import of the natural rights, we must explore
the rights and the wrongs of this circumscription. Craig does this,
firstly, by discussing the justification of having an authority which
can curtail natural rights at all, i.e. he discusses the rights of
government; and, secondly, by showing what authority natural rights
ought to have in civil society. The latter question is discussed in
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the final Section of Chapter 1, while the rights of government are
discussed in the intervening three Sections [2-4]. Here I will,
however, reverse the order so that the rights of government can be
dealt with in direct connection with the subject of the following
Chapter II, 'Of the Distribution of Political Power'.
It is all very well that we can show that men have a large number
of natural rights, when we abstract from the existence of society
and all its positive institutions. We do, however, know that man
is always living in social groups, so the really important question
is, what happens to the natural rights when we consider man in
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those circumstances in which he is in fact to be found. Millar's
and Craig's answer is that,
"the natural rights of man must be considerably
modified; but there seems no reason to believe
that they are altogether relinquished."
[Elements, I, 134].
Nevertheless it has been maintained by Rousseau that all natural
rights are abolished in society and that the only individual rights
are those granted by society, i.e. civil rights. This view is
completely implausible, according to Craig. For one thing, it would
simply mean that individuals have no rights whatsoever against the
state since the state itself is supposed to be the only source of all
rights. Consequently any government, whatever its character, would
have to be accepted. And although this in practice might not lead
to any great dangers in the kind of Utopian democracy Rousseau
envisages, it would, as governments in this world go, often lead to
despotism, [ib. 135-37].
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Furthermore, this view makes the very rationale of government impossible
to understand; For "the legitimate end of government' is "to protect the
natural rights of man, and to increase the effects of his natural powers",
but then, "Why should we suppose those very rights to be abandoned, which
society was instituted to defend?" [138, my italics]. All that is
required to this end is that, "man surrenders ... a small part of his
natural liberty, to ensure the full enjoyment of the rest". Such are
the "reasonable limits" within which "the demands of civil government
are ... confined", [ib. 139].
Finally, Craig pursues this last point in a rather significant way.
Theories like that of Rousseau normally exaggerate the amount of natural
rights given up in society because they exaggerate the extent of those
natural rights themselves. According to Rousseau they constitute "un
droit illimite a tout ce qui le tente et qu'il peut atteindre", and
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"la liberte naturelle ... n'a pour bornes que les forces de l'individu".
Clearly if nothing but the social ties restrict this state of complete
licence, then it lies close to hand to see social life as a complete
surrender of this state and its rights. But Craig has already argued
that there are very important restrictions on our natural rights. They
must not interfere with those of others:
"natural rights are strictly limited by that justice
towards others which we never can have any title to
disregard." [ib. 141].
Accordingly all that is necessary for social life is some further
restrictions which "are less numerous and important than has usually
been imagined." [ib.].
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Clearly Craig is here arguing the old liberal point that whatever is
not directly forbidden one has a right to do, whereas the view he is
criticizing in Rousseau traditionally is summed by saying that only
what is directly permitted does one have a right to do. He makes
these points particularly clearly in the immediately following, where
he first discusses how the natural rights to act at our own discretion
are "in some degree abridged". In order for there to be a society at
all it is necessary that each individual contributes something of his
own "property, labour, and talents". The abridgment of these natural
rights is specified for particular cases by means of
"positive laws directly restricting the natural rights
of man, and thus virtually acknowledging their previous
existence; and wherever such laws are not enacted,
natural rights maintain their native force." [ib. 142].
The very language of the law shows that there are natural rights, for
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it is "prohibitory"; whereas if
"all the rights of individuals, by the constitution
of society, [were] vested in the community, there
would be no occasion for restrictive laws in any
case, for whatever was not directly permitted would
remain virtually prohibited." [ib. 142].
Also, the very fact that positive prohibitions necessarily are limited
while man's capacity for new ways of acting seems infinite, shows
that even under the most despotic government restrictive laws must
trail behind pre-existing natural rights [ib. 142-43].
The second group of natural rights, those of self-defence and of
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punishment, are delegated in a much higher degree than the natural
rights to act at one's own discretion, but they are "by no means
surrendered, although the mode of exercising them be materially
changed". Normally they will be exercised by society on behalf of
the individual, indeed, protection and a regular administration of
justice are among the main advantages to be gained by man from
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social life, according to Craig. If society, however, fails to
protect man, "the right of self-defence ... reverts to the individual",
[ib. 145]. The natural right to punish injustice is given up more
completely. This right does not consist of the blind revenge, which
the injured often desires, but in that measured reaction which the
spectators can go along with. It is extremely rare that this level
of reaction is not achieved by the punishments which society in fact
inflicts; for normally judges will have in mind, not only the damage
to the injured individual, but also the damage to society, and hence
be "apt to err by severity, much more frequently than by mildness."
[ib. 147].
If just punishment is not achieved by society, the right reverts to
the individual, and it is in this way that rebellion by slaves and
tyrannicide is justified. [ib. 147-48]. Duelling is a, in Craig's
eyes, more absurd indication that the right to punish in the end
remains with the individual, [ib. 149-50].
The natural rights we retain constitute our sphere of individual
liberty. This liberty must, according to Craig, be carefully
distinguished from political power. We may have liberty without
political power, and we may even have some degree of political power
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without having much liberty, although it, of course, is unlikely and
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hard to imagine. Now, if we keep this distinction in mind, we
have the standard by which to evaluate the constitution of any
society, independently of the question of who should have the political
power to administer this constitution. The good constitution is the
one which allows the maximum of individual liberty that is compatible
with social life, i.e. with achieving those necessities and conveniences
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which Craig sees as the justification for social life. Or in his
own words:
"Here ... seems to be a standard entirely unconnected
with the distribution of political power, according
to which the constitutional laws of different
countries may be appreciated. Those governments,
whatever their forms may be, are most agreeable to
the principles of justice, which diffuse the greatest
portion of security and happiness, and call forth the
highest exertions of intellect, and, at the same time,




It is on this doctine of natural rights that Craig bases his thoughts
on equality in society [Elements, I, 151-55], and the one lends its
clarity to the other. It is clear that men are equal in their natural
rights and it is also clear that what they basically need from social
life is the same. When the fund out of which they pay and the goods
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they get are equal, it seems obvious to Craig that the price ought to
be the same, i.e. their natural rights ought to be restricted equally
by society. This has two consequences. Firstly, the civil rights
of citizens must be equal, for in fact
"civil rights are the natural rights of man, which,
so far from being relinquished at the institution
of government, continue vested in the individual,
to be exercised either by himself or by the community
for his benefit or protection." [ib. 151].
Secondly, since natural rights are restricted, and civil rights
created, by positive laws, such laws must apply equally to everyone.
This means that they must be strictly universal, and strict univers¬
ality is not just a formal requirement to the formulation of laws,
but a material requirement:
"it is necessary, not only that the same laws should
extend to every individual in the country, without
distinction of rank or wealth, but also that they
should be so framed, as to occasion the same restriction
of natural right to every class of the citizens. From
want of attention to this principle, many statutes,
which are perfectly general in their expression, are
very partial, and therefore oppressive, in their
7 O
operation." [ib. 153].
This doctrine of equality is obviously a further standard by which
to test existing societies and their laws, and Craig does in fact
outline a number of criticisms, which need not detain us here.
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Section 6. Right of Government
A theory which, like Craig's, argues for strict equality of rights
both in and out of society, is obviously obliged to account for
that major inequality which everyone seems to acknowledge, namely
the right of government. Craig faces up to this challenge in
Sections 2 - 4 of Chapter II, 'Of the Nature and Limits of the
Rights of Government'.
Craig first criticizes the two traditional justifications of the
right of government, that it is a divine right, or that it is a
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right arising from contract. He criticizes the divine right
theory for being vacuous. If government is supposed to be justified
because it must be God's creature, then any de facto government is
justified irrespective of its nature, for everything in the world
is in that sense created by God. So,
"By this system, it is plain that morality was
altogether disregarded, superior force being set
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up as the sole umpire of right", [ib. 96].
If government is supposed to be justified as God's tool to create
happiness in the world, then it is necessary first to show that
government in fact does increase men's happiness. Moreover this
argument from the utility of government is really one argument,
whereas the problem of whether it in the end is dependent upon God
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is a futher one. Craig concludes this argument by drawing that
clear distinction between morality and religion, which is an element
in the whole tradition of moral thinking with which we are here
concerned, and which yet allows an understanding of their frequent
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interconnection in the human mind:
"there are rules of morality which coincide with
the dictates of religion, but which maintain their
force in the human mind, even when our ideas of
the divine nature are obscured by ignorance, or
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distorted by superstition." [ib. 99],
Next Craig presents Locke's theory of the original contract, continued
by consent, [ib. 99-100], and then levels four points of criticism
against it. The first point is the well-known one that it is rather
impossible to find any natural beginning for this implied contract in
the life of the individual citizen, and that it seems somewhat strange
if a contract is supposed to come about piecemeal. Also it would
mean that children and teenagers have an ambiguous status. In his
second criticism Craig first makes the point that a contract must be
based on understanding and deliberate consent in order to be called so;
but this is precisely not the case with the social contract, which is
supposed to be by a tacit consent which should be implied by a person's
staying in the society concerned. This is, however, completely
implausible, for only very rarely do people have obedience to the
government as their motive for staying in a country. Normally,
"A man resides in the country of his forefathers from
habit, from affection to his friends, from the greater
probability of his being able to maintain himself, from
his inability to speak foreign languages, from the
expense of removal, from indolence, from prejudice".
[ib. 103].43
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Ifpolitical tests should be enforced in order to make the contract
explicit, this would in reality be a form of unjust oppression since
the alternative to taking the test, i.e. to leave the country, would
be no alternative for the majority of people. [104-105].
Furthermore, in assuming the right to enforce this test, the govern¬
ment is already exercising an authority which is supposed to rest on
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the test [105-106], and, of course, the test would in practice
become a meaningless formality [105].
The third criticism of the idea of implied contract is that it is
completely unclear what its contenct is supposed to be. Is it
obedience to the rulers? or to the constitution? or to all positive
law and institution? There is no natural authority to decide this.
If it is to the rulers that citizens are supposed to pledge obedience,
is this unconditional? This is highly implausible and can not account
for many societies, if any. If it is not unconditional, who is to
arbitrate in disputes? [106-107]. If it is to the constitution that
we are supposed to promise obedience, the theory cannot account for the
factual loyalty of all those who cannot, or do not, understand such
abstract principles [107-108]. And what is the constitution anyway?
It is often [!] unwritten and can only be understood from precedents
and practices stemming from a remote past.
The fourth criticism is that a contract, which is implied by mere
presence of person or property in a country, only seems to be dissolved
when one removes oneself or one's property or, alternatively, when
the government for some reason collapses. This means that there is
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really no rights left with the citizen as citizen, and hence no
possibility for change, improvement, or resistence. [110-112].
throughout
This, in a way, is the main theme / these criticisms: either
the contract is simple and clear, but then it will be so narrow that
it is implausible, that anyone should enter it; or it is elaborate
and abstract, in which case the majority of the people whould have
no possibility of understanding it. Or in other words, the contract
theory implies a rationalization of social life, which mankind in
general is incapable of.
Section 7. Means and Ends, Power and Right
It being impossible to justify the rights of government in any of the
usual ways, Craig naturally asks us,
"to look for their origin in those general principles
of morals, according to which all the actions of man
are approved or condemned." [Elements, I, 112],
Of those principles that of propriety cannot help us; it is only a
necessary, not a sufficient condition for the approval of an action.
So although it may be proper to obey the government, we do not on that
account approve that such obedience is enforced. Or to put it
negatively, it is not because disobedience is improper that we go along
with punishment of it. We must, then, look to the consequences of
submitting to government, its "utility", in Craig's terminology, in
order to find the justification of governmental rights, [ib. 112-113].
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The discussion which follows is extremely difficult to gauge. On
the face of it, it may seem as little more than a rather elementary
utilitarian justification of majority rule. I hope to establish
that it in fact is somewhat more subtle than that.
At the outset it is important to notice that Craig does not just
attempt to show that because government has such and such useful
consequences, man ought to submit to it. Instead he begins by
noticing that, as a matter of natural fact, men are always living
together in social groups with some kind of organised authority,
irrespective of how primitive a stage we turn to. He then goes on
to show in broad outline what the consequences of this are, i.e. what
men get out of the social combination. He divides this into five
areas. The first thing men gain from submitting to the authority
of an orgainzed social group is protection against other groups, or
tribes. The second is protection against other species of animals,
[ib. 113-116]. Thirdly, men get protection against injustice from
their neighbours. At first this takes the form of spontaneous
spectator reactions, but out of this grows organized law courts and
legislating institutions.. [116-119]. Fourthly, men benefit from the
division of labour, which Craig seems to take in the same broad sense
of complete human interdependence as did Hume and Smith. And fifthly,
when men have attained a more advanced civilization, they will be able
to see the long term, general benefits of a cultivated way of life,
[ib. 119-122].
Now, if men reflect on all this, they will see that they have an
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immediate justification for submitting to the social authority.
Indeed, they will be shaped by the social combination to such an
extent that they can hardly live without it, although they, of
course, have the right to try [122-123].
This argument from utility, which here virtually means necessity,
is, however, only an argument for some kind of organised social
life and not for any particular kind. In order to get any further
Craig introduces some very interesting reflections on the political
consequences of man's uncertain knowledge. It is clear that society
exists to further the interests of all citizens in the five broad
areas sketched above, but with respect to the exact means to this,
"with respect to every form and every measure of administration,
there is room for differences of opinion" [123]. In such differences
all individuals are
"equal both in rights and in means of information, or
at least there [is] no criterion by which superior
talents or knowledge can be made evident". [124].
Lacking such a "criterion" there will never be any certainty in the
direction a society is given and the form of government adopted, but
as those things have to be decided upon, the best we can do is to
follow the majority, not because it in any way is a guarantee of truth
or justice, but simply because this will neglect the fewest opinions
and rights. The power and direction of a society is thus completely
a matter of opinion and no "criteria" are possible. This means that
everyone alwasy must be free to try and sway the reigning opinion, and
this is the only way for a minority to seek change. If it actively
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tried to impose its ideas on society, it would disregard the fallibility
of human knowledge; and active resistance to the given majority is, in
a way, to opt out of that social life which is so necessary to man, i.e.
which is justified by its utility.
This must not be misunderstood to mean that a minority must put up with
everything. Any individual will always retain his natural rights and
will always be justified in protecting them [126]. Craig is quite
clear in his mind that when he bases politics upon opinion, and when
he sees opinion as something which is moulded by discussion, then
politics becomes a process of continuous discovery [127] and this implies
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the possibility of continuous change. He, however, does very aptly
adopt Locke's distinction between society and government and points out
that although the governmental system is susceptible to change as men
get new ideas, this does not mean that the social framework is
repeatedly dissolved and reconstituted.
This distinction, which is implied by Craig, is of the greatest
importance. What he is really saying is, that man is in fact always
living in society and that he virtually has to do so in order to be a
man. In order for a society to cohere and function as a society it
must be able to act in common, and yet men do not have any criterion
for how to act or for who should execute the action. Or in other
words, there is a need for government, and for that reason we approve
of the right of government in general, but we have no means of placing
this right infallibly with anyone in particular. Consequently, if
a given government goes wrong, we have no other choice but to revert
to general discussion. In such discussion the only certain points are,
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that we ought to act within natural justice, i.e. to protect natural
rights as far as at all possible, that we absolutely need society,
and hence government, and that no one has any ultimate right of
government.
That this is Craig's intention is shown by the very important opening
paragraph of the following chapter 'Of the Distribution of Political
Power' where he distringuishes between power and right, making it
clear that no one has any natural right to political power:
"The portion of political power to which each citizen
is entitled has been ranked by some authors among the
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natural rights of man. Yet, between these two
classes of rights, there are several distinctions both
obvious and important. Natural rights exist indepen¬
dently of combination; political power is the creature
of society; government is instituted chiefly for the
protection of natural rights; but the power granted to
each citizen, so far from being the object of government,
is merely the means by which that object is attained:
Natural rights, being founded on justice, are inalien¬
able, and although they may be modified for the general
good, they cannot be withheld, either by individuals or
societies, without occasioning direct injury, which may
be repelled or punished; but political power is a
privilege created by the general will, and conferred on
particular magistrates for general purposes; he who is
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possessed of it, has no claim to it for his own ad¬
vantage; he to whom it is denied, suffers no priv¬
ation of his own enjoyments. The distribution of
political power may be considered as the mechanism
by which government protects natural rights, and
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augments public happiness". [Elements, I, 156-57].
In the whole of the literature it is difficult to find a better
expression of the liberal priority of political values, of what is
ends and what is means; and it is salutary to know, and must have
been pleasant for Craig to report, that Millar agreed:
"however highly Mr. Millar valued Civil Liberty, he
considered Personal Freedom as infinitely more
important". ['Life', cxi].
Millar was, of course, in complete agreement with Craig that the
state is a means to protect natural rights [Hist. View, IV, 294-95],
and in regard to the right of government he made the point that our
natural rights, being based upon spectator reactions, are obviously
relational, i.e. refer to other people. This is expressed by the
law of natural justice, saying that we have a duty not to infringe
upon the natural rights of others. This must be the background to
Millar's idea that we have a derivative duty to find the means of
implementing the former duty and that this means is a government:
"men, when they come into society, are bound to
preserve the natural rights of one another; and,
consequently, to establish a government conducive
to that end." [Hist. View, IV, 301].
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From which it would seem to follow that we have a duty towards some
government, and that some government has the right to govern.
Whether or not Craig would subscribe to this particular way of
arguing, it is obvious that it comes to the same general conclusion
as he had come to.
Apart from this there is not much of philosophical interest in
Millar's published work relating to the right of government. He
mainly deals with "the principles of government" from a historical
and sociological angle, dividing them into the two broad classes,
well-known from Smith, the principle of authority and the principle
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of utility. It is under the latter that he deals with the state
as a means. Craig's discussion 'Of the Distribution of Political
Power', which is of considerably more interest, evaluates the main
political systems strictly as alternative means to a certain end,
with natural justice setting the range of the possible. However
important this discussion is in itself, it does, however, clearly
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fall outside our general argument and must be referred to an appendix.
Section 8. The Development of Law
The theory of law in Millar and Craig is in a way given with their
theory of natural rights: just laws simply tell men to respect and
protect natural rights. Their justification is obviously to be found
in spectator reactions, the clarity, certainty, and strength of which
distinguish law from mere moral duty:
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"Law, as distinguished from moral duty, relates to
all actions, with regard to which the interference
of spectators, whether in enforcing right, or
preventing wrong, is just and proper." [Elements, I, 274].
Law is the institutionalization of the clear, negative virtue of
justice which I have described earlier in this chapter. Both in
Millar and in Craig we find descriptions of how this occurs.^
Their basic idea is that law grows spontaneously out of the conflicts
of rights which are bound to arise when men are always living together
in social groups. Although there in primitive society will be a
tendency to decide such disputes by force, self-interest and social
pressure will more often lead to some kind of arbitration. Normally
men of some social standing are chosen as arbiters; as time goes by
they will become more and more recognized as professional judges in
disputes and in the end society will also provide them with the power
to enforce their decisions. As the extent of the job grows, it tends
to become a separate profession, which leads to the problems about the
dependence of the judges upon the rulers and/or the people.^ But the
professional!zation of the judges has other consequences. As we know,
it is a "propensity natural to all mankind" to see similarities
between different events and on this background to form general rules.
This obviously also happens in the case of decisions of disputes, but
this tendency is greatly strengthened as it becomes a separate
occupation for a certain group of citizens to decide disputes. They
will tend more and more to look to previous cases to find precendents
and they will become much more skilled in this than anyone else in
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society. In this way the earliest known kind of law, consuetudinary
or common law, grows out of spectator reactions which have been
institutionalized as the reactions of a particular group of people,
namely judges. As the complexity of the law grows and as people
become increasingly aware of the utility of the law, people will
begin to amend the laws handed down by tradition and the rules arising
from this deliberate legislative activity constitute the beginning of
statute law. The end result of this long development is that the
law of a society has become a large edifice which, although it springs
out of particular decisions, becomes a theoretical entity which is
independent of individual cases, and even determines how we are to
see new individual cases:
"The law is gradually formed into a great system,
which, if not entirely consistent in all its parts,
is rendered so by refinements, fictions, analogies,
and metaphysical subtilties; and justice with regard
to the particular matter in dispute is considered as
of very inferior importance to the beauty, order,
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and stability of the law." [Elements, I, 279].
Law becomes the object of a new and independent science. But the
important thing to notice is that "the men of system", as it were,
can only come to work when the object is already in existence; they
do not create it:
"General systems of Law have rarely, if ever, been
formed by the prospective wisdom of legislators,
but have arisen gradually, and almost insensibly,
from the slow progress of human experience." ['Life', xxxiv].
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Legislators cannot create law a priori, for they must themselves to
a very large extent be creatures of the society they legislate for.
Otherwise they would have neither the knowledge nor the authority
to do so:
"Before an individual can be invested with so
much authority, and possessed of such reflection
and foresight as would induce him to act in the
capacity of a legislator, he must, probably,
have been educated and brought up in the knowledge
of those natural manners and customs, which, for
ages perhaps, have prevailed among the countrymen."
[Ranks, 6].**^
All that so called legislators can produce is some kind of adaptation
of already existing law:
"It is even extremely probable, that those patriotic
statesmen, ... whose laws have been justly celebrated,
were at great pains to accommodate their regulations
to the situation of the people for whom they were
intended; and that, instead of being actuated by a
projecting spirit, or attempting, from visionary
speculations of remote utility, to produce any
violent reformation, they confined themselves to
such moderate improvements as, by deviating little
from the former usage, were in some measure supported
by experience, and coincided with the prevailing
opinions of the country." [ib. 7].
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The legislator who tries to do more than that,
"he who frames a political constitution upon a
model of ideal perfection, and attempts to
introduce it into any country, without consulting
the inclinations of the inhabitants", he "is a
most pernicious projector, who, instead of being
applauded as a Lycurgus, ought to be chained and
confined as a madman". [Hist. View, III, 329].
This "Great Man" theory is criticized not only as a theory of law
but as a theory of social life in general, particularly in Millar's
Introduction to the Ranks.
Law is, then, not an intended construction but the undesigned by¬
product of settlements of particular disputes. Only at a compara¬
tively late stage do rational constructions play a role in system¬
atizing, supplementing and, to some extent, changing the common law
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from views of "utility".
Section 9. Natural Justice at Work
On the background of the argument in the preceding eight Sections
of the present Chapter it would seem obvious that the theory of
natural justice which we met in Smith is taken over in all its
essentials by Millar and Craig. We have the same idea of the
relationship between justice and the other virtues and hence of the
relationship between law and morality. For Millar and Craig, as for
Smith and Hume, law is the kind of phenomenon which necessarily must
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have a history and which can only be understood in its evolution
out of natural justice. This means that all questions of justice
and right can only be raised and settled with reference to the
social context or situation. And finally, like Smith and, in his
own way, Hume, the two later authors think that it is through the
reactions of the impartial spectator that the individual questions
of justice are decided by being referred to their context. Or, to
put it differently, it is again the combination of universalizability
and maximum compatibility of individual aims in the given situation
which provides the criterion of natural justice. As we saw at the
end of Section 4 above, this is exactly the way in which Craig
approaches the question of what a good constitution is in the light
of his theory of natural rights.
In spite of the evidence for a line of argument like the one in the
present Chapter, Millar's theory has nearly exclusively impressed
scholars and critics as an historical and, not least, sociological
theory of law. There are, as we will see below, some good reasons
for this, but if we want to get a comprehensive and consistent
interpretation, which at the same time can show the line from Hume
and Smith and the line to Craig, then the natural justice aspect
has to be brought in. It has been stressed constantly in the
preceding Sections where we from many different angles have seen
the view explored that natural justice is the very framework of all
social life and that all other institutions, government, laws, civil
[or political] rights, etc., are nothing but means to serve and
preserve this framework.
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To illustrate this in a more concrete way and to further demonstrate
that Millar and Craig were serious when they spoke of natural justice,
I will in the present Section undertake a special analysis of what
their theory had to say about property relations in contemporary
Britain. These views are put forward in the Letters of Sidney and
repeated in the Elements of Political Science, Book II, Chapter V.*'*'
As I have pointed out in Appendix B, it is impossible to decide whether
Millar or Craig wrote the Letters of Sidney, but since they are based
upon a theory of natural justice which is common to both it hardly
matters for the sake of the present argument.
The Letters of Sidney are, as the subtitle tells us, "on Inequality
of Property", and the first six Letters, which correspond to Elements,
Book II, Ch. V, Sec. i, maintain that in Britain at the time this
inequality is so excessive that it has had the most appaling effects
on social life in a number of respects. It is completely undermining
both the private and social morality of the very rich as well as the
very poor and this evil spirit easily spreads to the whole community.
It creates a corrupt atmosphere in which all public spirit and
patriotism is spoilt. Furthermore, it is economically disastrous
for, argues the author, very much in the vein of some modern economists,
economic growth is a matter of capital and capital accumulation is much
impaired under conditions of extreme inequality of fortune. This part
of the argument is summarised in the following way:
"I trust I have shown, that excessive inequality of
property occasions misery both to the rich and to
the poor; that it is subversive of morality, is the
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bane of patriotism, the prolific mother of the most
flagitious crimes, that it is extremely hurtful to
agriculture, commerce, and population. It seems
altogether impossible for the mind of man to conceive
more numerous and more destructive evils proceeding
from one source."^7
After this harsh criticism of the evils consequent upon excessive
inequality, the next two letters make it clear that such criticism
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is not in any way implying a scheme for the levelling of property.
They, furthermore, go to some length to show that all the scaring
examples from history which establishment "alarmists" refer to are
completely out of place, for they are, in the view of the author,
all of them concerned with equality of political and civil rights
and not at all with property rights, which are natural rights.
Whether this is true or not is, of course, questionable, but it is
interesting to see the distinction between civil and natural rights,
which Craig draws so clearly in the Elements, being put to good
critical use.
Having cleared up this matter, the following letter, No. IX,
[Elements, II, 209-215] goes on to state the central philosophical
arguments. Justice and property are not rationally and deliberately
constructed by men out of considerations of utility; and more
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particularly they are not the creatures of society. Social
organization and government, on the contrary, is nothing but a means
to protect property, for property is one of the natural rights which
are founded in the natural feelings of spectators.^ Natural rights,
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including property rights, arise spontaneously among men irrespective
of their particular political organisation; they are temporally and
logically prior to civil society; and, indeed, the main function of
civil society is to guard those rights. On this central issue
Millar-Craig again find it appropriate to invoke the authority of Hume:
"the ingenious writer, who has said that the whole
apparatus of our Government is merely intended to
support the twelve judges, has only erred by going
a little too far." [Sidney, p.46].^*
After showing how rules of justice emerge spontaneously, and only
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later gain strength through consideration of their utility, the
author goes on to apply them to the problem at hand, the excessive
inequality of property. He takes the first step in the last section
6 3
of letter No. IX by making the negative point that levelling as such
is completely ruled out. He does so in the following strong words:
"All schemes of levelling are evidently destructive
of the Right of Property: they disappoint the
reasonable expectations of the present proprietors;
they reduce men educated in affluence to a comparative
indigence; they deprive many of the fruits of their
own labour, ingenuity, and economy; they are in
direct opposition to those rules and principles of
morality whch have been confirmed by the unanimous
assent of mankind, and which are absolutely necessary
to the enjoyment of security, order, and happiness.
Such an equalization differs, in no respect, from
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robbery, except in being the act of a greater number
of criminals, in causing greater immediate misery,
and in producing more destructive effects. Nor can
any Government, or any majority of a nation, have
any right to produce such equality, to attack that
property and those rights which society was instituted
to defend. If such an attempt should be made, it
would amount to a dissolution of the social combination;
the Government would no longer possess any claim to
obedience; and the Minority would be justified in
defending, by force, those rights which the Majority
had attacked. But all dangers of this sort, I trust,
are entirely chimerical; a system of levelling being
as repugnant to the feelings of the human breast, and
to all the rules of morality and justice which regulate
the conduct of mankind, as it is contrary to the
experience of all ages and nations." [Sidney, 47-48].
Having decided the matter of right with regard to levelling, the
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following letter, No. X, argues that levelling is not only unjust
but also useless. It does not pay economically and it cannot
function because inequality springs up again immediately.
This brings us to the conclusion that extreme inequality is bad but
levelling is worse. The former has disastrous consequences, but the
latter not only has as bad or worse consequences, it is also
fundamentally unjust. If we want to do something about the existing
great inequality, it has to be done within the framework of natural
260 .
justice and that clearly excludes the levelling of property.The
author thinks that this aim can be achieved through the following
three measures, which would all discourage extreme accumulations of
wealth without infringing upon property rights. 1] A change in the
inheritance laws such that primogeniture is dissolved and all
children inherit equally. 2] A change in the inheritance laws such
that only testaments for a limited part of a man's property are
enforced. 3] The distribution of the tax burden according to a
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somewhat progressive scale. I am not going to pursue the author's
arguments for those proposals in any detail, but I want to point out
the structure of the argument. It is in all three cases that, as
natural justice is not transgressed, the measures are by definition
just, and as they are desirable for other reasons, namely considerations
of utility, they ought to be carried through.
As to inheritance, he argues, in letter No. XI, that the impartial
spectator will approve that all those closest to a deceased person
succeed to his property and it is, therefore, part of natural justice.
This again means that it cannot rightfully be changed by statute, for
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only what is introduced by statute can be changed by statute. He
then goes on to show, in letter No. XII, that deviations from this
natural justice in inheritance were in fact deliberately introduced
by men and they ought accordingly to be abolished. Primogeniture
was thus introduced in rude and violent times when it was important
to have an agreed leader in war but, as this consideration of
expediency does not apply to modern times, there is so much more
reason for returning to natural justice, i.e. to equal inheritance
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for all the children, instead of limiting the succession to the
eldest son.
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As to testaments [letters XIII and XIV], he argues that they do not
have any foundation at all in human nature, i.e. in a spectator
situation. They are thus purely a matter of statutes, which means
a matter of expediency, and as we want to discourage large concentra¬
tions of wealth, only a certain part of a man's property should be
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allowed to be disposed of through testaments.
Finally, as to taxation, the author's point is that if the tax burden
is divided equally between all members of the society, it means that
the poor are deprived of basic necessities, the better-off of conven-
iencies, and the rich of luxuries. [Letter XV].^ Accordingly tax¬
ation ought to be progressive. Presupposed in this argument is, of
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course, that taxation is a matter of statute.
If we now take an overall view of the Letters of Sidney, we will see
that their structure is this. For many reasons we are apprehensive
about a particular feature of our social life, namely the extreme
inequality of property, and we want to do something about it. But
we are morally obliged to base our criticism of this situation, as
well as our remedy for it, on natural justice. Both in order to
find out what is natural justice in the case, and in order to apply
this justice, we have to enquire into the history of the situation.
Like Hume and Smith before them, Millar and Craig are always insist¬
ent that justice is a purely negative virtue: the law of nature only
tells us what not to do. What the Letters of Sidney make clear is
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that, as long as we keep within this framework, our political actions
can have all sorts of motives, but the range of politics is set by
natural justice. Furthermore, the negative character of justice
gives it its critical function. Whatever social institution we turn
towards, we have to ask whether it is contrary to the law of nature
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and, if that is the case, we are morally obliged to abolish it.
This is the great, fundamental principle which determines the rest of
Millar's and Craig's politics. It is behind their criticism of such
things as
"the game laws, ... and the laws relating to
apprenticeships, to corporations, and to settlements,
by which persons are prevented from changing their
place of residence at pleasure, and from employing
their labour and talents in the manner most beneficial
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to themselves." [Elements, I, 152-53],
It stretches to their active support for that great humanitarian
cause, the abolishment of the slave trade, and it determines their
views on the two great historical events of their time, the American
and French revolutions. Their whole-hearted support of the former,
as well as their very selective support of the latter spring from
the same source, their view of natural justice.
Section 10. The Role of History: Millar
In a sense our central argument could be said to end with this
demonstration of how natural justice, according to Millar and Craig,
can be an active force in men's approach to politics. It would,
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however, be a serious distortion of both Millar and Craig to let the
argument stop here. They would appear as mere epigones of Smith
who had nothing to say for themselves. Whereas this charge may not
be quite unjustified in a broader historical perspective, changes
are introduced which are of importance for our understanding of the
fate of the theory of natural justice. The major theoretical
changes were all due to Craig, as I will show below, but Millar is
not without importance either. Millar simply changed the whole
focus from jurisprudence in a philosophical sense to history and
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sociology of law. This is obviously true of his published works,
and it is largely true to his lectures as well. Although the latter
do contain a good deal of philosophical and critical material, their
whole approach to law is descriptive.
As we have seen at length in the present work the possibly most
characteristic feature of the theory of natural law in Hume and Smith
is the interconnexion between their descriptive and normative
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approaches to law. Millar himself does neither/nor confuse this
relationship, as we have seen above, but the fact that his interests
overwhelmingly concentrate on the descriptive disciplines may well
have contributed to such an effect on others. Hume and Smith were
themselves more groping their way towards a new theory than stating
it in a clear and finished form, as our constant reformulations have
shown.
Millar's historical and sociological approach has led to near un-
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animity amongst modern scholars that his real achievement is a
materialist, or economic interpretation of history similar to the
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one ascribed to Smith and obviously irreconcilable with an idea of
natural justice like the one presented above. As in the case of
Smith this suggested interpretation is so vague that it is next to
impossible to say exactly what it is, but since Millar's theory in
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all essentials is identical with Smith's, the same arguments
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apply here as in connection with Smith. Like Smith Millar uses
as his explanatory unit the typified reactions of individuals to
their situation, and like Smith he thinks that mankind's situation
can be divided into four broad types, the four stages of social
development. Likewise in agreement with Smith, Millar saw in
each of these stages a multiplicity of elements which would influ¬
ence the individuals living through that stage:
"the fertility or barrenness of the soil, the nature
of its productions, the species of labour requisite
for procuring subsistence, the number of individuals
collected together in one community, their proficiency
in arts, the advantages which they enjoy for entering
into mutual transactions, and for maintaining an
intimate correspondence." [Ranks, p.2].
As in Smith, the economic elements dominate and are necessary for
any social change, but they are hardly ever alone and sufficient.
It thus seems a strange sort of historical materialist who would
maintain that,
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"the ultimate cause of this great phenomenon [the
French Revolution] appears to be no other, than the
general diffusion of knowledge, and the progress of
science and philosophy." [Crito, p.3 my italics].
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The main obstacle to the materialist interpretation of Millar is,
however, the presence of a clear idea of natural justice. This
would be unintelligible unless history for Millar, as for Smith,
was an open-ended process with a plurality of factors at play,
amongst which men's application of the rules of natural justice
could be one. Millar's own will and ability to apply these
rules in a given situation has been demonstrated above.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that, irrespective of his
actual practice in the published works, Millar's intentions with
the discipline of jurisprudence were exactly the same as were
Smith's. Like Smith, he saw comparative, including historical,
studies of law like his own as being in direct continuation of
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the work of Grotius and the later natural law theoreticians.
But in his view these philosophers did not achive their goal, a
universal system of law, because they were too dependent upon
Roman law and because they did not clearly distinguish between
morality and law, but got their system infiltrated by the un-
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clarities of casuistry. In Millar's view it was Montesquieu,
Karnes, and Smith who improved this situation by their comparative
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studies of law. But the interesting thing is that the
sociological and historical knowledge is by no means the only
thing we get out of such studies. We,
"obtain, at the same time, satisfactory evidence of
the uniformity of those internal principles which are
productive of such various and apparently inconsistent
operations." [/list. View, IV, 285, my italics].
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It is only when we understand "the uniformity of those internal
principles" that we can see "that there is any thing stable or
precise in the moral sentiments of mankind" ['Life', xxvi].
This is "that standard of perfection which nature holds up to
the speculative mind" and which makes us "find no difficulty in
conceiving" improvements in the practical system of law in any
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country. In other words, the new study of law, which Millar
sees himself as continuing, has the same ideal as had the
natural law systems of Grotius and others, namely that of,
"delivering a system of law, free from the defects
which occur in every practical establishment, and
which might correspond in some measure, with our
views of absolute perfection". [Hist. View, IV, 282],
Craig sums up Millar's procedure nicely in the following words:
"Mr. Millar, in his Lectures, ... began by
investigating the origin and foundation of each
right in the natural principles of justice; and
afterwards traced its progress through the
different conditions of mankind; marking such
deviations from the general rule as the known
circumstances of particular nations might be
expected to occasion, and accounting ... for
those diversities in laws, which must otherwise
have appeared irreconcilable with the idea that
there is any thing stable or precise in the moral
sentiments of mankind". ['Life', xxvi].
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Section 11. The Role of History: Craig
In intention Millar was clearly the heir to Adam Smith's now
fashionable sociology and "economic" history, but also to his
strangely integrated discipline of jurisprudence, or philosophy of
law. In practice, however, and particularly in his published work,
he buried the latter under the sheer bulk of the former and did it
so effectively that it has hardly ever been caught sight of since
Craig.
Craig saw it, took it up, and changed it. In his treatment of law
in chapters I and II of Book II of the Elements he has taken a clear
stand on the integration of the history of law with the theory of
natural justice. He virtually denies history any role. This is
obviously a very dramatic break with the whole tradition of natural
justice which he otherwise takes over in so many respects. But
before we go into the details of this significant development it is,
I think, of quite some interest to get a little insight into the
background to it. This may be provided by a passage towards the
end of the 'Life' where Craig describes the influence of the French
Revolution and the following wars on the public opinion in Britain
in general, and on Millar and his work on the history of the British
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constitution in particular:
"For several years, the public attention had been so
fully engrossed by the important events passing on the
theatre of Europe, that there remained little curiosity
respecting those steps by which the British Constitution
had reached its present state. The minds of men were
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more intent on discovering what is best, than what
has actually taken place, and perhaps even the author
[Millar] was, for some time, less interested in his
usual speculations, while every appearance indicated
that a new era had commenced, and that the future
Governments of Europe were likely to have litte
dependence on former institutions". ['Life', cxxx;
my italics].
This passage is interesting in several respects. Firstly, Craig seems
to indicate that even Millar came in doubt about the value of history
for theoretical purposes. Only through a close analysis of the
lecture notes from the last decade of Millar's life might we have a
chance of throwing some light on the extent to which this is true.
Secondly, this passage in a nutshell shows what the ideology of the
French Revolution did to the old Scottish moral philosophy. It led
it to separate and choose between the two questions of "what is best"
and of "what has actually taken place", whereas the tradition which we
have tried to describe here was a developing attempt to connect them.
Thirdly, the passage shows how perceptive Craig could be and it shows
where he found the starting point for those reflections which led him
to discard the theoretical role of history.
Craig did reflect on this very clearly. Already early in the Elements,
while treating 'Of the Rights of Government', he confronts the question
as clearly as one could wish. The context is well-known to us;
although men universally have certain natural rights, it is only too
clear that governments more often than not infringe upon them far
beyond what can be justified. He then goes on:
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"The view of a state of society, so different from that
which the constitution of man had pointed out as just,
naturally suggests two questions, which, though quite
distinct, have frequently been confounded. 1st. From
what circumstances have the governments of the world
arisen? 2nd. On what principles can the powers
exercised by government be justified? The first is
entirely a question of historical research, and the
answer will be different in regard to the government of
every separate people. ... The investigation of the
actual origin of governments, while it thus opens a
field of incalculable extent, is but casually connected
with the science of politics: but before enquiring into
the constitution and duties of government, it is
obviously necessary to ascertain on what principles
those powers which distinguish a political state, from
that which has been denominated a state of nature, can
be justified". [Elements, I, 94-95, my italics].
This is a truly astonishing piece of writing from the heir apparent to
the John Millar tradition and it indicates that he may after all be a
bit more than the faithfully plagiarizing disciple. The passage
epitomizes a number of things. Firstly, it draws the distinction
between history and abstract science clearly and distinctly and, like
the last quoted passage from the 'Life', it draws it as a distinction
between the quaestio de facto and the quaestio de jure. Secondly,
when one remembers that it was Smith's and Millar's constant ambition
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to deal with "history and theory", it is difficult not to see them
as at least part of the target when Craig says that the "two
questions though quite distinct, have frequently been confounded".
More direct targets would, of course, be the Whig traditionalists and
Burke. Thirdly, it is the writing-off of the quaestio de facto as
"entirely a question of historical research" which allows him to see
that the other question, the quaestio de jure, really is the backbone
of an entirely separate discipline, "the science of politics", a
discipline which the world since came to hear more about. It's this
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insight that is the background to the surprising title of Craig's work.
Section 12. Against Law: Civil Law
This development is reflected in an unusual way in Craig's treatment
of law which we must now turn to. He divides law into civil and
criminal [chapters I and II of Book II]. The basis for this distinct-
is a distinction
ion/between two kinds of injuries; those injuries which can be "repaired"
so that the injured person is put back into his position before the
injury are the objects of civil law, whereas injuries which cannot be
"repaired" but have to be punished through the infliction of harm are
the objects of criminal law [Elements, I, 275].
In the chapter on civil law Craig first gives a short sketch of how
law develops out of spectator situations, as mentioned earlier, and
of how such consuetudinary law is later supplemented with statute law.
He then goes on to argue that both in the case of common law and in
the case of statute law the decision of court cases must be to a very
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large extent hinge on the discretion of the judge. In the former
case because no two cases are completely alike and hence there is
no such thing as a real precedent; in the latter case because all
general rules must be interpreted in order to cover any particular
case, and "this want of precision [is] inherent in the nature of
general rules" [Elements, I, 284]. To those difficulties of the
law comes the difficulty of establishing the facts of a case, which
will also add to the discretionary powers of judges, [ib. 284-85].
Altogether the existing systems of law are such that they inevitably
invest the administrators of justice with wide discretion and hence
exposes them to corruption, [ib. 285-86]. A well-known remedy to
this is to multiply the judges, but it never really works [286-89].
The second common remedy is jury trial of the facts combined with
judge-administration of the law. This is, however, rather impossible
in practice, for the distinction between the facts and the law in a
given case is hardly ever clear so, either the laymen on the jury will
meddle in abstract principles of law which they have no chances of
understanding, or they will be led by the judge, in which case the
purpose of jury trial is defeated. [Elements, I, 289-98]. This brings
Craig to his surprising suggestion,
"to enquire, whether it be really necessary to establish
any system of abstract law, and to decide disputes on
other grounds than the merits of each case, and the
unalterable dictates of natural justice." [Elements, I, 298].
This is what he sets about to do in the following Section II of the
Chapter.
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Abstract law, as it is known, is uncertain because it requires so
much discretion. Also it is so extremely complex and this is the
reason why the administration of it becomes so complex and impene¬
trable; it increases the number of court cases and their duration
far beyond what strict justice requires, and it makes the
administration of justice so expensive that the protection by
courts very often is an illusion. Furthermore, once an abstract
law system is in existence, the continuation and perfection of it
becomes an object in itself, as mentioned already in the previous
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Section. This means that the overall usefulness of the system
or the general rule becomes the central thing, for which the
merits of the particular case may have to be sacrificed; and this
in the end amounts to substituting power for justice:
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"The very essence of law is to look to the utility
of the rule in future cases, rather than to equity
in the present instance; to do, in short, what may
be a direct act of injustice to one individual, if,
in consequence of it, the system will be rendered
more perfect, and future disputes or injustice
prevented. But the principle on which such decisions
are given is by no means unobjectionable. The
community may have the power of sacrificing the
property of an individual to the good of the whole,
but they have no such right". [Elements, I, 307-308].
Apart from showing a firm stand against utilitarianism proper, this
passage is of interest because it shows that Craig has abandoned the
idea, which is so prominent in both Hume, Smith, and Millar, that
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justice and public utility will coincide. More particularly it
shows that the trend, which Millar saw in modern, commercial society,
towards evaluating all institutions more and more in terms of their
public utility, for Craig was something to be resisted, not just
noticed. Finally, Craig makes the point that systematic law must
always trail behind social life, for the latter consists of parti¬
cular cases and the former can only begin to accommodate them when
they have occurred [ib. 309-11]. As long as we are brought up
under abstract systems of law, "our moral feelings are perverted",
and we mistake legality for justice. "No longer solicitous to act
justly, we are satisfied if we have acted legally [ib. 312].
Craig's solution is simple and radical: "to throw away [our] enormous
folios, and refer to the judge within the breast"! [ib. 302]. With
references to and quotations from Harrington he urges that we discard
all formal law and that means, of course, all the law which is de facto
given, which has been shaped by history in the ways described by Millar.
He sees the law which tradition hands down to us as the main hindrance
for justice, and it is thus hardly to be wondered at that he wants to
separate the study of the two in the manner described below.
Instead of formal law we should take up a system of pure natural
justice, which in practice means that all cases should be decided
completely by jury. When there is no formal law, all discretion,
and hence all uncertainty, will disappear, for natural justice is
completely clear and, "No man ... can be at a loss to discover the
light in which his actions will appear to an impartial spectator:
nor will it be difficult for him to anticipate, with regard to his
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claims against others, the award which a jury, looking only to justice
in the present dispute, will pronounce." [ib. 300]. The impartial
spectators on a jury will have nothing else to look after than strict
justice; there is no formal system or general rule to take care of;
and they are laymen, not professionals with professional interests.
Also all complexity will disappear; hence only cases of genuine in¬
justice would be raised and they would be simple, short, and cheap.
There would be no danger that equity might be sacrificed in the
interest of utility; and all decisions would be taken from the view¬
point of contemporary spectators, not based on out-dated rules. Craig
sums up this back-to-nature message in the following forceful terms:
"Justice is not, as systems of law would pretend, an
abstract science, requiring a long and difficult
education. It is implanted in the human breast; and,
bom with man, would grow up with him to maturity,
were it not choaked by noxious weeds. Destroy those
notions, of law as opposed equity, and justice will
spontaneously arise and flourish. The moment that the
real nature of the transaction is ascertained, the
feelings of mankind suggest the proper award. Let us
then cease to accumulate statutes, precedents, and
authorities; discarding all consideration of hypo¬
thetical cases, let us attend to the exact merits of
those disputes or misunderstandings submitted to our
judgement; and let us do justice between man and man."
[Elements, I, 311-12].
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However, not everything in society can be decided by "the natural
feelings of justice". Although it is a matter of such natural
feelings that, say, the de facto possession of a piece of land for
a certain period is taken to establish property right in this land,
there is nothing 'natural' about how long the period should be.
Equally, although it is absolutely necessary for the existence of a
society that the citizens contribute to the administration etc., of
it, there is nothing 'natural' about exactly how much. In cases
like these the natural feelings have to be supplemented by reasoning
about what is the most expedient in a given society. However,
"views of general utility, depending on information,
reasoning, and experience, must be more various than
the natural feelings of justice." [ib. 313].
Human reasoning is fickle and uncertain, and there is no guarantee
that men will ever agree. Accordingly someone's view of what is
expedient will have to prevail - those of the government, for lack
of better. Such statute laws
"are reducible to two great classes. 1st, Those
which, though consonant to the dictates of equity,
are intended to introduce a greater uniformity
into practice than could arise from natural feelings;
and, secondly, those which, founded on views of
expediency, introduce duties or rights, unsupported
by the law of nature, though not necessarily in
opposition to it." [Elements, I, 315].
To add precision to the natural feelings of justice and to enforce
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those joint actions which are necessary to keep a society going, for
those purposes,
"as conscience is silent, and opinions will vary,
statutes must be promulgated, declaring explicitly
what is considered as necessary for the good of the
nation" [ib. 322].
Statute law derives its extent from what is comprised in its linguistic
formulation. It has to be formulated and to be intelligible to
ordinary jury folk. It derives its authority from power and its
raison d'etre from expediency.
Such, then, are Craig's astonishing ideas of civil law, which could
almost be called an anti-law philosophy. As we will see below, he
carries the same ideas over into the field of criminal law. Before
doing so he does, however, devote the first Section of the Chapter
'Of the Administration of Criminal Law' to the fundamental question
'Of the Right of Punishment'.
Section 13. Punishment
Rousseau's suggestion that the right of punishment springs out of
the social contract, i.e. rests on implied consent, is briefly
rejected for the simple reason that the ideas of contract and implied
consent to not make sense, as shown earlier. The justifications of
punishment which Craig really wants to discuss are, however; 1] the
reform of the offender, 2] the satisfaction of mankind's resentment,
3] the general good.
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Craig sets out in typical Smith-Millar fashion, remarking that the
reform of the offender obviously cannot have been the original motive
for punishment. In the primitive ages of mankind the motive could
only be revenge. It is only when life becomes more civilized that
reform can come in as a motive. Craig soon turns his back on natural
history, saying that reform ought not be a motive for punishment, for
what is good for a man is completely individual and his own respons¬
ibility. We do not know what is good for others and no one would go
along with forcing any imagined "good" upon another. In short, it is
paternalism:
"To employ coercion with a view solely to reformation
is to decide for another where happiness is to be found,
to force him to adopt our ideas, and to compel him to
prefer our judgement to his own." [Elements, I, 329].
Those difficulties in justifying punishment by the reform of the
offender led William Godwin to completely discard punishment as a
suitable measure and to propose to replace it by education of
offenders. However,
"Perhaps a task more difficult could not be assigned to
man. It would require the most rare conjunction of
prudence, forbearance, penetration, reason, and
eloquence" [ib. 332].
Punishment must thus have other foundations, but this should not prevent
us from having reform in mind in the way in which we inflict punishment.
The right of punishment does, as we already know, arise from the
natural feeling of resentment at injury, when this feeling is tempered
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in such a way that the uninvolved spectators will go along with it.
This feeling is universal to mankind and cuts across all cultural
and social boundaries; if it is not distorted, it is our natural
8 7
measure of punishment, [ib. 333-35]. The logic behind punishment
is harm for harm and it is only when the two are seen to be connected
that we count one as punishment of the other. An indirect con¬
firmation that man does think retributively about punishment is to be
found in the fact that we tend to project those natural sentiments
beyond the present life into a future state where it would have no
meaning to see punishment as an attempt at reform or the like. [ib.
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336-37]. Resistance to this foundation of punishment is normally
due to the fact that resentment in itself is an unpleasant feeling
and, if we do not see it in its context as a reaction to injury, this
may dangerously impair our willingness to inflict just punishment,
[ib. 338-40].
This retributive view of punishment obviously presupposes that respon¬
sibility, in one sense or another, can be attributed to man. This
idea has been criticized by Godwin from the usual deterministic
standpoint that it is unfounded to see man's will as somehow an ultimate
cause of actions; the will is itself caused, the motives are caused,
etc. So to hold a man responsible by punishing him is entirely un¬
justified since he is nothing but the medium for part of a long chain
of causes. This criticism is, in Craig's view, misconceived. Although
all man's actions may well be determined by prior causes, it is a fact
that it is beyond human knowledge to find more than some of the more
obvious and immediate of those causes; so the only way in which we can,
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and in fact do, influence the behaviour of others is by reacting to
it. In the case of injury the reaction is resentment and consequent
punishment.^
Godwin raises the further criticism that it is impossible to establish
guilt because the mind of another person is unknowable [ib. 342-43].
Craig's answer is that if we took this seriously, then virtually no
human action would be possible since they nearly all relate or refer
to others as persons, [ib. 343-44],
It may seem strange to attribute both the argument from determinism
and the argument from our ignorance of other minds to the same person,
but I do not propose to go into the tangled question of whether Craig
is faithful in his interpretation of Godwin. Nor do I think that we
will be able to throw much light on Craig's own doctrines by exploring
his general relationship to Godwin. There are obvious similarities
in their idea of doing away with professional lawyers and judges and
substitute them with lay juries, but the differences are much deeper
and more interesting. One is a radical utilitarian who wants to
substitute educational treatment for punishment. The other upholds
a peculiar doctrine of natural justice and believes firmly in
retributive punishment.
One of the main justifications of the right of government, according
to Craig, is that it is needed to provide internal security. The
only way it can do so is by a strict administration of justice. This
cannot be substituted by any direct power over the citizens, and the
reason Craig gives is again the limitations of human knowledge. It is
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simply not possible to know enough about the minds of any number of
people to guide them directly. The only thing the government can
and, of course, ought to do is to influence the citizens indirectly,
or negatively, through punishment of injustice, [ib. 346-48]. This
argument from ignorance is obviously the general form of the old
liberal argument for a free market economy: no one has enough know¬
ledge to direct the economic activity of men and hence we will have
to leave it to the individual - within the boundaries of natural
justice. This is again closely connected with the view which we
have seen recurring in Craig and which I in connection with Smith
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called negative utilitarianism, namely that whereas we do not have
much idea of what is good for other men and of where we should lead
them, we do have pretty clear ideas of what is damaging to them and
hence of what we should forbid them to do to each other.
The usefulness of the administration of punishment to provide public
security has, however, by many, including Bentham, been taken as the
ultimate justification of punishment, according to Craig. This is
in his view the most dangerous of all, for in doing away with natural
justice and substituting public utility, we open the door for the use
of punishment for all sorts of purposes:
"The moment we depart from the criterion of justice
furnished by the natural and universal sentiments of
mankind, we no longer have any known or determinate
standard; we shall be guided by our fears, by our
speculations, or, what is worst of all, by the
exclusive interests of those ranks which are above
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temptation to the crime, and most likely to be injured
by its prevalence: statute will be added to statute,
punishment raised upon punishment, till at last our
criminal law will become the disgrace of humanity."
[ib. 349].
In short, this would be to substitute power for justice. From this
point Craig goes on to formulate some of the classic criticisms of
the utilitarian justification of punishment and some of his formu¬
lations here are of such clarity that one would have thought they
were part of the academic harvest rather than of the political-
philosophical seed of the battle of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism
would make the distinction between guilt and innocence meaningless:
"The instant we depart from the plain undeviating course
of retributive justice, and award punishments merely for
the sake of example, or increase the severity of law
from speculations respecting public expediency, that
moment the distinction between guilt and innocence is at
an end, and we must view the legal penalties, not as
justly attached to the commission of crimes, but as the
means of producing advantages to many, at the expense of
a few." [ib. 352-53].
When that distinction is obliterated we may as well punish the
innocent as the guilty. This can, however, not be right, for,
"while we applaud the punishment of the guilty, our
minds would revolt from that of the innocent, however
conducive it might be to the happiness of millions.
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There must, therefore, be some difference between
the two cases; we must intend something more than
the public good, when we punish a crime; there must
be something connecting in our minds the penalty
with the offence, independently of that benefit to
society, which, in particular circumstances, may
possibly be promoted by injustice." [ib. 351-352].
Also, if we disconnect guilt and punishment, the proportionality
between crime and punishment will be lost. This will easily lead
to too severe punishment, and men are then likely to lose respect
for the law and to follow their feelings of natural justice in
seeing the punishment as the crime. [ib. 353-362].
Craig clearly sees that a utilitarian theory of law amounts to a
form of legal positivism which sets up a barrier between the law and
morality, whereas for him law, as we have seen, is a part, albeit a
very special part, of morality. Such a barrier will have pretty
disastrous effects:
"Actions being judged by a criterion altogether different
from their real merits, the genuine moral feelings are
silenced by pleas of legality, or stifled amidst false,
though plausible, pretences of the public good."
"An action is being avoided, not because it is morally
wrong, but because it is legally punishable; another is
performed, not because it is strictly jsut, but because
a penalty has been annexed to its omission." [Elements,
I, 363 $ 362].
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Utility is, then, not the justification of punishment, the natural
feelings of justice are. The only place Craig sees for consider¬
ations of expediency in punishment is that they can strengthen our
determination to punish in spite of sudden pity for the offender,
[another detail taken over from Smith] and that they can guide us
as to the means of punishment [ib. 350-51],
Section 14. Against Law: Criminal Law
Having established the justification of punishment, Craig in the
following Section produces the same argument concerning criminal
law which he had given for civil law, namely that all formal or
abstract rules should be abolished and the law simply consist in
the natural reaction of the lay spectators on a jury. The jury
should, of course, decide law as well as fact in any given case,
and they should fix the level of punishment. Such a system
would dispense with the promulgation of the law in the form of
general rules. Nothing can be added to or subtracted from natural
justice as it exists in the natural feelings of mankind, and general
rules are useless because they cannot catch the details of particular
cases. In fact, they will just lead to the need for review bodies
which are bound to be a source of corruption. Also punishment of
crime is a highly individual matter which cannot be administered by
means of general rules, but only by living spectators. So the
message is the same as in the case of civil law: to abolish all
formal law. The need for it is much greater in criminal than in
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civil law, for the former is easier to exploit by the rulers and
ruling classes for suppression.
Like civil law, criminal law has in certain respects to be supplemented
by statutes enacted by the legislature out of considerations of utility.
This is the topic for the third and final Section of Chapter II. The
best method of punishing is a matter of trial and error, which has to
be conducted by a continuing body in order that one error may benefit
the following trial. Only a legislature, which should be alert to the
progress in "moral and political knowledge", can fill this role.
Furthermore, there will always be a need for laws of a merely administ¬
rative nature and, since jurors may have difficulty understanding such
expediency laws, the punishment for transgressing them ought to be
fixed by fiat of the legislature. In such cases observance of the law
is a matter of mere legality, not morality. Finally, what counts as
crimes against the government must to a large extent be laid down by
statute. But in all those cases it is clearly implied that the
statutes are checked by natural justice and that they in the end only
exist for the sake of justice and its administration.
This, then, is Craig's radical proposal for how to return to natural
justice: to abolish all formal law in as far as it is at all possible.
It may not be immediately clear how this view is to be brought into
line with the view, which we have seen Craig taking over from Hume and
Smith, that the spectators' natural reactions to injustice are so clear
and certain that they are spontaneously rule-forming. The question is,
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where exactly does the line between rules of natural justice and
formal laws go? Although Craig does not face the question in this
way, it seems fairly clear from the foregoing what his answer must
be. The rules of formal law are first of all declared law, or
positive law, but, apart from that, also consuetudinary law, in so
far as it exists in the form of precedents which are the object of
study by a special profession. Or in other words, formal law seems
to be a creature of positive institutions in certain of its aspects.
In contrast, the rules of natural justice seem to be nothing but
spontaneous formations which only exist as part of popular morality.
Certain things around them, such as the specific way in which they
are enforced, are matters of positive institution; but in themselves
they are nothing but an off-spin of inter-human relationships. So
in a way his proposal could be said to be that certain institutions
should be abolished, namely all the institutions upholding formal
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law, with the exceptions given above.
286 .
EPILOGUE
In seeing a significant connexion in social thinking in general,
and in legal thinking in particular, from Hume through Smith to
Millar and Craig I have not found much support in modern
scholarship. The differences have been more in the limelight.
If we, however, go back to one of those near-contemporaries for
whom this tradition was a heritage to be accepted or rejected, we
will get the indications of some understanding of this. I am
thinking of James Mill who had been sitting at the feet of Dugald
Stewart in Edinburgh. In the early years of the new century while
he was trying to find his own philosophical standpoint, and before
he identified it with that of Bentham, he reviewed the posthumous
editions of Millar's Historical View and the Ranks, both of which
Craig was responsible for.*
In the first of these reviews Mill takes Hume as the starting point
2
for the line of thinking which had led to the Historical View .
But at the same time as he sees this ancestry he also seems to
perceive an important difference. Whereas Hume had given a
3
"complete union of history and philosophy" , it was in Mill's view
necessary to separate the two into the narration of facts, "which
is more properly the business of history", and the formulation of
general, explanatory laws which can be used in history and which are
the subject of philosophy. As Mill reads Millar he was trying to
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make exactly this separation:
"It is in this light that [Millar] ... seems to have reviewed
4
this subject".
While the distinction between the particular statements which make
up history and the universal statements which make up the theoretical
sciences is both valid and useful, it would seem fairly clear that
none of the four thinkers dealt with here were confused on this point;
for all of them history provided illustrations of the general principles
contained in the developing science of human nature. Mill's
insistence on the distinction may, however, very well be a sign that
he is losing sight of the integration which there also is between
history and theory in the tradition we are dealing with. One of
the main points in the theory of human nature was to show that the
institutional manifestations of human activity are of such a kind
that they necessarily must have a history.
If one overlooks this integration one is likely also to overlook that
human evaluations in general, and particularly human morality, can not
be understood just on the background of the universal features of human
nature described by a theoretical science; they have to be seen in their
context, in their situation, as well. The situation must, however, be
particular and some of its features must be unique. Accordingly it
can only be accounted for by history, whose task it is to make the
particular and the unique intelligible.
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Any mistakes in this connection are most likely to show themselves
in the appreciation of the theory of justice in our four thinkers,
since this is the place where the theory of contextual evaluation
is most well developed. This presumption is, indeed, confirmed
by Mill. If we turn to his review of the Ranks^, we will find
that it is only concerned with Craig's 'Life of Millar', which
prefaces the main text, since,
"In other respects [the edition] differs not from those which
have preceded it".
Mill's attitude to Craig is quite hostile and at one point he complains
that,
"We are at a loss ... after all that Mr. Craig has said, to
understand the peculiar view of jurisprudence which Millar
took. The foundation on which he rested our moral judgements
is pretty distinctly explained, and is sufficiently absurd.
We are sorry that we cannot form a more distinct conception
of his speculations on the rest of this subject, which we have
7
no doubt were of a very different importance."
Although this is mainly a complaint about Craig's performance it does
reflect in a very interesting way on Mill himself, for it is just not
correct that Craig's description of Millar's "peculiar view of
jurisprudence" is less distinct than that of the foundation of our
moral judgements. Whereas the latter topic, however, is so well-
known from Smith that Mill immediately can take a standpoint on it,
the former is felt to be "peculiai" and impossible to form a "distinct
conception of".
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This must be some of the clearest evidence we can find that Hume,
Smith and Millar never got the full message of their jurisprudence
across even to their immediate posterity, and Craig's changes in
the doctrine could only have the effect of obscuring it even more.
Craig discarded the historical, and hence the broader social,
aspects of the situations in which men, as spectators, decide
questions of justice. In this respect he was in accord with the
new century, for it came increasingly to neglect this basic idea
that all human judgement must be undertaken, as well as understood,
on the basis of an immense amount of background knowledge which
inevitably has to be presupposed or taken for granted, and which
only history can give some account of. Without this idea the theory
of moral sentiments, as developed by Hume and Smith and conveyed by
Millar, must disintegrate into three or four only vaguely related
disciplines; history and social psychology of morality, and a
curious blend of meta-ethics and normative ethics. This would
nowhere be more evident than in the special area of morality dealt
with by jurisprudence; and amongst its repercussions would be the
formation of political economy and political science as independent
disciplines.
Just as the impartial spectator must look rather naked and "sufficiently
absurd" without the appropriate historical dressing, so the judgements
and opinions of the day, without the impartial spectator behind them,
must look rather like fashions: constantly changing. The latter
has been the perspective from which the 20th century has seen the
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Scottish speculations on law, as we have seen at some length in
connection with both Smith and Millar. It is the sociology and
the history of law and morality which impresses modern scholarship.
The main point in the present work has been to restore some balance
in this by introducing a third factor, the critical function of
jurisprudence, to which both the history and the social psychology
of law in a sense is subservient. Once we have got a clear view
of this program it would seem to present a worthy challenge to bring
it up to date and for someone to fulfil the old promise,
"in another discourse ... to give an account of the general
principles of law and government, and of the different
revolutions they have undergone in the different ages
and periods of society".
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APPENDIX A.
NATURAL OBLIGATION IN HUME
In Chapter II, Section 8, I have presented what I take to be Hume's
theory of obligation, both as far as the obligation to natural and to
the important artificial virtues is concerned. There are, however, a
good deal of passages in the Treatise dealing with obligation which we
have not accounted for and which seem somewhat puzzling. I am, of
course, thinking of Hume's frequent use of "natural obligation".
In one of the central passages, which I have already quoted, he is clearly
taking natural obligation to be our obligation to perform the natural
virtues:
"where an action is not requir'd by any natural passion, it
cannot be requir'd by any natural obligation; since it may be
omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the
mind and temper, and consequently without any vice." (T. 518)
Here natural obligation is clearly taken to be contrasted with "arti¬
ficial obligation" (an expression not used by Hume), in the sense of
obligation to perform the artificial virtues. But elsewhere Hume takes
natural obligation to be identical with interested motivation: "The
natural obligation to justice, viz. interest ... ". (T. 498); "interest
is the first [i.e. original or natural] obligation to the performance
of promises". (T. 523) In his later discussions of the relation between
the obligation of promises and the obligation of allegiance he also
frequently talks of "the natural obligations of interest". (T. 545; 544,
546 etc.) Clearly natural obligation here means something different
from what it means in the first quoted sense. When we behave justly
and perform promises out of self-interest there is obviously nothing
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involved about us hating ourselves for the lack of a natural motive and
thus a natural virtue. Natural obligation in the sense of interested
motivation is closely akin to Hobbes's idea of natural obligation:1
to have an obligation is to be obliged, i.e. urged by natural (self-
interested) passions to do something, without the interference of
anything moral. Natural obligation must, therefore here be taken in
opposition, not to "artificial obligation", but to moral obligation.
We can, however, not complain about this confusing use of the word
"natural", for Hume has already early in Book III gone through five
different senses of the word, namely as opposed to the miraculous, the
unusual, the artificial, the civil, and the moral; and he concludes
by warning us: "The opposition will always discover the sense, in which
it ['natural"] is taken"! (T. 474-75)
The concept of natural obligation in the sense of interested motivation
is also necessary if we are to understand Hume's idea that moral obliga¬
tion varies proportionally with the natural obligation. This idea
comes up in various places, but particularly clearly in the Section
'Of the laws of nations' in the Treatise. He there points out that
men in fact more easily go along with transgressions of the natural
laws between states and their sovereigns than between private men.
(T. 568) He ascribes this to the fact that whereas justice between
states arises out of self-interest on the part of the states, just as
is the case with individual men, and whereas this likewise gives rise
to a moral obligation, this self-interest will often not be so strong
and, indeed, necessary as between individuals and, consequently the
moral obligation must be weaker as well:
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"'tho' the intercourse of different states be advantageous, and
even sometimes necessary, yet it is not so necessary nor advan¬
tageous as that among individuals, without which 'tis utterly
impossible for human nature ever to subsist. Since, therefore,
the natural obligation to justice, among different states, is not
so strong as among individuals, the moral obligation, which
arises from it, must partake of its weakness". (T. 569)
The interest involved consists of a regard to the utility of a certain
kind of actions (and their motives), and it is through sympathy with
this utility that our moral evaluations and obligations arise, as we
have seen. So when the utility varies, so does the evaluations and
the obligations: "the moral obligation holds proportion with the
usefulness." (E. 206)
Hume states the same idea when he treats of the virtues of chastity and
allegiance to governments, but he there also points out that the direct
connection between utility and obligation may be off-set by the influ¬
ence of general rules. When people have become used to a pattern of
behaviour in accordance with certain rules, they do not automatically
and immediately change that behaviour when the rules prove not to be
useful any longer. Thus women still stick to the rules of chastity
when they are past the child-bearing age, though the rules then no
longer serve their specific purpose; (T. 572-573. E. 207-208) and
men do not instantly rebel against a government as soon as it does not
quite serve their interests. (T. 551-553) Thus one natural principle,
the adherence to general rules, overrules another, the motivating
force of utility, in certain cases. In both the cases mentioned he
points out that this is as well, for in general the long-term effect of
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adherence to the general rules is more useful than it would be to follow
the ideas of utility at any given moment. (T. 552-553, 572-573;
E. 207-208) In other words, an unintended, but useful result is
created by thwarting motives which intended useful results.
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APPENDIX B
THE WORKS OF MILLAR AND CRAIG
John Millar only published two works under his own name, The Origin
of the Distinction of Ranks: or, An Inquiry Into the Circumstances
which give rise to Influence and Authority, in the Different Members
of Society^, and An Historical View of the English Government from the
Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution in 1688. To which
are Subjoined Some Dissertations Connected with the History of the
2
Government from the Revolution to the Present Time. Although both of
these works contain material which is relevant to our inquiry, neither
of them is in any way primarily jurisprudential, Apart from these
Millar's works are anonymous. According to his first biographer,
John Craig, he published "one or two anonymous pamphlets, on such poli¬
tical questions as he thought important to the public welfare, and a
3
few articles in the Analytical Review." There is fairly general
agreement that one of these pamphlets is the Letters ofCrito, on the
4
Causes, Objects, and Consequences of the Present War. It has been
speculated that Millar is also the author of the Letters of Sidney, on
Inequality of Property. To which is added, A Treatise of the Effects
of War on Commercial Prosperity. As to the reviews in the Analytical
Review, mentioned by Craig, it has so far been impossible to establish
which ones are to be ascribed to Millar.^ Of these works only the
Letters of Sidney are of direct interest to us, but then they are, as
we will see, of the very highest importance.
Is this pamphlet really Millar's? William C. Lehmann thought that
7
this is "a strong probability" because of the close similarity between
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the Letters and Millar's known views and because there "is ... nothing
8
that speaks clearly against it." Hans Medick has recently gone much
further and claimed that he could now give "den sicheren Nachweis der
Autorschaft Millars ..., der bisher in der Sekundarliteratur nicht
9
erbracht werden konnte". Although I am of the opinion that it is
quite possible that Millar is the author of the Letters of Sidney, I
can certainly not agree that Medick has proved this. Indeed, his "proof"
throws some additional doubt over Millar's authorship. Medick's argu¬
ment is that certain of the most central passages in the Letters
reappear verbatim in John Craig's Elements of Political Science^®; but
since this work in Medick's opinion largely is a paraphrase of Millar's
unpublished Lectures on the Science of Government which Craig had listened
to as a student^, he concludes that also the Letters must be Millar's.
There would seem to be at least one other obvious possibility, that
Craig himself wrote the Letters and later incorporated them in his major
work! To Lehmann's rhetorical question about
"Who but a man like Millar would be quoting Harrington in
1796; and who else in Scotland would be likely to know of a
law on testaments just passed in France, of which he had not
12
yet seen 'the specific regulations'!"
we could fairly confidently answer that a student, a relative and good
friend, and an intellectual ally, in short, a man like Craig would be
13
quite likely to do so. So while Millar may be a good guess about
the authorship of Sidney, this is by no means proved; and there is at
least one obvious and quite likely alternative author, John Craig.
Where does this place Millar in our account? Well, apart from the
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controversial Sidney and apart from what can be extracted from the pub¬
lished works mentioned above, there are his lectures. While Millar's
14
own lecture-notes have not been preserved, a large number of students'
notes of his lectures are still in existence, and some of them are of
such a quality that they give us a fairly good idea of Millar's
lectures.^ These lecture notes are of extraordinary importance, first
of all because they point backwards to Adam Smith, but also because they
point forward to John Craig. It is clear that Hans Medick is quite
right when he sees Millar's Lectures on Government as the closest we
come to the work on the "Theory and History of Law and Government"
which Smith never got quite ready for publication;^ and I would add
that there is much material of equal importance in some of the other
of Millar's lecture courses, especially the Lectures on Civil Law.
Furthermore, it is evident that there is a close relationship between
the lectures on Government and Craig's big three volume work on the
Elements of Political Science which was published some thirteen years
after Millar's death. Medick even maintains that this work
"grossenteils auf einer Plagiierung des Millarschen Manuskripts
17
der 'Lectures on the Science of Government' beruht".
This does, however, seem to me both inaccurate and unjust. It is in¬
accurate in that while it is true that some parts of Craig's work are
dependent upon Millar's Lectures on Government, other parts are equally
close to some of his other lectures; the influence of Millar's Lectures
on Civil Law is e.g. clearly to be seen. Medick's allegation of
plagiarism is unjust as long as it is not qualified half-way out of
existence. It should be explained that Craig's arrangement of the
material in the Elements is completely new; and it should further be
explained that this new arrangement is rather significant, for it re¬
flects a substantial change in the political and social thinking in
general, and the jurisprudence in particular, which we find unfolding
from Hume through Smith to Millar. As shown in Chapter IV above,
history is deprived of any theoretical role and left out of the account;
and together with it the idea of unintended consequences also becomes
insignificant, at least as far as the theory of law is concerned. Once
this has been substantiated, it will be clear that Craig's Elements of
Political Science assumes a much more interesting place in the history of
liberalism from Hume to the Philosophical Radicals, and it seems to me
unwise to write the work off as mere plagiarism until this has been
attempted.
Although I cannot accept the charge of plagiarism, and although I think
that something interesting and new happens in Craig, my main theme has
been that there is a strong continuity in the idea of natural justice.
In order to get the details of this continuity we would have had to make
use of all the existing notes from Millar's lectures referred to above.
When I say "all", I mean roughly that. As I mentioned, it is not just
a matter of close similarities between Craig's Elements and Millar's
Lectures on Government, but also Millar's other lecture courses and,
particularly, the Lectures on Civil Law. However, as I explained in




MILLAR: "IDEOLOGE DES KLEINEN BURGERTUMS"?
Hans Medick and Annette Leppert-FSgen have presented us with the undoubt-
and
edly shrewdest and most sophisticated commentary on / criticism of John
Millar.''" It is therefore a pleasure to disagree with it in most of its
aspects. In order to bring out the issues as clearly as possible I
will state the position of our authors in a number of theses and after¬
wards answer them one by one.
2. thesis: Millar is fundamentally to be seen as the ideologist "des
kleinen Burgertums", of the middling ranks.
2. thesis: This ideological function is made clear by a number of
significant inconsistencies in his doctrines, for these inconsistencies
are the simple reflections of the contradictory situation of the minor
bourgeoisie. The difficulties in Millar's theory
"sind ... aus der spezifischen in sich widerspruchlichen
Situation einer Klasse abzuleiten, die einerseits die waren-
produzierende Gesellschaft, in der "every man thus lives by
exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant", von den
Begrenzungen eines Subsystems befreien wollte, so dass
schliesslich "the society itself grows to be what is properly
2
a commercial society", wahrend sie auf der anderen Seite die
kapitalistischen Konsequenzen des ubiquitaren Tauschs scheute."
(27-28)3
The intellectual inconsistencies are, therefore, inevitable and necessary,
(p. 27).
3CC .
3. thesis: The most fundamental inconsistency is to be found in
Millar's theory of labour. When he analyses the process by which
feudal society develops into modern commercial society, he uses labour
(namely the labour of the middling ranks) as the foundation for property,
and as the precondition for the evolution of the political autonomy
and liberty of the individual, (pp. 28-30) - This theory falls
into contradiction when Millar analyses the fully developed commercial
society, for here the basic thing, labour, becomes a commodity in itself:
"Widerspruchlich muss diese Theorie in dem Augenblick werden, wo
die in Geschichtsphilosophie und politischer Theorie unterstellte
okonomische Autonomic der Warenproduzenten dadurch ins Schwanken
gerat, dass deren Arbeitskraft selber zur Ware wird, sie
selber - und nicht mehr nur, wie es sich in der Begrundung der
"commercial society" ausnimmt, die von ihr produzierten
»•
Uberschusse uber den Eigenverbrauch - Gegenstand des Tausches
ist und der Nichtbesitz geradezu die Voraussetzung dieses
Tausches bildet." (p. 30)
4. thesis: This is linked with a difficulty in the theory of capital.
When Millar deals with pre-commercial society, he says that "capital
is composed of what is saved from the produce which [has] ... not
been consumed by individuals";^ but when he comes to modern society
this idea is completely transformed and capital is now an independent
"Produktionsfaktor" along with the two natural ones, land and labour.
As such it is an independent source of new property, namely profit,
which is thus not based on the owner's own labour, (pp. 30-31)
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5. thesis: This leads to a split in Millar's class-theory. For he
sees clearly that as long as we are in pre-commercial society there
must be two broad classes, those with, and those without property; and
he sees that these two classes must be opposed to each other as rulers
and ruled. In modern society, however, there must be three classes,
corresponding to the three means of production. But as Millar here
suddenly alleges that capital helps the labouring classes in maintaining
themselves, he is also led to maintain that this class-structure does
not lead to any clear and stabile power-structure, i.e. to any antag¬
onism. Millar is simply blind to the fact that the new capital has
its foundation in exploitation, (p. 31-32)
6. thesis: Historically the middle class of small producers is the
link between the feudal and the full-blown capitalist society, but it
is different from both and it is antagonistic to both. (Cf. 2. thesis
on the contradictory situatiort of the class.) Millar wants to turn
the condition of this class into the permanent condition for society
in general. His blindness to the true character of capitalism means,
however, that he only attacks to one side, as it were, namely feudal,
and feudal looking, impediments to his Utopia, (p.32)
7. thesis: This leads him in the Letters of Sidney to adopt the
contradictory standpoint of first arguing clearly against inequality
of property and then defending private property even more strongly
against all levelling, (pp. 32-33)
8. thesis: The latter is even done with such excessive zeal that he
would maintain private property in the interest of a minority against
the will of a majority of the people. (33-34)
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9. thesis: This contradiction between criticism of inequality and
condemnation of equalization is impossible to resolve, but it can be
enlighteningly explained. It is an expression of the ideology of
"reasonable economy" of the small producers which, on the one hand, re¬
quires the existence of private property but, on the other hand, must
exclude excessive possessions as leading to - bad economy. This is the
"kleinburgerliche Horizont", the spoken and unspoken assumptions
•%
"des kleinburgerlichen Okonomen: and, in the end, "des kleinburgerlichen
Moralisten Millar", (pp. 34-38)
This interpretation seems to fit like a glove. It is just a question
whether the hand is Millar's or, for that matter, Craig's. I think
not. I will start my answers with the third thesis and move on from
that. At the end I will take up theses 1 and 2.
Adv. thesis 3: This starts from a clear mistake. Millar does not
adopt Locke's labour theory of property. He is quite as clear as Smith
that property has its origins in the spectator situation and he repeats
this nearly ad nauseam. One of the clearest passages is in the ninth
of the Letters of Sidney and it is of such importance that it is worth
quoting at length:
"The simplest view we can take of this subject [the source of the
right of property], is to consider the feelings which would
naturally arise in the breast of a spectator, while one man
endeavoured to dispossess another of any external object already
under his natural power. To him, the interests of the two
individuals would be equally important; and as he could have
no sympathy with the preference which the aggressor evidently
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gave to his own happiness over that of the other, he would
disapprove of it as improper. By being in possession of the
subject in dispute, one of the parties had formed a natural and
reasonable expectation of enjoying it; and the attempt of the
other threatened to disappoint this just expectation; to
render his situation in some respects worse than it was before;
to diminish his enjoyment, and to do him positive injury.
The spectator would readily sympathise with the resentment
which such conduct was fitted to excite, and would readily
assist him in recovering that subject, of which he had been un¬
justly bereaved. The other person, besides being actuated by
self-preference, which none could approve, could suffer no
real loss by the refusal of the object he desired; his situation
would be exactly the same as before he made the demand; he would
neither be deprived of any enjoyment, nor of any reasonable
expectation of enjoyment; and any resentment, which, in such
circumstances, he might express, would appear to others highly
absurd. Where the difference of sympathetic feelings was so
strong, the spectators would never hesitate with respect to
the propriety of their interference; and, thus, an idea of pro¬
perty would arise from the mere circumstance of actual possession.
Accordingly, occupancy, the mere laying hold of a subject, has,
by all writers on natural law, been accounted the chief mode
of beginning a right of property; and, in many rude nations, this




But when mankind has got beyond the "rude" stage and has taken to agri¬
culture, then,
"after a person has long cultivated the same field, his possession
becomes gradually more and more complete ... and when by his
industry and labour he has increased the value of the subject,
he seems justly entitled, not only to the immediate crop that is
raised, but to all the future advantages arising from the melior-
7
ation of the soil." (Ranks, p. 158).
This last quotation indicates exactly what it is Millar does with Locke's
labour theory of property: he twists it into a supporting argument
for his own spectator theory. The idea is simply that nothing heightens
a man's expectation of having his de facto possessions at his command
more than his actually conferring some work on it; and as any impartial
spectator fully goes along with this his right is so much more firmly
recognized. This again is spelled out with all the clarity that could
be wished for in the ninth of the Letters of Sidney:
Various circumstances concur in strengthening and confirming
this right. Few acquisitions are made without the employment
of some labour or ingenuity, and no association can be stronger
than between a man and the produce of his own labour. His
exertion is altogether voluntary; and, while it marks, in the
strongest manner, his desire of possessing the subject, it often
adds greatly to its value, and sometimes is the sole source
of its being in a situation capable of being used. A man, by
building a house, evinces his intention of possessing it; and
by his labour puts materials, formerly of little value, into
such a form as may afford him conveniency and comfort; should
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another person, who had given no assistance to the work,
endeavour to dispossess him, the difference between their
rights would be obvious to the most careless observer.
[footnote: "See Locke on Civil Government, Book II, Chap.
V."]" (Sidney, 45).8
Furthermore, it is not the case, as maintained in thesis 3, that labour
as such is the precondition for the political autonomy and liberty of
the individual members of the emerging middle class. Rather it is
labour done in new circumstances, viz. in a market situation. It is
the market that makes people free individuals, whatever they have to
offer on the market. This applies to labour services as well as goods,
but of course the latter is the most frequent and obvious in the early
stages of the evolution of the market system. Accordingly Millar says
that, "the labouring parts of the inhabitants" "often find it more
9
profitable to work at their own charges" etc.
The whole point in a theory like the Smith-Millar-Craig one is that with
the development of the market its liberating or independence-making
effects spread downwards to the very lowest orders of the people. It
is, therefore, creating a situation in which even the poorest do not
need to sell themselves any longer (as Medick and Leppert-Fogen main¬
tain, p.30), but only their services. Of course this may lead to new
social problems, especially educational ones, but that is after all not
any contradiction, but a practical problem.
Millar sees the development of Britain "since the Reign of William III"
as leading in exactly this direction. In the important Essay No. Ill
in Hist, view, IV, he shows how capitalism in commerce and farming
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in this period increased freedom and independence in general and how it
created the chances of obtaining them for so to speak all. The conse¬
quence of such liberty is inevitably inequality, but the important thing
is that this is not a final and monopolized inequality. Over a few
generations the "manning" of the various ranks will change in a system
of liberty and it is to achieve this that laws of inheritance, testa¬
ments, and entails should be reformed.1^
Adv. thesis 4: Similarly there is no contradiction in Millar's theory
of capital. What is just savings in pre-modern society can only become
capital, in the modern sense of an independent means of production,
when a market has developed. The criticism that profit cannot be
property in the proper sense because it is not based on the owner's labour
is refuted once we remember that Millar does not embrace the labour
theory of property (see my answer to thesis 3 above).
Adv. thesis 5: Millar maintains that the two broad classes of pre-
commercial society are opposed to each other as rulers and ruled, because
there is no market system through which the property of the former can
be circulated and thus benefit others than themselves. The only two
ways property can be used or circulated are either as gifts, which
creates dependents, or by means of violence, which leads the propertied
classes to use power and thus also creates dependents. It is this
situation which is changed by the market, if it is not prevented by
continued enforcement of feudal laws. Savings turned into capital by
the market can be spent and they can change hands. The three classes of
modern society are accordingly not classes in the same absolute sense as
the two classes in earlier periods, for their "manning" is continually
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changing. In fact this creates a tendency towards a society where
the class-concept is nearly inapplicable, society being in that respect
atomized into individuals. Although property always will have a strong
influence on power, this will in such a situation be very much loosened.
Adv. thesis 6: This thesis rests on a particularly nice mistake. It
brings out clearly that our authors have misunderstood the real basis
and starting-point for Millar's various criticisms, i.e. natural law
in his and Smith's sense. It is because feudal institutions are in
conflict with this that Millar criticizes them. When he does not crit¬
icize capitalism as such, it is obviously not because of any particular
"class-interest", but because he conceived the society of small and
middle-sized producers as a form of capitalism; the liberal form of
capitalism where no monopoly or monolpoly-creating laws (inheritance,
entail) are enforced and where there, outside the market, is room for
mending the various social defects which must arise.
Adv. thesis 7: There is therefore no contradiction in his criticizing
inequality of property and at the same time rejecting levelling. Both
the then existing excessive inequality and any future levelling of
property would in the same manner transgress natural justice and liberty,
they are both illegitimate interferences.^
Adv. thesis 8: It is, therefore, not because of anybody's interest,
but because of natural justice, that property has to be defended
against attacks wherever they come from.
Adv. thesis 9: There is, as shown, no contradiction to explain. As
to Millar's "kleinburgerliche Horizont" and his zeal for "reasonable
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economy", this is not an absolute and unchecked ideology but a set of
moral, social, and economic ideals which are tried out against the
superior ideal of justice and liberty. In so far as they pass this
test they can be allowed.
Adv. thesis 2: A contradiction is a logical relation between propo¬
sitions. What a contradiction between classes, or a contradictory
situation, is, I do not know; but, even if there were such a thing, our
authors still owe us an explanation of how exactly intellectual contra¬
dictions are "abzuleiten", to be derived, from it. Anyway, we have
seen that the particular intellectual contradictions they find in Millar
are imaginary.
Adv. thesis 1: Whether Millar is the ideologist of any class or not is
not particularly interesting as long as it is not shown exactly what
this would explain. Moreover, even if Millar is the ideologist of a




According to Louis Schneider'*' Millar's thought is not beset by quite so
many contradictions as Medick and Leppert-F5gen credit him with; it is
rather characterized by a number of suggestive and significant unclari-
ties. Schneider's main claim is that Millar on the one hand presents
a
what is normally known as/laissez-faire theory of society, but on the
other hand he engages in various social criticisms which are in "tension"
with this theory:
"Men's actions, ... often have unintended beneficient consequences,
and it is these, rather than maleficient ones, that need primary
emphasis. Excellence in institutions is characteristically
achieved when men are not planning for it. Old institutions
are likely to incorporate wisdom. ... Deliberate social planning
is likely to have pernicious results. "System" is particularly
to be regarded with wariness. ... The above strain or tendency
in his thought may be said to suggest a "model" of society whereby
it works well if left essentially untouched and paradoxically
flourishes when men do not concern themselves about its wel¬
fare. The model is plainly "low" on rationality. Men need
not (and do not) reflect much on social objects. Unintended
consequences of action are likely to provide necessary social
forms and changes. It has already been amply indicated that
projection, speculation, and system are to be looked at askance.
The model is accordingly also "high" on laissez faire. But all this
... is in tension with other very significant aspects of Millar's
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thought. In particular, the low-rationality feature is in
conflict with Millar's animadversions on the Catholic Church,
which, in his view, simply as a matter of fact, does not
exhibit low rationality. And the laissez faire feature quite
fails to fall into easy congruity with the criticisms he makes
2
of the society and culture of his day and place."
This understanding of Millar's social and political theory hits a
number of points correctly, but it is faulty in various respects.
Firstly, it is true that for Millar all human actions have unintended
consequences. Secondly, it is correct that this shows that there are
limits to men's rational and deliberate planning of society. Thirdly,
it gives tradition a certain importance. It does, however, not mean
that any institution is wise or good, because it is old and traditional.
It is so because it fulfills certain criteria (namely, the criteria
provided by natural justice and liberty).
Furthermore, the fact that there are limits to what men can achieve by
rational action in society does not mean, according to logic and
according to Millar, that nothing can be achieved that way. Indeed,
Millar-Craig's philosophy is an attempt to delineate the areas where
we should definitely not achieve anything but disaster if we began to
plan according to some preconceived plan. Those are the areas de¬
termined by justice and liberty; but outside those areas there is no
3
reason whatsoever why we should not try to plan although we, of course,
do not have any guarantee of success (our actions will always have
other effects than those aimed at). Thus, although we must leave the
market alone, there is every reason to help those who occasionally fare
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badly in it. (Schneider's first specific complaint, pp. 2093-2094).
Moreover to think the market system on the whole beneficial, and its
alternatives any way bad, obviously does not compel one to like all its
effects, like e.g. the "commercialization of life". (Schneider's
4
second complaint, pp. 2094-2095).
Although we have an obligation to leave property rights untouched, we
have no obligation to keep up old statutes for inheritance and entail,
on the contrary. Likewise as to the system of government (Schneider's
third complaint, pp. 2095-2096): it is only to be judged in terms of
expediency, i.e. in terms of its ability to protect justice and liberty.
By this standard a Parliamentary reform was called for in the late 18th
Century, according to Millar and Craig.
Finally, Schneider's criticisms reach their climax in connection with
the grounds for political obligation in Millar (pp. 2096-2097). On the
one hand Millar presents the British Constitution as the outcome of a
long, slow growth which no human could have planned or envisaged. On
the other hand he claims the right for modern man to evaluate it
rationally.
Here we must first remember that Millar never lets tradition imply obli¬
gation. In so far he is therefore perfectly entitled to insist on an
independent criterion of evaluation. Secondly, though Millar is not
specific on this, it ought to be clear that although men's social
knowledge of necessity is limited, this does not free them from judging
as best they can. Thirdly, it is amply clear that Millar's criticism
of excessive, or constructive, rationalism in social matters always
*
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concerns large-scale reconstructions, whereas what he himself suggests
is small-scale, piece-meal amendments (of Parliamentary election^ of
inheritance laws, etc.). As for Millar's positive attitude to one of
the largest scaled reconstructions ever, the French Revolution, we must
first of all remember that he had so many reservations about it that
all he really endorsed was the early attempt to imitate the British
Constitution, and, secondly, that any liberal, in the sense of Hume,
Smith, and Millar, would allow that situations can arise where so funda¬
mental values are infringed upon that there is no other recourse than
violence. (Letters of Crito, e.g. letter no. 2.)
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APPENDIX E.
CRAIG ON POLITICAL POWER
As argued in the text,* Craig's ideas about political power are mainly
of interest because he has such a clear view of the relationship between
power and right, seeing the former, and thus the state, as a means to
protect the latter. His discussion of the distribution of political
power (Elements, Book I, Ch. II) is, however, in itself of quite some
interest. He begins by pointing out that any form of political
power is tantamount to political inequality, so the whole argument con¬
cerns what kind of political inequality is least inexpedient. The
first question is whether the inequality should be permanent or
temporary. The former could neither be justified by any inequality
in natural rights, for on that point we are completely equal, nor by its
usefulness, for it can always turn out to be necessary to get rid of the
rulers. Permanency will often have a tendency to corrupt the rulers
and take away all public spirit and regard for individual rights since
all competition is ruled out. These arguments, of course, apply
whether rulers are elected or born to permanent power; the latter will
just add arbitrariness to the selection of the kind of persons who will
rule. Political power ought thus not to be permanently with anyone in
particular and the whole question becomes one of how widely it should
rotate. It is in this context that Craig puts forward the extremely
2
interesting argument that "Man is formed by the circumstances in which
he is placed" (Elements, I, 173) and hence, to let him be involved in
the political life of a society in an active role will educate him and
"form" him to be a genuine citizen; and, obviously, the more this can
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be extended, the better. This general argument must, of course, be
adjusted to the individual situation, and if there e.g. is a section of
the population whfc.h is so poor that its votes could be bought by the
rich or those in power (as was the case in contemporary Britain,
3
according to Craig), then they should not be enfranchised. This quali¬
fication should, however, be very low and it should further be said in
its defence that it would be a general rule which would not be directed
against particular individuals, but against a group whose membership
4
would be continuously changing. In this context it should be re¬
marked that Craig strongly criticizes the idea that society at any time
is divided into (two) fixed, and opposed, classes. "On the contrary,
society consists of insensible gradations, rising from the lowest to the
highest station, etc." (Elements, I, 198).^
In the light of this Craig goes on to argue for some Parliamentary
reform in Britain, including not only extended suffrage to the lower
house, but also the replacement of the House of Lords by the kind of
senate which he also finds desirable in principle, an independently elected
one with full powers alongside those of the lower house (but with some
extra qualifications on candidates and electors). He also argues the
case for retaining the monarchy.
There are, however, only two more arguments in the Chapter which are of
interest for us. The first is fairly straightforward. Craig argues
that, although he supports the separation of the legislative and the
executive powers for a number of reasons, he cannot agree with
Montesquieu that this separation is essential for the protection of in¬
dividual liberty. The independence of the judicial power is the only
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real necessity here. This argument is, of course, a clear consequence
of the idea that rights are not protected by formal law, but by the
spectators on a jury.^
The second argument to be mentioned is of interest because it in a
nutshell shows the difficulties in a purely naturalistic theory of
politics. It occurs in the first half of Section II of the Chapter
we are concerned with. Having argued in the first Section that poli¬
tical inequality is basically a creature of expediency which only
resides temporarily in any person and that apart from that men are
equal, Craig now points out that after all men are, as a matter of
fact, not equal. They are different in intellectual power, in wealth,
and in birth, and whether or not we like it, such things create respect
and thus power. This is in Craig's eyes a confusion of power with
influence. Influence is a purely subjective phenomenon which is de¬
pendent upon the nature and state of the minds of those who are being
influenced, but power rests on an enforcible obligation to obey. If
power were to rest on influence, it would be a government of force.
On reading this Hume's words about all power resting on opinion come to
mind and one is led to ask, how can there within a sentimentalist frame¬
work, like the Hume-Smith-Millar-Craig one, be a distinction between an
"enforcible obligation" and a subjective "influence"? The answer is
obviously that what carries weight with the impartial spectator is an
enforcible obligation and, as we know, the spectator is the embodiment of
the dual criteria of maximum compatibility and universalizability.
Between them they should be able to satisfy both the naturalist's wish
for explanation and the moralist's demand for justification.
NOTES
3
CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM
1. This has been demonstrated as clearly as one could want by
Duncan Forbes in his Hume's Philosophical Politics.
2. I am here thinking of the work of F.A. von Hayek. See
especially The Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation,
and Liberty, I-II.
3. This claim will be appropriately modified for individual
elements of the tradition as the account goes along.
4. The modem discussion between Professor Hart and Lord Devlin
about the relationship between morality and law is obviously
very closely related to our discussion and it might have
furnished an alternative formulation of our starting-point.
r
5. I am, of course, thinking of Professor C.D. Campbell's Adam
Smith's Science of Morals.
6. I have in mind the work of such scholars as Pascal, Meek,
Skinner, e.a., which will be dealt with below.
7. See Medick & Leppert-Fbgen, 'Frtihe Sozialwissenschaft als
Ideologic des kleinen BUrgertums: John Millar of Glasgow,
1735-1801'. The arguments of Schneider are structurally
similar, although they are without most of the ideological
lace work: 'Tension in the Thought of John Millar'.
8.
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Remarks on Some Fundamental Doctrines in Political Economy;
cf. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 600, note 25.
9. Except for a few footnotes in Medick, Naturzustand und
Naturgeschichte der biirgerlichen Gesellschaft, and in Medick §
Leppert-FBgen, op. cit., which present him as a mere plagiarist
of John Millar.
10. See Lehmann, John Millar of Glasgow, 1735-1801, pp. 57ff and
407ff; same, 'John Millar, Professor of Civil Law at Glasgow
(1761-1801)'; same, 'Some Observations on the Law Lectures of
Professor Millar at the University of Glasgow (1761-1801)';
Medick, op. cit., pp. 185ff; and Medick § Leppert-FBgen, op.
cit.
CHAPTER II. HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
1. Letters, I. p. 32; and cf. T. 620-621.
2. Letters, I, p. 33; and cf. T. 621.
3. See especially:
Cumming, Human Nature and History, II, Chapter 13, esp. pp. 170ff.
Capaldi, David Hume, The Newtonian Philosopher, pp. 179-87.




5. Cumming, op.cit., esp. pp. 172-74.
6. Enquiry, 219-220, the note.
7. The following short sketch of Hume's moral theory does, needless
to say, not pretend to any completeness nor to any originality.
Its only purpose is to set the scene for Hume's theory of
justice. I owe much in this introduction to Professor P.S. Ardal's
interpretation in his Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise; cf.
also his Introduction and Notes to his edition of Treatise, Books
II and III.
8. See Ardal's treatment of sympathy in chs. 3 and 6 of his book,
mentioned in the previous note.
9. This idea permeates large parts of the Treatise, and it is
difficult to single out any passage in particular. But the
whole passage T. 584-87 must be one of the nicest. Also its
"building [which] seems clumsy and tottering to the eye'
(T. 586) provides an interesting reference-through-contrast
to one of the early treatments of sympathy, the house with
"the little room lost in the stairs, antichambers and passages"!
(T. 363f.) .
10. Again there is an absolute abundance of clear and quotable
passages all through the Treatise to illustrate this, and again
I will refer especially to Book III, Part iii, Sect. 1 (T. 580-84).
319.
11. Hume gives this division in the Treatise on pp. 589-90. It is
not necessary for my purposes to argue that sympathy is involved
in our evaluation of all four kinds of qualities. But see
Ardal, op.cit., pp. 152-56.
12. Treatise, Book III, Part ii, Sect. 1, 'Justice, whether a
natural or artificial virtue?'
13. All words marked * in quotations from the Treatise are inserted
in the text (or somehow altered) from the list of Hume's
handwritten marginal notes to the 3rd Book of the Treatise,
published by R.W. Connon in his article, 'Some MS Corrections
by Hume in the Third Volume of his Treatise of Human Nature',
Long Room, No. 11, 1975 > pp. 14-22.
14. K. Haakonssen, 'Hume's Social Explanations: The Case of Justice'.
15. See Duncan Forbes's treatment of this in the first two chapters
of his Hume's Philosophical Politics.
16. In Treatise,p. 493, Hume says that the state of nature can be
very useful and a legitimate methodological device, enabling
one to treat of the emotional side of human nature in abstraction
from the "understanding", i.e. social restraint (a point which
incidentially shows his social conception of reason).
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17. It is in connection with Hume's account of the origin of
justice that R.D. Cumming (see note 3 above) sees a difference
between the Treatise and the Enquiry: In the Treatise justice
is mainly seen to alleviate the miseries of mankind; in the
Enquiry it is more regarded as an instrument that creates
"abundance". But this does not seem to be very persuasive,
for just as Hume in the Enquiry points out how by "art, labour,
and industry" in society we can create our enjoyments in "great
abundance" (E. 188); so he in the Treatise points out, not only
that it is "by society all his [man's] infirmities are compensated",
but also that "tho' in that situation [society] his wants multiply
every moment upon him, yet his abilities are still more augmented,
and leave him in every respect more satisfied and happy, than 'tis
possible for him, in his savage and solitary condition, ever to
become." (T. 485). And Hume then goes on to point out the
arrangement which really makes society advantageous: the division
of labour. On the other hand, Hume does also in the Enquiry
say that "few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal
hand of nature" etc. (E. 188). In both works justice thus has a
backward looking as well as a forward looking aspect, which is
hardly surprising since the two aspects are complementary. And
I fail to see any difference in the stress put on them in the two
works.
18. Concerning Hume's theory of the calm passions, see Ardal,
op.cit., ch. 5; in this context especially, pp. 104-106.
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19. The treatment of the matter on p. 498 is at least as ambiguous.
I am glad to discover that Prof. Ardal in his paper to the 1976
Edinburgh Hume Conference takes much the same line as I
concerning the conventional institution of justice. See
'Convention and Value', forthcoming in the Conference Proceedings.
I am grateful to Prof. Ardal for letting me consult his paper
before publication.
20. I take it as self-evident that Hume is talking of the extension of
justice to more and more people, not the extension of the concept
of justice to new areas, like e.g. contracts, or the extension
of, say, the concept of property from cattle to land. There is
no indication that anything like the latter was in his mind in
the paragraphs of the Treatise with which I am dealing here.
21. On the low level of rationality, see also e.g. T. 492 and 526.
22. The points about the artificiality of justice in this quotation
are going to be treated of below. Here I only quote the passage
at length for the sake of comprehensibility.
23. 'Hobbesian' on the traditional reading of Hobbes.
24. See his criticisms of such moral and legal positivism: T. 500,
521, 578-79; E. 214.
25. I am indebted to Professor Leon Pompa for a discussion of the
negative character of this doctrine.
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26. Hayek, 'Dr. Bernard Mandeville', and 'The Legal and Political
Philosophy of David Hume'.
27. We still have not seen how justice becomes obligatory.
28. See Sections 9 and 10 of the present Chapter; Chapter III,
Sections 14-16: Chapter IV, Sections 10 and 11, and the Epilogue.
29. This seems to me the most fitting label for Hume's position.
For the message of his discussion of determinism seems to be
distinctly methodological, more than it is metaphysical, namely:
don't be an indeterminist, for that is to abdicate the very hope
of finding an explanation by means of causation, whereas determinism
is a way of keeping the hope up.
30. Hume goes on to oppose "natural" to "miraculous", to the "rare
and unusual", to "artificial", to "civil", and to "moral" (474-75);
and the first three comparisons reappear in the Enquiry, pp.307-08,
the note.
31. Letters, I, p. 33. This was not the last time Hume had reason to
be annoyed that people misunderstood him on this point. When he came
to write his own "reference" for the Edinburgh chair, he had to do
it in the form of an anonymous defence of the Treatise. One of
the last points he makes is this:
"When the Author [i.e. Hume himself] asserts that Justice is an
artificial not a natural Virtue, he seems sensible that he employed
Words that admit of an invidious Construction; and therefore makes
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use of all proper Expedients, by Definitions and Explanations,
to prevent it. But of these his Accuser [identity not established]
takes no Notice. By the natural Virtues he plainly understands
Compassion and Generosity, and such as we are immediately carried
to by a natural Instinct; and by the artificial Virtues he means
Justice, Loyalty, and such as require, along with a natural Instinct,
a certain Reflection on the general Interests of Human Society,
and a Combination with others. In the same Sense, Sucking is an
Action natural to Man, and Speech is artificial. But what is there
in this Doctrine that can be supposed in the least pernicious?
Has he not expressly asserted, that Justice, in another Sense of
the Word, is so natural to Man, that no Society of Men, and even
no individual Member of any Society, was ever entirely devoid of
all sense of it?" (A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in
Edinburgh, pp. 30-31).
32. For good discussions of this tradition and its relevance to social
and political philosophy, see Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, I
(esp. pp. 20-21), as well as the literature referred to there
(pp. 150-51), particularly Heinimann, Nomos und Physis, and Popper,
The Open Society and Its Enemies, Chap. 5.
33. As Professor D.D. Raphael has suggested in his 'Obligations and
Rights in Hobbes '.
34. It is undoubtedly this last circumstance which leads Hayek to say
that Hume actually did revise the traditional distinction (Law,
Legislation, and Liberty, I, p. 20).
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35. See Section 4 above.
36. See Section 4 above.
37. Hume also makes the point that the necessary subordination
in society requires inequality (E. 194).
38. As Professor Ardal rightly points out, this is in a way an
anticipation of J.L. Austin's view, "that 'I promise' is a
performance, and not a statement about a mental act." Ardal's
note 39 to his edition of Treatise, Books II and III, p. 347.
Cf. Ardal, 'And That's a Promise'.
39. When Hume deals with obligation in the Section on promises in
the Treatise he says explicitly that the reasoning is the same
as for "justice in general" (T. 518) .
40. See above, Section 2.
41. See above, Section 2.
42. On this point, see Ardal's Introduction to his edition of Treatise,
Books II and III,p. 28.
43. This is of course the main theme of A Dialogue.
44. See Forbes's exposition of this in Hume's Philosophical Politics,
Chap. 4.
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45 . See above , Section 2.
46. There is at least one other place where Hume hints that actions
rather than motives can be the important thing in seeing how
obligation comes about; see Treatise, p. 479 on obligation,
where he ends, saying, "Actions are at first only consider'd as
signs of motives: But 'tis usual, in this case, as in all others,
to fix our attention on the signs, and neglect, in some measure,
the thing signify'd".
47. Apart from obligation in the sense dealt with in this Section, Hume
also frequently talks of "natural obligation". I discuss this
in Appendix A.
48. Hume's Philosophical Politics, p. 61, note 1. Forbes is arguing
with C.W. Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume.
49. Forbes, op. cit., p. 59, cf. pp. 63 and 64.
50. Ib., pp. 26-27.
51. Ib., p. 61, note 1.
52. Ib., pp. 316f.
53. Cf. T.A. Roberts, The Concept of Benevolence, p. 103.
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54. Hume does not, like Smith later, go into the development of
the ideas of property in any systematic way, but he does at
least once mention three of the famous four stages, 'Of Commerce',
Works, III, p. 289.
55. It is difficult not to read this as a reference to the work of
Bernard Mandeville.
56. Forbes, op. cit., p. 119. The whole of his chap. 4, 'Social
experience and the uniformity of human nature', is highly
relevant for the points made here.
57. I owe this formulation in terms of the distinction between
means-utility and end-utility to Hayek's Law, Legislation, and
Liberty, II, pp. 17ff., and cf. the very interesting note 14,
p. 155.
58. Pp. I6f.
59. Cf. my treatment of this above, Section 2.
60. Indeed one can say that this is the framework for Hume's whole
theory of knowledge: each new element must fit into a context
or be discarded.
61. I think that this argument can be extended to the whole of Hume's
moral philosophy, but that is beyond my concerns here.
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62. This latter point is rather important, for it suggests that
not all the aims are equally important, equally close to
human nature, and hence do not count the same in the test of
maximization of compatibility of aims. Hume does not have
any very specific theory on this point. But in suggesting
the primacy of the prevention of the negative (injustice) over
the promotion of positive valuations (see above, p. 76), he
does approach a distinction between negative and positive
values, of which the former are basic to the very existence
and well-being of men and of the form, 'Not to be harmed' in
some respect. This is taken up and worked out in some
detail by Smith as part of the foundation for justice, and
in this form I will characterize it as negative utilitarianism
(see Chapter III, Section 11, and Chapter IV, Section 2 below).
63. See e.g.:
F.A. von Hayek , Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics
pp. 99-107, 111, 160,
H.B. Acton, 'Prejudice', pp. 323-336,
F. Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, Part I, ch. vi,
G.H. Sabine, A History of Political Thought, ch. 19.
For excellent general treatments of Hume on the one hand, and
on the other the Common Law and Whig traditions and Burke,
see J.G.A. Pocock, 'Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A
Problem in the History of Ideas', pp. 202-232; and Forbes,
op. cit., ch. 8, sec. ii.
For the Common Law tradition in particular, see J.G.A. Pocock,
The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law.
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CHAPTER III. SMITH'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
1. See e.g. his contrast between "Philosophers" and men in
"common life", TMS, I, i, 3, §8.
2. As with Hume, the prime object of my discussion of Smith's
general moral theory in this Chapter is to locate his theory
of justice as precisely as possible.
3. Cf. Hume: "we blush for the conduct of those, who behave
themselves foolishly before us; and that tho' they shew no
sense of shame, nor seem in the least conscious of their folly."
(T. 371) . This is to Hume "a pretty remarkable phenomenon"
(T. 370).
4. See J.R. Lindgren, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith, pp. 21ff.
5. For a very strong expression of this need for identification,
see TMS, VII, iii, 1, §4. The expressions are particularly strong
here because Smith is trying to refute the suggestion that the
act of sympathizing is in the end egoistic. For a similar, but
more detached, refutation, see TMS, I, i, 2, §1, where he points
to the spontaneity, as opposed to reflectiveness, of the pleasure
of sympathy and pain of antipathy.
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6. Cf. TMS, VI, ii, 1, §1: "Every man feels his own pleasures
and his own pains more sensibly than those of other people.
The former are the original sensations - the latter the reflected
or sympathetic images of those sensations. The former may be
said to be the substance - the latter the shadow."
7. It is particularly unfortunate that Lindgren chose to call this
"aesthetic sympathy" since Smith's whole point is that no
sympathy is involved. This leads to various curious mistakes
in his treatment. See Lindgren, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
8. While Smith was preparing a second edition of the TMS Hume sent
him some criticism on this point. See Hume, Letters, I, pp.
311-14.
9. In editions 2-5 Smith continued the note with the following
analogy: "Two sounds, I suppose, may, each of them taken singly,
be austere, and yet, if they are perfect concords, the perception
of their harmony and coincidence may be agreeable."
10. See my summary of Hume's argument above Chapter II, Section 2.
11. Dr. G.E. Davie has drawn my attention to this parallel and he
tells me that Smith so far as the senses are concerned may be
working on a suggestion in Condillac. We will return to the
general view of knowledge indicated here. See Section 5 below.
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12. Smith gives this explanation of propriety in contrasting it
with our judgement of actions and their motives according to
merit. We will deal with merit below since Smith's viewpoint
is that merit in a sense is dependent upon or derivative from
propriety.
13. There is a strong asymmetry between the positive case, praise,
and the negative, blame, which is of great importance in Smith's
theory and which we will return to below.
14. Cf. again Smith's account early in the TMS of how both the
sentiment of the agent and of the spectator must be changed, in
order to get "such a correspondence with one another as is
sufficient for the harmony of society" (I, i, 4, §7).
15. See also all the other examples of adjustment in the following
§§.
16. Cf. TMS, III, 3, §38: "The man within the breast, the abstract
and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct, requires often
to be awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence of
the real spectator: and it is always from that spectator from
whom we can expect the least sympathy and indulgence, that we
are likely to learn the most complete lesson of self-command.
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17. Again we find that Hume has anticipated this suggestion: "No
quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and
in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize
with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations
and sentiments, however different from, or contrary to our own.
This is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace
every opinion propos'd to them; but also in men of the greatest
judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to follow
their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their
friends and daily companions. To this principle we ought to
ascribe the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and
turn of thinking of those of the same nation; and 'tis much
more probable, that this resemblance arises from sympathy, than
from any influence of the soil and climate [cf. Montesquieu],..."
(T. 316-17) . It is this kind of mutual sympathy which for both
Hume and Smith provides the possibility of education. From the
hand of nature all men are basically alike but education can make
them different for education consists in exposure to a variety of
situations from which new lines of behaviour and thinking are
picked up through mutual sympathy with other participants in the
educational situation. This situational education explains the
difference between the philosopher and the porter (W.o.N., I, ii,
4 and V, i, f, 51) as well as the differences between the Dutch,
the English, and the Scots in connection with commerce (Justice,
pp. 253ff.). And cf. Hume, 'Of the Original Contract', Works
III, pp. 444-45. We will be returning to the whole problem of
situationally determined selection of behaviour below in the final
Section of this Chapter.
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18. Cf. V, 1, §1.
19. Much stress has always been put upon Smith's indebtedness to
ancient stoicism. This should not lead one to forget that
scepticism was as much a part of the ancient legacy and both
in Sextus and in Cicero Smith would find support for the view
that men always have to accept the opinions and the behaviour
of the society into which they happen to be born, the "acceptance"
being a matter of sheer necessity. In contrast to the sceptics
Smith did, however, not end the story there. For him man always
has the possibility of developing standards above those of his
society by means of which he can evaluate the social morality,
but he can only do so piecemeal and with isolated parts of the
given morality, while the rest necessarily has to be accepted
for the time being.
20. This theme is frequently recurring in the TMS. Some of the more
noteworthy "wonder and surprise" passages are the following:
I, i, 4, §3; I, i, 5, §§6-8; I, ii, i, §12; I, iii, 1, §13;
II, ii, 1, §6; IV, 2, §§8 8 11; VI, ii, 2, §2; VI, iii,
esp. §§5, 9, 11.
21. See the essay 'On the External Senses'. For a kindred view of
Smith's conception of knowledge, see Lindgren, The Social
Philosophy of Adam Smith, ch.l.
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22. It is in much the same way custom gains an influence on judgement
of beauty. If there is any break in the habitual coherence of
things, "We miss something we expected to find, and the habitual
arrangement of our ideas is disturbed by the disappointment"
(TMS, V, 1, §2).
23. Lindgren, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith, esp. pp. 16 and
74-78.
24. This is a reference to TMS, VI, ii, 2, §§15-18, a more elegant
one than the footnotes of a later age.
25. Cf. also Enquiry 213, note. In a note to TMS, IV, 2, §3, the
Editors, Professors Raphael and Macfie, point to this note in
the second Enquiry, saying that, "Hume must have had an objection
of this character put to him, for he attempts to reply to it in
a footnote appended to Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,
V. i, first paragraph ... ". As shown in the text above Hume
does, however, deal very clearly with this issue already in the
Treatise; pp. 471-72 are particularly clear. The Enquiry
does not add anything new to this.
26. See TMS, VII, iii, 2, §§7-9.
27. Although Hume despairs of a full explanation at T. 617, he does,
of course, characterize the difference between the pleasure/pain
of moral approval/disapproval and other kinds of pleasure and
pain. Apart from what is quoted and mentioned by me in the text,
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he invokes his theory of the indirect passions of pride and
humility, love and hatred which attend moral judgement (T.
473, 574-75, and 614). I do not think that Smith takes an
explicit position on this theory.
28. And cf. e.g. VII, iii, 1, §2.
29. See e.g. II, ii, 3, §8, and IV, 2, §7.
30. See e.g. Ill, 5, §8; VII, ii, 2, §13; VII, iii, 1, §2;
VII, iii, 3, §16.
31. This is a frequently recurring theme in the TMS. Some of the
more memorable passages are: II, ii, 3, §§11-12; III, 2,
§12, §§33-35; III, 5, §§7, 12-13.
32. And cf. VII, ii, 1, §§45-47.
33. Cf. R.H. Popkin, "Hume and Kierkegaard".
34. This hesitation in itself shows Smith's uneasiness at the kind
of strong teleological expressions which he often indulges in
in the run of his argument.
35. See e.g. I, iii, 1, §7; and IV, 1, §10: "In ease of body and
peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon
a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the
highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for."
335 .
36. Cf. Ill, 2, §15: "Pain ... is, in almost all cases, a more
pungent sensation than the opposite and correspondent pleasure.
The one almost always depresses us much more below the ordinary,
or what may be called the natural state of our happiness, than
the other ever raises us above it."
37. It should be noticed that it is in this connection that Smith,
in answer to Hume's criticism, clarifies the various layers in
the whole sympathetic process and points out which is pleasant
in itself, and which follows the quality of the original
feeling (I, iii, 1, §9 note).
38. Cf. Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, pp. 64-70 and
The Open Society and Its Enemies, I, pp. 22-25 and ch. 9.
39. The whole idea of the "negative", i.e. of pain, misery, unhappiness,
as in a sense of primary importance in morals has been rediscovered
in our century in the form of so-called negative utilitarianism.
See Popper, The Open Society, I, ch. 5, note 6, and ch. 9, note 2.
Also H.B. Acton's and J.W.N. Watkins' symposium on 'Negative
Utilitarianism*, and most important maybe K.E. Tranby, 'Asymmetries
in Ethics'. Professor Tranby rightly points out the basic affinity
between negative utilitarianism and Schopenhauer's moral theory.
This whole complex of connected ideas will reappear prominently
in connection with Millar and Craig.
336.
40. Cf. also Justice, pp. 5-6.
41. Cf. Smith's impressive, early speculations about this in the
Rhetoric, pp. 80-81.
42. Cf. Justice pp.136 and 152.
43. Cf. also Smith's nice distinction between the "rules" of
justice and the "precepts" of the other social virtues; the
former we "observe", the latter we "follow" (II, ii, 1, §5).
44. See also VII, iv, esp. § §1 and 7ff.
45. From this angle we will be returning to the problem below,
Section 15. Smith draws the distinction between natural and
acquired rights in Justice, p. 8.
46. It is this very basic agreement on the absolute utility, public,
i.e. means-utility of justice plus Hume's well-known formulation
that the strength of obligation follows the extent of utility
(in the above sense), which keeps a little doubt lingering in
my mind as to the identity of the "author of very great and
original genius", referred to in TMS II, ii, 1, §5. Professors
Raphael and Macfie maintain (p. 80, note 1 of their edition of
TMS) that it must be Karnes, and their most weighty argument seems
to be that Karnes stressed the stricter obligation of justice as
compared with benevolence. But in view of the reflections above,
the same seems to be the case with Hume.
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47. It should be noticed that Smith takes care to refer to the
moral primacy of the individual by the way he expresses
himself in other places. He thus talks of the pain produced
by injustice as "real and positive hurt to some particular
persons" (II, ii, 1, §§3 & 5).
48. Professor Raphael has shown how this case apparently has
occupied Smith from a very early date, see Raphael, 'Adam
Smith and "The Infection of Hume's Society'". The case is
also mentioned in Justice, p. 136.
49. Cf. Justice, op. cit.
50. It is interesting in this connection to note that when Smith
comes to show how society's or the spectators', reactions to
us are internalized by mutual sympathy (in III, 2), he again
draws a sharp distinction between positive and negative: praise
is rarely internalized unless there are praiseworthy motives
behind (ib. §4); but blame is always received and internalized,
both when there are blameworthy motives behind and when there are
not (ib. §11, and cf. ib. §29).
51. Cf. Justice, p. 152.
52. It should be noticed that the final period of this quotation spells
out what is behind one of Smith's frequently repeated, and rather
odd-sounding standard phrases: (a) what is, (b) what ought to
be, (c) what upon a certain condition would be, the opinion of
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the spectator. (a) gives the standpoint of the actual
spectator; (b) gives that of the impartial spectator;
and (c) gives the way the former can approach the latter,
namely through the sympathetic understanding of the situation
and of human nature. It is this last point which makes Smith
talk of consistency in the sentiments of mankind (in the
quotation): hence the Socratic role of knowledge in morals.
53. W.C. Swabey, Ethical Theory from Hohbes to Kant, p. 179.
Quoted from Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals, p. 51.
54. Campbell, op. cit., p. 51.
55. See Campbell, op. cit., p. 52.
56. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 219 and 218.
57. See TMS, VII, iv, §§7-35.
58. Note the determining influence of the particular context.
59. Nothing could better illustrate how interwoven descriptive and
normative theory is for Smith than this extraordinary suggestion
that the criticism of legal positivism is now on a better footing
due to the improvement in the science of human nature.
339 .
60. Cf the 'Introduction' to the Justice. Scattered through
Smith's writings there are many descriptions of how formal
law develops out of men's spontaneous search for natural
justice; see e.g. Justice, Part I, Div. iii, §11.
61. Cf. Justice, p. 1: "Jurisprudence is that science which
inquires into the general principles which ought to be the
foundation of the laws of all nations."
62. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science of Morals, pp. 58-59.
63. Cf. Justice, pp. 1-3.
64. Reference can only be made to the set of notes edited by
Cannan, since the set found more recently is still not available
for study.
65. Since Roy Pascal published his 'Property and Society'.
66. For further description of the hunting stage, see W.o.N., V, i, a-b,
and Justice pp.14-15 and 107-109.
67. This distinction between various kinds of injury should be compared
with Smith's distinction between natural and acquired rights which
we briefly discussed above Section 12 and note 45.
68. Cf. Justice, p. 109.
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69. This, of course, provides the basis for Smith's criticism of
the contract theory of government, see Justice, pp. 11-13.
70. See Justice, p. 16.
71. This at least seems to be the case in ancient times. See
Justice, p. 23.
72. See W.o.N. Ill, iii, 3ff and Justice, p. 40.
73. W.o.N., III, iii, 7.
74. Skinner, 'Adam Smith: an Economic Interpretation of History',
p. 167.
75. Cf. Justice, pp. 42-43.
76. I owe this point to Mr. J.F.G. Shearmur who has suggested to me
that feudalism for Smith should be seen as an anomaly which was
created by the failure of the republics to solve the problem of
defence against the barbarian invasions.
77. I am greatly indebted to Mr. J.F.G. Shearmur for three or four
years' discussion of many of the following points.
78. Pascal, 'Property and Society', p. 173.
79. Meek, 'Smith, Turgot, and the "Four Stages" Theory', p. 10.
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80. Meek, op. cit., pp. 9-10. It should be remarked that this is
a general summary of the views of the Scottish Historical School,
of which Meek considers Smith one of the pioneers and John
Millar the Master.
81. Meek, 'The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology', p. 40.
82. Skinner, 'Adam Smith: an Economic Interpretation of History',
p. 175. In a note Mr. Skinner refers to the relevant, and
rather interesting, passage from Engels: "In a letter to
J. Bloch, dated September 1890, Engels wrote that 'According to
the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining
element in history is the production and reproduction of real life.
More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if
somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is
the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into
a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase' {Marx-Engels, Selected
Works (1958), ii, 488)." (Skinner, op. cit., p. 175, note 53).
83. The distinction between basic subsistence needs and "the pleasures
of wealth" which we meet in this discussion is obviously closely
related to Smith's famous distinction between necessaries and
luxuries in W.o.N., V, ii, k. It should, nevertheless, not be
confused with this, for Smith is very emphatic in the latter
discussion that the level of necessaries is socially determined.
We are thus, once again, being presented with an implicit
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confrontation between something "artificial" and something
"natural". How the two distinctions in Smith are related and
also how they lead forward to the basic idea behind
diminishing marginal utility is outside what we can deal with
here.
84. Cf. our extensive discussion of this function of mutual
sympathy, above Sections 3 and 4.
85. Cf. also the description of "The poor man's son whom heaven in
its anger has visited by ambition" (TMS, IV, 1, §8).
86. Cf. also W.o.N., III, iii, 12.
87. Skinner, 'Adam Smith: an Economic Interpretation of History',
p. 155.
88. Skinner, 'Adam Smith; Science and the Role of the Imagination',
p. 165.
89. I owe this point to a paper read by Mr. J.F.G. Shearmur to a
seminar in the Department of Philosophy, University of
Edinburgh, in 1975. The point that pleasure and pain are not
as such explanatory, but are dependent upon the situation in
which they occur, is also borne out by its connection with
sympathy which, when it is mutual is the selector of behaviour
in any situation. Cf. Sections 2 and 3 above.
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90. Indeed, economic motives can themselves be explained in terms
of taste, vanity, the situational factors, and mutual
sympathy. It is, therefore, not inconsistent with the
present interpretation that Smith explains the fact that the
Dutch in his day were much more punctual in performing commercial
agreements than the English, and the latter still better than
the Scots, by referring to these people's self-interest in
different situations. (Justice, p. 253.)
91. See also Rhetoric pp..168-70 and 174-75, and W.o.N., V, i, b,
24-25.
92. Cf. W.o.N., I, viii, 24, where Smith talks of this delay in
development as a matter of more than 500 years, and possibly much
more.
93. Meek, 'Smith, Turgot, and the "Four Stages" Theory', p. 9.
94. See Justice, p. 44.
95. See Justice, Part IV, and pp. 26ff., and W.o.N., V, i, a.
96. See Justice, pp. 263f . I am also here indebted to Mr. J.F.G.
Shearmur.
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97. K.R. Popper, 'On the Theory of the Objective Mind'. Objective
Knowledge, p. 179. See also his The Open Society and Its
Enemies, Vol. II, Chapter 14 (esp. pp. 97 and 265); The
Poverty of Historicism, Sections 31-32 (esp. p. 149); and
'Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften'.
98. Cf. Popper, Objective Knowledge, p. 179. Professor L. Pompa
has stressed the importance of this distinction (private
correspondence), and I am greatly indebted to him for discussion
of this and related points.
99. Skinner, 'Adam Smith: an Economic Interpretation of History,
p. 175.
100. Roy Pascal makes a typical non sequitur in this respect:
"Social development, following the development of property and
wealth, can only take place if the necessary conditions of exchange
exist ... Smith sees social development, therefore, as a completely
... material process." ('Property and Society', p. 171). What
is taken as a necessary condition in the first sentence , seems
clearly to have been transformed into a sufficient condition
when we reach the second sentence. It is exactly this
transformation I deny in Smith.
101. The whole discussion of the economic interpretation of Smith in
the present Section applies in virtually every detail to Millar
as well, for Millar's work consists to a very large extent in
a detailed elaboration of Smith's ideas of a history of society
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and law, and the description of these ideas in the preceeding
Section does, therefore, also to a large extent apply to
Millar. In the critical literature Millar has been taken
as quite as much, or even more, of a "materialist". Apart
from the literature quoted above in connection with Smith,
see especially W. Sombart, 'Die Anfange der Soziologie'.
Vague or uncommitted are:
W.C. Lehmann, John Millar of Glasgow, 1735-1801, esp. pp.l31ff.
A.S. Skinner, 'Economics and History - The Scottish Enlightenment'
and 'Natural History in the Age of Adam Smith'.
A.L. Macfie, 'John Millar - A Bridge between Adam Smith and
Nineteenth Century Social Thinkers?'.
H. Medick and A. Leppert-Fbgen, 'Frtlhe Sozialwissenschaft als
Ideologic des Kleinen BUrgertums: John Millar of Glasgow,
1735-1801'.
The last mentioned article will be the object of a special
discussion in Appendix C below.
102. To what extent Smith's many concrete policy proposals are based
on natural justice is an extremely interesting question, the
answer to which, however, is of so Herculean proportions that
it must be renounced here.
CHAPTER IV. NATURAL JUSTICE IN MILLAR AND CRAIG
1. There are a number of problems with the texts, esp. the Sidney,
which are of some importance for the understanding of this Chapter.
I have dealt with these problems in Appendix B, which should be
read first. See also Chapter I (text to note 10).
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2. See 'Life', pp. xxiv-xxv; Elements, I, p. 74; ib. Book I,
Chap. I, Sect. 1; and ib. p. 274.
3. See 'Life', pp. xxvi-xxxviii; Elements, I, Introduction;
Sidney, Letter No. 9.
4. 'Life', p. xxvi; and in the Elements, I, p. 47, Craig claims
that, "Mr. Hume's system ought to be considered as an essential
part of that of Dr. Smith."
5. See 'Life', pp. xxxi-xxxii; Elements, I, pp. 10-15. It is
interesting that Craig in the former place, in discussing the
relationship between aesthetic and moral judgements, compares
Millar with Karnes. And maybe even more interesting that Millar
himself, when elaborating upon this in his Civil Law Lectures,
refers to Burke.
6. Pt. I, Sec. I, Ch. V of the TMS.
7. It seems to me rather significant that Craig on this point
refers to Hume, rather than to Smith (Elements, I, p. 26,
note), and to the Second Book of the Treatise (the reference is
to the seminal paragraph in II, ii, 7, pp. 370-71). It is
things like this which open one's eyes to the possibility that
there is more in common between Hume and Millar-Craig than is
often allowed for. In many ways it would have seemed much more
have
obvious for Craig here to/referred to the final three paragraphs
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of the very first chapter of Smith's Theory of Moral
Sentiments'. Those are the paragraphs on sympathy with the
insane, the baby, and the dead. It seems to me that Craig's
words about Millar very much apply to himself, i.e. that he was,
"A zealous admirer of Mr. Hume's philosophical opinions, which
he had early adopted, ...'. 'Life', lxi.
8. For those points, see Elements, I, pp. 23-31.
9. Elements, I, pp. 19-21. Craig here takes the impartiality of
Smith's spectator somewhat too literally and, with a well-known
mistake, makes him a rather mystical "third man". On this
basis he rejects Smith's idea of the double sympathy involved
in judging of ourselves as too intellectualistic and an
embarassment which makes it impossible for him to explain the
stronger feelings involved in those judgements compared to
judgements of others. Op. cit., pp. 21-22, note.
10. 'Life', xxvii-xxviii; Elements, I, pp. 32-48.
11. Elements, I, pp. 33-37.
12. Although Craig gives no more than the indication of a theory of
obligation (Elements, I, pp. 38-39), it is quite remarkable that
he does so by means of a rather Hume-like idea of association,
whereas Smith's spectator theory is not to be sighted.
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13. Craig lists some of the features of indirect utility which
on the whole weaken it against propriety and direct utility
(Elements, I, pp. 42-47). Craig's treatment of general
rules and indirect utility is somewhat peculiar, for although
there is a connection between them, as he shows, they really
constitute two independent problems. Thus one would expect
that both propriety and direct utility were subject to rules
to a certain extent as well.
14. Elements, I, p. 19, note. Cf. also 'Life', xxvi-xxvii, and
Elements, I, p. 47, note. It cannot be denied that Craig
betrays himself as a rather poor scholar, as far as those basic
moral principles are concerned; and much the same goes for
Millar in the Lectures. At the last mentioned place he sees
Hume as the progenitor of the utility concept; Smith as that of
the idea of sympathetic understanding of utility; and neither
of them as having understood the importance of indirect utility.
But of course all three ideas are to be found, in one form or
another, already in Hume.
15. Elements, I, Book I, ch. 2.
16. Hist. View, IV, Essay 6. Millar does, however, turn to some
of the theoretical points involved, in the following Essay 7,
as we will see. He draws the distinction between self-regarding
and other-regarding virtues, ib. pp. 273-74.
17. Elements, I, pp. 49-62.
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18. Elements, I, p. 47, note.
19. Elements, I, pp. 55-56. But he goes on to point out that as
this "warmth" never reaches the level of resentment and desire
for punishing, it is not strange that religious restrictions
on intemperance are never enforced by law for very long in any
society. It should be noted that in his treatment of the third
personal virtue, fortitude, (pp. 58-62), Craig clearly echoes
Smith's well-known chapter 'Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion
upon the Moral Sentiments', TMS, V. 2.
20. This rather broad meaning of justice seems to be common to all
our four authors.
21. Craig also refers to impropriety in passing, and thus confirms
that an unjust act is improper (which we could not logically
conclude from his statement that propriety is a necessary
condition for justice) .
22. Craig rounds off his Section 'Of the Social Virtues' with a
discussion of those virtues which are a mixture of benevolence
and justice, i.e. those which arise from (a) gratitude,
(b) filial relation, and (c) parental relation (pp. 74-83).
His general point in this discussion is that benevolence is the
prevalent element in those virtues and that it, therefore, cannot
be regarded as injury to neglect them. Accordingly they cannot
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be enforced by law, and already existing laws to that effect
are unjust and ought to be abolished. Those duties should
be purely moral (ii>., 82-83). This latter is an important
theme to which we will return.
23. Hist. View, IV, 272-73.
24. See the previous Essay No. VI on 'The Effects of Commerce and
Manufactures, and of Opulence and Civilization, upon the Morals
of a People', Section iii, 'Of Justice and Generosity'.
(pp. 235-36).
25. The text says "virtue", but this is corrected in the Errata list.
26. Sidney, pp. 44-45. This theme is taken up in our detailed
discussion of the Sidney in Section 9 below.
27. Elements, I, p. 84.
28. Ib., pp. 91-92. Craig does not spell this out in detail here but
refers to his preceeding treatment of those points. It is
interesting that Craig continues to point out that Godwin makes
this doctrine rather vacuous by introducing the idea of "a certain
sphere of discretion" in the 2nd edition of his Political Justice
(cf., however, D.H. Monro, Godwin's Moral Philosophy, pp.117-18).
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29. Hist. View, IV, p. 294. We will return to this important
passage in Millar below, note 37.
30. " ... political conclusions referring altogether to the
condition of man in society, the continuation of natural
rights after the institution of government, is the only
circumstance which can render their original existence a
matter of * practical importance" (Elements, I, pp. 134-35).
The sign * indicates a correction in the printed text. Craig
entered corrections and additions in handwriting in his own copy
of the Elements, which is kept in the Kashnor Collection in the
National Library of Australia in Canberra. I have used this
copy throughout. Most of these notes fall in either of two
categories, (a) stylistic improvements of the text (including
corrections of misprints); (b) political-historical comments
from hind-sight.
31. Quoted by Craig (p. 170) from Du Contrat Social, Liv. I, Chap.
VIII (p. 247 in the Classiques Garnier edition, Paris, 1962).
32. See Elements, I, p. 91, for the division of natural rights into
two broad classes, and see the previous Section for my discussion
of this.
33. See ib., p. 142, " ... when new privileges are to be created,
the language of the law is changed; in place of being
prohibitory it becomes permissive, originating and conferring
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such rights as did not formerly exist."
34. See ib., pp. 113-19, and below Section 7.
35. See ib., p. 144, and cf. p. 152.
36. See ib., pp. 112-22.
37. Most of the points in this whole theory of the existence of
natural rights in society are summarized in less than two pages
by Millar in Hist. View, Vol. IV, pp. 294-95:
"There are natural rights, which belong to mankind antecedent
to the formation of civil society."
They concern our personal safety, the "exercise of our natural
liberty, so far as it does not encroach upon the rights of
others", and our property (gained by occupancy or by labour).
The rights continue to exist in society, but some are modified
and some are resigned (the right to punish; part of our property
(for taxes); and in general "we must yield obedience to the
legislative power"). In all cases we do, however, only give up
rights in order to achieve the general purposes of social life.
It is the ability to combine social life and maximum liberty
that is the testing ground for "the various political systems
which take place in the world".
38. There are some few, obvious exceptions to this, such as
absolutely necessary expropriations, which require "particular laws".
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39. At the outset of this discussion, pp. 94-95, he makes a
distinction between the origin of government, and the
justification of it, and maintains that these two are
completely separate. This and other similar statements
by him are of quite fundamental importance for our evaluation
of the very character of his theory and of its relationship to
that of Hume and Smith; and we will return to it in Section 11.
40. Craig refers to Locke and Sidney, and points out how this
argument had gone out of fashion since their days (ib., p. 97,
note) . Millar made short shrift with this traditional theory
as well, for he "dismissed, as scarcely worthy of refutation,
the doctrine of Divine Right" ('Life', xlix).
41. Hume is not mentioned, but one certainly feels his influence here'.
42. Cf. Elements, I, 336-37, where Craig virtually restates what I
have called Smith's moral theology (cf. Chapter III, Section 8;
and Section 13 of this Chapter).
43. This criticism of tacit consent as well as the idea of the
multiplicity of reasons for why individuals stay in a country,
are also to be found in Millar, Hist.View, IV, pp. 303-304.
44. Cf. Hist. View, IV, p. 301, where Millar makes the redundancy
of the contract clear. It is, of course, Hume's old idea and,
indeed, it is not surprising to hear that Millar in his Lectures
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on Government "was at some pains to enforce Mr. Hume's
objections to the fiction of an Original Compact, long the
favourite opinion of the English Whigs"'. ('Life', xlix-1) .
45. And he criticizes Hume for denying this (p. 126).
46. It is a measure of just how clearly Craig had thought about
his priorities that he condemns the ideology of the French
revolution for fostering this doctrine:
"Most of the writers in favour of the French revolution seem to
have fallen into this mistake. It gave rise indeed to the most
reprehensible articles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man,
and of a Citizen, which preceded the French Constitution of 1791.
The opinion seems to have been adopted, without due consideration,
from the writings of Rousseau." (Elements, I, 156, note).
This footnote and the text to which it is added contains in a
nutshell the clash between the old liberalism and what J.L. Talmon
has called totalitarian democracy. We repeatedly witness how
Millar-Craig's very balanced attitude to the French revolution
springs directly out of their view of politics and the state as
a mere tool for higher purposes.
47. This contrast between rights as fundamental and government as
derivative and a mere means is reflected in another, very interesting
contrast. According to Millar rights are very uniform, whereas
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systems of government vary extremely from one place and time
to another. This difference reflected itself in Millar's
Lectures on Civil Law and on Government respectively; see
'Life', pp. xliii-xliv; and cf. ib., pp. c-cl.
48. See Hist. View, IV, pp. 287-310, and cf. 'Life', p. 1.
49. See Appendix E.
50. The most important passages on which I base my account are:
Hist. View, IV, 275-81; 'Life', pp.xxxiv-xl; and Elements
I, pp. 116-19 and 275-81.
51. Craig stresses this problem and strongly criticizes the fathers
of the French 1791 Constitution for making "the judges dependent
upon popular favour" (Elements, I, p. 276, note).
52. Here is yet again an "aesthetic" idea adapted to the moral
sphere; in a sense it is complementary to the idea of the
unexpected and unusual, which arouses wonder and surprise. Both
ideas, of course, are formulated by Smith.
53. This argument is obviously the "sociology of knowledge" version
of Hume's and Smith's argument against all legal positivism, viz.
that all positive legislation presupposes that men already
have basic ideas of justice and injustice, an argument which,
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of course, follows directly from the doctrine of natural
justice.
It is interesting to speculate that it is the idea of the
limitation on our reasoning faculties and, particularly, the
point that we cannot construct ideas, and hence evaluate,
independently of the elements in the situation surrounding us,
which is the background to Millar's enthusiasm for "the good
old Humean philosophy".
There is a further, rather obvious element in the theory, which
points beyond Hume (and which one need not be a Wittgensteinian
to notice): At least some ideas are not just formed as
reflections of reality; they are formed as part of an ongoing
activity. Apart from being interesting in itself, this is
also of importance in so far as we may here have an indication
of the theoretical background to the (Smithian) idea that a
society which, like a liberal market economy or "commercial
society", increases the activity of the people, is also
productive of new knowledge. This is particularly clear in
Millar's Essays IV, V and VI of Vol. IV of the Hist. View.
It is exactly the same idea which Craig brilliantly uses in
of
arguing for some kind/involvement of the people in the politics
of a society. At the end of Sec. I, Ch. II, Bk. I of the
Elements (I, pp. 178-82) he argues, by means of historical
examples, that all the various aspects of culture have reached
their high points in the wake of political upheavals and
exertions involving the people. This involvement and its
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effects may become permanent, and yet avoid all the
disastrous aspects of political unrest, if a form of
government is introduced which draws in the people. This
view of culture as the concomitant of exertions in active
life is, of course, well-known from Adam Ferguson; and the
argument from educative involvement is the whole point of
de Tocquevilie's defence of democracy in Democracy in
America as well as the argument for democracy which a modern
"old" liberal like von Hayek takes as the strongest available
(see his The Constitution of Liberty, pp. 108-109).
54. See Hist. View, IV, pp. 58, 235ff., 278; and 281: "But
though the rules of justice derive their origin from the
business of the world, and are introduced by the actual
decisions of judges, their extensive utility is likely to
attract the notice of speculative reasoners, and to render
them the subject of criticism and philosophical discussion."
55. In the following I take Sidney as the leading text because it
is the earliest and may be Millar's rather than Craig's. But
there is not much to distinguish one text above the other.
There are some details and elaborations added in the Elements,
and some references to the politics of the 1790's are left
out. There is only one major rearrangement of the argument
(see below, note 58); the material of the first and the final
letter is either scattered elsewhere or left out; and there is
added one full Section, 'Of Sumptuary Laws', which questions
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the expediency of such laws.
56. See John Hicks, A Theory of Economic History, for the broadest
historical perspective.
57. Sidney, p. 27; cf. Elements, II, p. 209.
58. In the Elements this is rearranged so that the decisive argument
of Letter IX (and most of Letter X) comes first (II, pp. 209ff.),
whereas the material of Letters VII and VIII is pp. 218-30; in
many ways a better arrangement.
59. This is particularly well expressed in a passage which exhibits
all the charm of the intelligent political pamphlet, combining clear
principles and day to day politics:
"General reasonings, respecting expediency, may, undoubtedly, direct
the opinions of those, who have leisure and ability to trace the
operation of causes in their most remote effects, and obvious
utility will, in some degree, influence the decisions of all;
but a consent of mankind so universal, as we find taking place
on this subject [of property], must be produced by a sentiment
inseparable from human nature, which can neither be silenced by
partial views of self-interest, nor misled by sophistry. It is
the more necessary, Sir, to investigate these principles, as the
First Minister of State [Pitt] has thought proper lately to declare
[footnote: "In the debate on the Succession Tax."], that the
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right of property is altogether the creature of civil society
[footnote: "Mr. Pitt has borrowed this opinion, without
acknowledgement, from Rousseau - Du Contrat Social, Liv. I,
Chap. IX."]; from which opinion it would incontestably follow,
that a vote is the only criterion of justice, and that the
majority, whenever they are so disposed, have a full right to
equalize property, or to institute a community of goods. I
hope, on the contrary, to be able to show, that a majority
possesses no such rights; that property is defended by the
natural feelings of mankind; and that all levelling, whether
supported by many or by few, must occasion the greatest
injustice." (Sidney, 43-44).
60. See the admirably clear passage to this effect in Sidney pp. 44-45
(Elements, II, pp. 210-211). I deal with this passage in
Appendix C.
61. A footnote refers to "Hume's Essays, Part I, Essay V". This is
'Of the Origin of Government', and the relevant passage is
Essays, I, p. 114.
62. In this connection it is important to notice that Millar is
quite clear about the social dangers if "utilitarian"
considerations become too prevalent. In Hist. View, IV,
pp. 260ff. he argues that when justice in "opulent and luxurious
nations" comes to be judged more and more by "considerations of
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interest", then there is a danger that some people may find
that their interest lies somewhere else. This can have
catastrophic consequences. His examples are the Roman
provincial governors and modern mercantile companies with a
monopoly on trade "in very distant countries". Millar
undoubtedly had the East India Company in mind.
63. This is in the Elements, II, pp. 214-15.
64. This corresponds to Elements, II, pp. 215-18.
65. In view of this very balanced view of inequality of property
and in view of the complete and emphatic rejection of all
levelling both in Sidney and in Craig's Elements, it is
surprising, or maybe not so surprising, that R.L. Meek in his
essay on 'The Decline of Ricardian Economics in England' says
that,
"A significant number of economists was at this time becoming
conscious of the fact that the labouring classes were beginning
to think for themselves and to question the moral validity of
the foundations of the social structure. In his Elements of
Political Science, published in 1814, John Craig could remark
that 'the fear of levelling is altogether chimerical'". (Meek,
Economics and Ideology, p. 69. The reference in the Elements
is II, p. 230). This leads one to think that for Craig
levelling was not all that bad an idea; whereas his real
standpoint is that this fear of levelling is "chimerical",
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1) because levelling is so patently against natural justice
that virtually everyone would reject it out of hand; 2) because
it stems from a false interpretation of historical cases of
"levelling", which, in his view, were all concerned with civil,
and not natural rights'. As to "the moral validity of the
foundations of the social structure", the point of the argument
in the Sidney and in the Elements is that certain aspects of
this structure are immoral, in that they are unjust; but, on
the other hand, all schemes of levelling are much more immoral
by the same token.
66. Cf. Elements, II, p. 239.
67. Sidney, p. 54. Letter No. XI corresponds to Elements, II, pp.
239-45; letter No. XII to pp. 245-51.
68. Letter No. XIII = Elements, II, pp. 251-57; letter No. XIV =
Elements, II, pp. 257-63.
69. Entail obviously succumbs to the same argument (Letter No. XIV,
Elements, II, pp. 261-63).
70. Cf. Elements. II, pp. 263-70. The distinction between necessaries
and luxuries (or superfluities) is, of course, well-known from
Smith (W.o.N., V, ii, k), and we have mentioned it briefly in
note 83 to Chapter III. It seems obvious that it is this
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distinction which leads Craig so close to seeing the
connection between marginal utility and value in the Remarks
on Some Fundamental Doctrines in Political Economy. It
should be noticed that both in the Letters of Sidney and in
the Elements there is an attempt to distinguish between three
categories: "necessaries, comforts, and superfluities"
(Sidney, p. 75). This seems to be an attempt to refine
Smith's troublesome distinction - maybe in light of the fact
that Smith really has two different distinctions, as pointed
out in my note mentioned above. As becomes clear later in
the Elements (Book III, Part II, Chap. II, Sects, i and ii),
Craig associates this distinction with the broad division of
society into the labouring poor, the middling ranks, and the
rich; and it also provides the framework for his discussion
'Of Taxes on consumable Commodities'.
71. It will be noticed that all those arguments rely on the usual,
allied pairs of opposites:
the natural vs. the deliberately created
the unchangeable vs. the changeable
justice vs. utility
rights vs. statute.
The idea of artificiality vs. nature is conspicuous for its
absence. It would have caused nearly as much havoc in this
list of opposites, as did /2 in that of the Pythagoreans.
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72. This discussion of the Letters of Sidney is taken up again in
Appendix C in the context of a rival interpretation. This
discussion is complementary to the one presented in this
Section.
73. Cf. Smith, W.o.N., I, x, ii.
74. Exceptions are the political, and anonymous, pamphlets Crito
and Sidney, the latter of which may not be by Millar; cf.
Appendix B.
75. See the literature referred to in Section 16 of Chapter III
above.
76. The bulk of Millar's published work is a detailed application
of Smith's theories, primarily in the context of Great Britain,
but also a good deal of other historical material is dealt with.
77. See Chapter III, Section 16 above.
78. Cf. Skinner's interpretation of Smith by means of Engels's idea
of the "economic" as the "ultimate"'. See Chapter III, Section 16,
and note 82.
79. See Hist. View, IV, pp. 282-83, and 'Life', xxiii-xxv.
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80. Hist. View, IV, pp. 283-84, and 'Life', xxiv-xxv.
81. Hist View, IV, pp. 284-85, and 'Life', xxv-xxvi.
82. Hist. View, IV, pp. 281 and 284.
83. He is describing how Millar's work on bringing the Hist. View
up to his own time (i.e. what really should have been Vol. IV)
was interrupted by his involvement in the debate about the
Revolution and the war.
84. Hans Medick has clearly seen that Craig's work has this
"grosse disziplingeschichtliche Bedeutung"; but he has not
sufficiently clearly seen that the crucial move is the discarding
of history from any theoretical role. Seeing nothing in Craig's
work but a plagiarism of Millar, he takes the latter and, through
him, Smith as the founder of political science as an independent
discipline. See Medick, Naturzustand und Naturgeschichte der
biirgerlichen Gesellschaft, Ch. VI, Sec. 2, esp. pp. 187-89.
85. See Elements, I, pp. 278-80.
system
86. Craig, of course, means an abstract/of law, as is clear from the
context.
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87. Cf. Elements, I, 345: "That degree of resentment ... which
all mankind acknowledge to be just, or rather the indignation
excited by crimes in the breast of impartial spectators, is the
great original foundation of the right of punishment, and
furnishes the standard by which its just degree may, in every
case, be ascertained."
88. Craig is here clearly taking over what I called Smith's "moral
theology"; See Chapter III, Section 8; and cf. also note 42 to
the present Chapter.
89. See Elements, I, 340-42, esp. p. 342: "Whether there be what
might be termed absolute desert, or whether man, if capable of
comprehending at one glance the infinite progression of moral
and physical causes, might continue to judge of merit and
demerit as he does at present, is a consideration totally
foreign to our enquiries. It is enough that no individual
has ever existed, to whom, in real life ... the ideas of merit,
justice, and retribution, did not seem essential parts of human
nature."
Craig seems to be getting at the idea that punishment presupposes
something between absolute determinism and absolute indeterminism,
for the whole idea of punishment is to "softly" determine, or
"influence", the offender. Absolute indeterminism, in the sense
of arbitrariness, would exclude this. Absolute determinism is not
presupposed, and it is beyond humans to establish or refute it.
Cf. my analogous speculations in connection with Smith's view of
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history, Chapter III, Section 16.
90. See Chapter III, Sections 10 and 11, and esp. note 39.
91. This distinction between the rules of natural justice and
formal laws is obviously closely connected with the distinction
between nature and artifice. The location of this distinction
has, however, obviously changed somewhat between Hume and
Craig.
Concerning Craig's "anti-law" philosophy in general it should be
remarked that it undoubtedly has some reference to the general
debate in Scotland about legal reforms (esp. jury trial) in those
years. About this debate, see N.T. Phillipson, The Scottish
Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session, 1785-1830.
EPILOGUE
1. In the case of Hist. View Millar's son-in-law, James Mylne, was
co-editor.
2. James Mill, Review of Hist. View in The Literary Journal or
Universal Review of Literature Domestic and Foreign.
3. Mill's description of Hume's philosophical history is extremely
interesting and clear:
"Mr. Hume was the first author who exhibited the complete union
of history and philosophy. Not satisfied with composing a more
elegant narrative, than had been done by any one before him, of
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the military transactions of his country, of the succession
of her kings, and the principal events of their lives, the
business of the common historian; he proposed to himself as
a particular object to describe the mode in which the people,
at every particular period, were sorted, and arranged, the mode
in which they were connected together, the mode in which they
were governed, and the mode in which they lived both at home, by
themselves, and in the state with others. The last and great
point to complete the philosophical delineation, was to point
out the manner in which the principles of human nature operated
in conjunction with the circumstances in which the people were
placed, to produce the political changes; and thus to refer
particular facts to general laws, the real business of philosophy."
(Mill, op. cit., 325-26).
4. Mill, op. cit., p. 326.
5. James Mill, Review of Ranks in The Literary Journal or Universal
Review of Literature Domestic and Foreign.
6. Mill, op. cit., p. 625.
7. Mill, op. cit., p. 629.
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APPENDIX A. NATURAL OBLIGATION IN HUME
1. Hobbes's theory of obligation is extremely complicated and
hopelessly contradictory in places. This has sparked off
a very extensive literature during the past generation or
more. In my Danish prize-dissertation on Sammenhaengen
mellem Hobbes's metafysik og hans statsteori (The
Connection between Hobbes's Metaphysics and His Political
Theory), University of Aarhus, 1970, I tried to show that he
has two different concepts of obligation, a) a natural
obligation-of-the-will which is caused by the laws of nature,
and b) a moral obligation which arises from self - imposed
covenants (op. cit., pp. 110-121).
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APPENDIX B. THE WORKS OF MILLAR AND CRAIG
1. First published in 1771 under the title Observations Concerning
the Distinction of Ranks in Society. All references are to the
fourth edition, Edinburgh 1806.
2. The first edition (1787) and the second edition (1790) only
took the history "to the Accession of the House of Stewart",
but in the posthumous third edition (1803) the editors, J. Craig
and J. Mylne, incorporated a volume covering the period to 1688,
which was ready for the press, as well as a volume of Dissertations,
as indicated by the title. I am referring to this third edition
(in four volumes). For the details on Millar's writings, see
Lehmann, John Millar of Glasgow, 1735-1801, Ch. VI, and pp. 415-16.
3. John Craig, 'Account of the Life and Writings of John Millar,
Esq.', p. lxxxvi. This 'Life' prefaces Craig's edition of
the Ranks (1806).
4. First as letters to the Editor in Scots Chronicle (Edinburgh)
from May to September 1796. Republished in pamphlet form same
year. See Lehmann, op. cit., pp. 56, 404, and 418; and Medick
and Leppert-FBgen, 'Frtihe Sozialwissenschaft als Ideologie des
kleinen BUrgertums: John Millar of Glasgow, 1735-1801', pp. 23-24.
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5. First published in part as letters to the Editor in Scots
Chronicle, August to November 1796; published in full as
a pamphlet same year. See Lehmann, op.cit.; Medick and
Leppert-FOgen, op. cit.; and Medick, Naturzustand und
Naturgeschichte der bhrgerlichen Gesellschaft, p. 187,
note 42.
6. See Lehmann, op. cit., pp. 56, 60, and esp. Appendix II for
a discussion of this point and generally about Millar's
possible anonymous works.
7. Lehmann, op. cit., p. 56, and cf. ib., pp. 404-405.
8. Op. cit., p. 405.
9. Medick, op. cit., p. 187, note 42.
10. Medick, op. cit.; and Medick and Leppert-FOgen, op. cit.
p. 24 and p. 43, note 29. Craig's Elements was published in
three volumes in Edinburgh, 1814.
11. Millar was not only Craig's professor, but also his uncle.
12. Lehmann, op. cit., p. 404.
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13. Someone must have seen this possibility before. On the
title page of the copy of Sidney preserved in the Edinburgh
Public Library is added, by hand and in old ink, "By John
Craig, Esq.". It is, however, not in Craig's handwriting!
14. Although Medick, op. cit., p. 186, note 41, believes that
one set of student notes is a transcript of Millar's own
lecture notes. But see Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble
Savage for a note of caution (note 143, p. 165).
15. For very general descriptions of these lecture notes, see
Lehmann, op. cit., pp. 57-58 and 407-409; and Medick, op.
cit., pp. 185-189. Both Lehmann and Medick think that the
notes on Millar's Lectures on the Science of Government ought
to be published in some form, and Medick (op. cit., p. 186,
note 41) actually promises to do so. It is much to be hoped
that this will happen.
16. Medick, op. cit., pp. 185-189.
17. Op. cit., p. 187, note 42.
APPENDIX C. MILLAR: "IDE0L0GE DES KLEINEN BURGERTUMS"?
1. Hans Medick and Annette Leppert-Fbgen, 'Frtihe Sozialwissenschaft
als Ideologic des kleinen BUrgertums: John Millar of Glasgow,
1735-1801'.
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2. These quotations are from Smith's W.o.N., I, iv, 1. Smith
and Millar are taken by our authors as being in much the same
quagmire, Millar being the deeper in it. Concerning Smith,
see also Medick, Naturzustand und Naturgeschichte, pp. 287ff.,
where the author levels much the same criticisms against Smith
as the present ones against Millar. It is, in my opinion,
particularly unfortunate that Medick rounds off his discussion
of Smith with this ill-founded criticism, for his treatment of
Smith in chapter VI is the one in the whole Smith literature
which comes closest to an adequate account of the integrated
role of history in Smith's theory of natural justice (although
there is no suggestion about the exact nature of the normative
basis).
3. All references in brackets in this Appendix are to Medick and
Leppert-FOgen, op. cit.
4. Medick and Leppert-FOgen refer to Locke: "Millar schliesst
sich in den 'Letters of Sidney' explicit der Lockeschen
Arbeitslegitimation des Eigentums an; s. den Hinweis auf
das klassische Kap. V des II. 'Treatise of Government' in
Sidney IX, 45." (P. 44, note 50). The authors take it as
established that Sidney is by Millar. We have disputed this
above, but to simplify the argument of the present Appendix,
we will leave it alone. Whether Millar or Craig wrote the
Letters, our authors are equally wrong.
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5. Sidney, p. 23; quoted by Medick and Leppert-Fbgen, p. 30.
6. Sidney, pp. 44-45; repeated in Elements, II, pp. 210-211,
where Craig at the end adds a reference to "Karnes's Hist.
Law Tracts, Tract III".
7. I have italicized the "seems" which I suggest is to be read
as "seems to the spectators".
8. This is repeated in Elements, II, 211-212.
9. Ranks, p. 231; quoted by Medick and Leppert-FOgen, p. 29.
10. Hist. View, IV, pp. 130-31.
11. It is, in view of this, a strange misunderstanding when Medick
and Leppert-FOgen, p.23,say that it is Parliament which, according
to Millar, should distribute property. All Parliament should
do is, of course, to abolish the old inheritance laws and then
let the distribution of property run its own course, Millar
being confident that this would mean less excessive inequality.
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APPENDIX D. TENSIONS IN MILLAR?
1. Schneider, 'Tension in the Thought of John Millar'.
2. Schneider, op. cat.pp. 2089-2090.
3. And this even applies to the Catholic Church which Schneider
makes so much of.
4. See Millar's very balanced, and curiously overlooked, judgement
of modern society in Hist. View, IV, pp. 253-55.
APPENDIX E. CRAIG ON POLITICAL POWER
1. See Chapter IV, Section 7.
2. This is mentioned in note 53 to Chapter IV.
3. Elements, I, pp. 202-205. In 1841 Craig added the following
interesting note in hand on p. 204 (it is appended to the
paragraph ending " ... enormous fortunes"):
"These observations have been confirmed by the open venality of
the Boroughs in which the freemen, mostly people of the lowest
classes, have unfortunately continued as electors under the
Reform act ... 1841 ..."
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4. After rejecting Hume's idea of double elections (which was
tried out in France in 1791, and endorsed by Macintosh) as
an alternative to restrictions in universal suffrage, Craig
adopts the latter (pp. 208ff.). But in 1830 he added in
hand a long note discussing the possibility of the ballot.
It is at the bottom of pp. 208-211:
"Another plan for checking the corruption attendant on Uni.
Suffrage is the Ballot. As a voter after being bribed might
disregard his promise, it is conceived that no person would
bribe him. Mankind however are not sufficiently base to
destroy all confidence in their promises - The ancients founded
freedom on Virtue; some moderns think it rests more safely on
the lowest degradation of the people. Ballot, too, along with
Un. suff. would destroy that influence of the higher orders
which would be necessary to prevent Laws from being dictated by
ignorance or partial interest - Destruction of [one word illegible]
Machines in England. 1830.
Whether Ballot might be useful with a moderate qualification may
admit of doubt - probably it would be nugatory."
It is impossible to say whether the final paragraph was added
later than the preceding.. The ink and the handwriting are
rather uneven in both parts.
5. Craig introduces this argument in dismissing the well-known
criticism of universal suffrage, that it would be subversive
of property (Elements, I, pp. 196-202).
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6. If he had maintained the importance of formal law, he would
undoubtedly have found more substantive tasks for the upper
house, namely in securing the justice of such law. As it stands,
Craig does not seem to see much more in the senate than a
duplicate house of representatives, elected in a slightly
unusual way. In this he contrasts interestingly with a modern,
liberal proposal for a senate, that of F.A. von Hayek;
but then Hayek is a great believer in formal law. See esp.
Hayek, The Confusion of Language in Political Thought, and
his Law, Lesiglation, and Liberty, Vol. 1; and as far as
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